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Abstract
Researchers have used various measures as indications of “earnings quality” including persistence,
accruals, smoothness, timeliness, loss avoidance, investor responsiveness, and external indicators such
as restatements and SEC enforcement releases. For each measure, we discuss causes of variation in the
measure as well as consequences. We reach no single conclusion on what earnings quality is because
“quality” is contingent on the decision context. We also point out that the “quality” of earnings is a
function of the firm’s fundamental performance. The contribution of a firm’s fundamental performance to
its earnings quality is suggested as one area for future work.
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Understanding earnings quality:
A review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences

Patricia Dechow
Weili Ge
Catherine Schrand

Over the years, researchers have devised various measures of “earnings quality” to represent
decision usefulness in specific decision contexts. These measures, however, have become
proxies for “earnings quality” in a generic sense, absent a decision context. The result is that
some papers use a proxy for earnings quality that does not match the hypothesized form of
decision usefulness in their study, but they nonetheless find results that are consistent with their
hypothesis. Other papers are intentionally agnostic and find robust results across multiple
proxies for earnings quality. The fact that researchers find consistent and robust results across
proxies suggests that there is common component to the various measures of quality, which is
the firm’s fundamental earnings process. Existing research does not clearly distinguish the
impact of a firm’s fundamental earnings process on the decision usefulness (“quality”) of its
earnings from the impact of the application of accounting measurement to that process.
Research attention has focused on earnings management that reduces the reliability of earnings
rather than on the ability of specific features of an accrual-based accounting system to provide a
more decision-useful measure, conditional on the firm’s fundamental earnings process.
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Understanding earnings quality:
A review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences

We begin with a definition of “earnings quality” that sets the scope of our review. Higher
quality earnings more faithfully represent the features of the firm’s fundamental earnings process
that are relevant to a specific decision made by a specific decision-maker. Our definition implies
that the term “earnings quality” is meaningless without specifying the decision context, because the
relevant features of the firm’s fundamental earnings process differ across decisions and decision
makers. Consistent with this broad definition, we review approximately 350 published papers on
earnings.1 We do not require that the researcher use the term earnings quality.
This broad scope is motivated by the varied and often imprecise use of the term “earnings
quality” by practitioners (including regulators, enforcement agencies, and courts), the financial
press, and academic researchers. Lev (1989) popularized the adjective “quality” as a descriptive
characteristic of earnings for academic researchers when he stated that one explanation for low R2s
in earnings/returns models is that: “No serious attempt is being made to question the quality of the
reported earnings numbers prior to correlating them with returns.” Lev’s statement implicitly
suggests that he defines earnings quality as decision-usefulness in the context of equity valuation
decisions.
This use of the term “quality” is consistent with O’Glove’s practitioner-oriented financial
statement analysis textbook, Quality of Earnings, published in 1987, and even with Graham and
Dodd’s use of the term in Security Analysis, published in 1934. Graham and Dodd describe the Wall
1

We searched four journals starting with the first issue (in parentheses) through 2008: Contemporary Accounting
Research (1984), Journal of Accounting and Economics (1980), Journal of Accounting Research (1964), and Review of
Accounting Studies (1996). We searched The Accounting Review from 1970 through 2008. We added articles from
other journals and working papers to the extent we are aware of them, but we did not perform a systematic review to find
them.
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Street equity valuation model as earnings per share times a “coefficient of quality” where the quality
coefficient reflects firm-specific characteristics such as dividend policy, as well as “size, reputation,
financial position and prospects,” the nature of the firm’s operations, and macro factors including
“temper of the general market.”
Accounting researchers continue to use the descriptor quality in reference to the
decision-usefulness of earnings in equity market valuation, but use of the term has been
extended to other contexts as well, likely because of our conversational understanding of the
term quality as an indication of superiority or excellence. This evolution of a term such as
earnings quality to its current state of ambiguity is not unique. Schelling (1978) describes the
phenomenon:
Each academic profession can study the development of its own language. Some
terms catch on and some don’t. A hastily chosen term that helps meet a need gets
initiated into the language before anybody notices what an inappropriate term it is.
People who recognize that a term is a poor one use it anyway in a hurry to save
thinking of a better one, and in collective laziness we let inappropriate terminology
into our language by default. Terms that once had accurate meanings become
popular, become carelessly used, and cease to communicate with accuracy.
Our approach in this review is to embrace the fact that earnings quality is a multi-faceted
term. We therefore expand the scope of the review beyond studies of the decision-usefulness of
earnings in an equity valuation context. We identify the various proxies that have been used to
measure earnings quality, evaluate the various attributes of decision usefulness (i.e., “quality”) that
researchers have measured, and point out the strengths and weaknesses of each measure. We also
identify circumstances where researchers obtain conflicting results because of ambiguity in what is
meant by “quality” or differences due to the choice of earnings quality proxy.2

2

A number of survey papers of earnings quality and/or earnings management predate this review: Healy and Wahlen
(1999); Dechow and Skinner (2000); McNichols (2000); Fields, Lys, and Vincent (2001); Imhoff (2003); Penman
(2003); Nelson, Elliott, and Tarpley (2003); Schipper and Vincent (2003); Dechow and Schrand (2004); Francis, Olsson,
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An important feature of our review is the method we use to organize our discussion of the
papers. We apply the approach that Chronbach and Meehl (1955) suggest to assess the validity of a
latent construct in general to the specific case of earnings quality. For each paper, we identify its
proxy for earnings quality. We use three broad earnings quality (EQ) categories: (i) statistical
properties of earnings; (ii) investor responsiveness to earnings; and (iii) external indicators of
financial reporting quality. The properties of earnings category includes: a) persistence and accruals,
b) earnings smoothness, c) asymmetric timeliness and timely loss recognition; and d) benchmarking,
in which the distance of earnings from a benchmark is viewed as a measure of its quality (e.g., small
profits). The investor responsiveness to earnings category includes papers that use an earnings
response coefficient (ERC) as a measure of earnings informativeness or earnings quality. The
category for external indicators of financial reporting quality includes: AAERs, restatements, and
internal control procedure deficiencies reported under SOX. Table 1, Panel A, lists the EQ proxies
and the sections of this survey in which we discuss them. Exhibit 1 provides a brief summary of the
intuition behind each measure and comments on its use as a proxy for earnings quality. By
juxtaposing the papers against other papers that examine the same EQ proxy, we are able to draw
conclusions about the contexts in which the proxy is decision-useful.
We then classify the papers into two groups according to whether they provide evidence on
1) the determinants of the earnings quality proxy, or 2) the consequences of the earnings quality
proxy. Table 1, Panels B and C, list the categories of determinants and consequences. The
determinants papers propose or test theories about features of the firm (or the firm’s environment)
that cause an earnings outcome; the earnings quality proxy is the dependent variable in the analysis.
The consequences papers propose or test theories about earnings quality that cause an outcome; the
and Schipper (2006); Lo (2008). These reviews typically provide a definition of earnings quality in an equity valuation
context and discuss only the literature related to that definition.
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earnings quality proxy is the independent variable in the analysis.3 We perform a second sort of the
papers by either the hypothesized determinant or the hypothesized consequence of earnings quality.
Juxtaposing the papers against other papers that examine the same determinant (or the same
consequence) provides an efficient means to informally assess the convergent and divergent validity
of the proxies. That is, we can examine whether determinants that should be related to the various
proxies in the same way are, and whether the proxies that should not be related are not. The double
sorting therefore allows us to more easily identify patterns of mixed and missing evidence. Figures
1 and 2 provide an overview of the studies we have reviewed.
In Section 2, we summarize our key findings about the literature taken as a whole and our
conclusions for each specific earnings quality proxy. We also provide a list of ten additional
findings, some of which offer suggestions for future research. The detailed discussions of the papers
that support the conclusions follow in Sections 3 through 6. Readers that want to view the evidence
organized by the EQ proxy should read Sections 3 and 4. Readers that want to view the evidence
organized by determinant or consequence should read Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 concludes.

2. Summary of findings
Figure 1 (Figure 2) reports the number of papers that examine the various determinants
(consequences) of each earnings quality proxy. Figure 3 combines the information in Figures 1 and
2 to give a quick preview of the various links that have been examined by researchers. Figure 4
provides a graphical representation of whether researchers validated their earnings quality proxy by
showing that the proxy was also correlated with another proxy (e.g., documenting that SEC
3

Chronbach and Meehl (1955) describe the determinants and consequences as part of the nomological network in which
a construct occurs. The nomological network is the interlocking system of laws which may relate (a) observable
properties or quantities to each other; or (b) theoretical constructs to observables; or (c) different theoretical constructs to
one another which set forth the laws in which the construct occurs.
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enforcement firms have high discretionary accruals). The conclusions below are based on the
review of the literature represented in Figures 1 through 4.

2.1 Overall conclusions
A somewhat unsatisfying feature of this survey for readers is that we do not suggest that
there is a single best proxy for earnings quality that is appropriate for all decision contexts. In fact,
an overriding message of the survey is that earnings quality is context-specific, and thus our
assessment of the ability of each measure to capture decision usefulness is also context specific. The
commonly used proxies for EQ, however, vary with respect to the degree to which they measure
decision-usefulness across different types of decisions, and hence there is no overall best measure.
Our review of the proxies provides evidence on which types of useful information each EQ proxy
captures.
All of the proxies for earnings quality that involve earnings (i.e., properties such as
persistence as well as the ERCs) have at their core the reported accrual-based earnings number.
Reported accrual-based earnings are a function of “fundamental” earnings (X), which are
unobservable, as well as the accounting system that imperfectly measures X:

Reported Earnings = Function of (X) + error induced by accounting system (e)

Fundamental earnings (X) represents the output of the firm’s production function or business
model and can be thought of as the expected cash flows generated during the period that could be
annuitized to obtain the fundamental value of the firm, alternatively referred to as perpetual earnings.
Throughout the review, we use the term “fundamental earnings process” to represent X. The quality
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of fundamental earnings will be a function of the operating cycle, macro business condition,
investment opportunity set, managerial skill, and other features of the firm. The “error” term
represents the ability of the accounting system to measure the firm’s fundamental earnings process.
There may be a feedback loop: the accounting measurement system could influence management’s
behavior that in turn changes “fundamental” earnings and its quality. For example, not requiring the
expensing of stock options could result in greater stock option usage than otherwise would occur,
which could affect risk taking behavior, which will in turn affect the fundamental earnings process.
Since all of the EQ proxies involve reported earnings, they all are affected by both the
fundamental earnings process as well as the ability of the accounting system to measure the process.
There are multiple reasons that the accounting measurement system captures the fundamental
process with error. The standard setters are working with a different measurement system in mind
(e.g., focusing on fair valuing assets and liabilities and measuring earnings as the change in wealth).
Management make poor forecasts that affect accrual estimation (e.g., forecasting the level of returns
incorrectly) or that affect real decisions (e.g., overinvesting in inventory or PPE, requiring a
subsequent write down). Items that should be expensed are ignored (e.g., expected environment
liabilities, bad investments). Firms structure transactions to get around undesirable accounting
implications (leasing, securitizations, stock options).
As accountants, one important area of research should evaluate the ability of the accounting
system to measure different types of earnings processes. That is, we should focus on the “e” term.
Another important area of research should examine when reported earnings, in total, are of higher
quality. Both types of research are important for understanding earnings quality.
Our point is that the current research does not adequately recognize the distinction between
the fundamental earnings process and the measurement of the process, which limits the conclusions
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we can make, as a profession, to statements about the quality of the earnings as a whole rather than
about the contribution of accounting measurement to the quality of reported earnings. We turn to
Graham and Dodd for a lucid characterization of this issue and to emphasize the essential nature of
the problem:
Most important of all, the analyst must recognize that the value of a particular
kind of data varies greatly with the type of enterprise which is being studied. The
five-year record of gross or net earnings of a railroad or a large chain-store
enterprise may afford, if not a conclusive, at least a reasonably sound basis for
measuring the safety of the senior issues and the attractiveness of the common
shares. But the same statistics supplied by one of the smaller oil-producing
companies may well prove more deceptive than useful, since they are chiefly the
resultant of two factors, viz., price received and production, both of which are
likely to be radically different in the future than in the past. (p. 33/34)
To better understand this deficiency in the literature, we estimate correlations between the
commonly used earnings quality proxies.4 Table 2 shows that the correlations between most of the
EQ proxies are positive and statistically significant, but they are not generally economically
significant. For example, the correlation between timely loss recognition and persistence is less than
two percent. Moreover, all EQ proxies have a negative correlation with the smoothness proxies.
These correlations suggest that there is a common driver of the EQ proxies, which at least in
part will be the firm’s unobservable fundamental earnings process. The degree to which the
unobservable fundamental earnings process affects each proxy varies, as does the degree to which
the proxy is affected by the accounting measurement system. All of the proxies reflect both
elements, but the proxies are not equally affected by these two factors.
Given the fundamental component of the proxies, studies that examine determinants and
consequences of the EQ proxies, measured using reported earnings, cannot identify the unique

4

For illustrative purposes, we measure each variable using a common specification. All proxies are defined to be
increasing in “quality.” For example, we use the additive inverse of the Dechow/Dichev abnormal accruals measure
because, in the literature, larger absolute errors are assumed to represent lower quality.
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contributions of the fundamental component from the ability of the accounting system to measure
the process. For example, studies predict and find a negative relation between large absolute
discretionary accruals and both the number of independent directors of a firm and auditor size,
suggesting that both independent variables are determinants of earnings quality. The prediction
assumes that these parties affect EQ through their influence on the financial reporting process.
While the studies make various attempts to control for the fundamental earnings process, they
generally cannot reject the hypothesis that they are finding a correlation between their hypothesized
determinant or consequence and the fundamental component of quality.
For example, the most significant area of research in terms of the sheer volume of published
papers is on the determinants and consequences of abnormal accruals derived from accrual models.
Exhibit 2 provides a summary of the most commonly used approaches to measuring abnormal
accruals. The accruals models attempt to control for the accruals that are related to the firm’s
fundamental earnings process, calling them normal, non-discretionary, or innate accruals. But, many
of the controls that are used are measured by reported accrual-based earnings associated with the
process (growth in sales revenue, for example). Thus, the accruals models may distinguish normal
accruals from the component that represents discretion, but the normal or innate accruals do not
necessarily adequately capture the fundamental earnings process.
Researchers could make positive predictions about how determinants would differentially
affect specific quality proxies or about different consequences of the proxies. The testable
hypotheses are generally derived from decision models and the models suggest a specific form of
decision usefulness (i.e., earnings quality). Most theories would not predict a relation with all
proxies, or at least would not predict an equally strong relation with all. But researchers typically do
not conduct such analyses. In fact, the studies that test theories by examining multiple proxies for
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earnings quality often suggest that the study’s findings are robust to alternative specifications of
earnings quality. The results are consistent across the proxies, but we question whether they should
be.
In summary, our wide-ranging finding across all the EQ proxies is that we have not
adequately separated the unobservable dimension of quality related to the fundamental earnings
process from the ability of the accounting measurement process to contribute to the quality of
reported earnings. The research attempts to separate abnormal accruals from normal accruals, but
the distinction between the normal accruals and X as a source of reported earnings quality is still an
open question.
In the remainder of this section, we summarize our specific findings on each individual EQ
proxy (Sections 2.2.1 through 2.2.3). Detailed discussions of the papers and justification for the
conclusions are discussed in the survey section noted. Exhibit 1 provides an overview of each
proxy, its strengths and its weakness, and how fundamentals and measurement error in the
accounting system are likely to affect the proxy. In Section 2.3, we outline additional conclusions
based on our survey of the entirety of the network of studies, with some suggestions of future
research opportunities.

2.2 Specific findings on each EQ proxy
2.2.1 Properties of earnings
Earnings persistence and accruals (Section 3.1.1): A considerable number of studies provide
evidence on the ability of reported earnings, and various components of earnings, to predict future
cash flows relative to cash flows or other earnings metrics. Another set of studies examines earnings
persistence directly, typically using an approach that measures the incremental contributions of
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accruals, in total or individually, and cash flows to earnings persistence. Researchers have
partitioned the accruals in many ways in an attempt to characterize the effect of accruals on
persistence. For example, researchers have examined normal vs. abnormal accruals, extreme
accruals (in magnitude), more vs. less reliable accruals, operating vs. investment accruals, short-term
vs. long-term accruals, and even specific accounts. A broad summarization of the findings is that the
cash flow component is more persistent than the accrual component of earnings, and that the
abnormal accrual component is less persistent than the normal accrual component of earnings. (See
Section 3.1.1.)
The research on persistence does not generally separate the contributions of the fundamental
earning process (X) and the measurement of the process (e) to the persistence of reported earnings.
The studies that examine the incremental persistence of accruals to cash flows are not sufficient to
segregate the effects of “X” from “e” because current cash flows do not represent the fundamental
earnings process, and in fact, the premise of accrual-based accounting is that accrual-based earnings
should provide better information about fundamental earnings than current cash flows. Several
studies do provide direct evidence on how the application of accounting measurement rules to
specific earnings processes (or features of a process) affects EQ outcomes. Penman and Zhang
(2002), for example, show that expensing costs that have future benefits will lead to higher future
earnings as the future benefits are “realized” in earnings, but the slowing of these expensed
“investments” can lead to transitory boosts in earnings. As a consequence, increases in capitalized
investments will likely lead to errors such that the currently observed return on assets is not
sustainable. Lev and Sougiannis (1996) suggest that the expensing of R&D can lead to an earnings
stream that does not reflect growth in the fundamental earnings process.
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In summary, while we may be able to characterize earnings persistence and conclude that
firms with more persistent earnings have more accurate equity valuations, which implies greater
decision usefulness, we have relatively less to say about the importance of the measurement process
in reaching these conclusions. By clarifying and distinguishing between fundamentals and the
accounting measurement system, more insights could be obtained about the role of the measurement
system itself.

Earnings smoothness (Section 3.1.2): As noted in the introduction, the commonly-used smoothness
proxies are negatively correlated with the other EQ proxies (Table 1). Because smoothness is based
on the reported earnings number, it will have a fundamental component that represents the
smoothness of the firm’s fundamental earnings process. The other EQ proxies such as persistence,
timeliness, or value-relevance, however, also are affected by the fundamental earnings process and
the application of the measurement system to that process. Hence, the negative correlation suggests
that the application of accounting measurement to the fundamental process does not have the same
impact on resulting smoothness properties of reported earnings as it does for the other proxies.5
Another finding that is different for smoothness than for the other EQ proxies is that the limited
literature that has examined the use of discretionary accruals to artificially smooth earnings (by U.S.
firms) suggests that smoothing is value-relevant rather than opportunistic (e.g., Subramanyam, 1996,
and Tucker and Zarowin, 2005).

5

Ewert and Wagenhofer (2009) just recently distributed a working paper that models a firm’s accounting choices over a
single earnings process and measures various properties of the reported earnings including smoothness, persistence, and
value relevance. Each of these commonly used proxies for earnings quality is evaluated relative to an unobservable but
known construct in their model that represents the reduction in the variance of the terminal value in an equity valuation
model associated with reported earnings. Likewise, Basu (1997) shows that persistence, asymmetric timeliness, and
ERCs are related properties.
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While we identify these contradictions between smoothness and the other EQ proxies, we are
short on explanations. There is little research that attempts to ascertain the “normal” component of
smoothness that results from unbiased application of an accrual process to the firm’s unobservable
fundamental earnings process. As shown in Figure 1, only three papers in our database examine
fundamental firm characteristics and smoothness proxies and one finds negative evidence.
Smoothness has generated more consistent results as a proxy for earnings quality, and in particular
for earnings management, in cross-country studies. The international evidence suggests that there is
a significant component of smoothness that is artificial and that represents opportunistic earnings
management. This finding, which contrasts with the limited findings in the U.S., may result from
the ability to create a smoothness proxy that captures cross-sectional variation in artificial smoothing
or earnings management. In international studies, researchers typically benchmark earnings
smoothness against the smoothness of operating cash flows (e.g., Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003).
In these settings, the cross-sectional variation in the discretionary component of smoothness may
dominate the measurement error in the fundamental component of smoothness, which makes the
“abnormal smoothness” measure a reasonable proxy for earnings management. More research could
be done to explain the inconsistencies between the firm-level results in the U.S. versus the country
level results.
In summary, the ability of smoothness to capture 1) the smoothness of a firm’s fundamental
earnings process, 2) the smoothness induced by the unbiased application of an accounting
measurement system to that process, and 3) the effect of intentional distortions on smoothness, is
still very much an open question.
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Timely loss recognition/Asymmetric timeliness (Section 3.1.3): Timely loss recognition measures
get more at the heart of the distinction between the quality of the fundamental earnings process (X)
and the ability of the accounting system to measure the process (e) than the other EQ proxies. A
stronger association of earnings with negative stock returns is more likely to be related to the
application of financial reporting rules to a fundamental earnings process than to be a feature of the
process itself (since stock returns are not an output of the accrual accounting system). However,
differences in timely loss recognition within countries (or regions) with the same standards or legal
origin suggest that timely loss recognition has an endogenous component related to firms’ reporting
incentives. It is not driven purely by a country’s accounting system.
Using the returns-based measure of timely loss recognition as proxies for quality, however,
requires that the researcher consider two significant issues. First, variation in asymmetric timeliness
may reflect variation in the ability of earnings to capture value relevant information, as generally
predicted, or it may be evidence of variation in the ability of returns to reflect value relevant
information. The assumption of market efficiency that underlies the interpretation of returns-based
metrics as a measure of earnings informativeness is not likely to hold equally across markets, which
will induce omitted correlated variables bias. This issue is of particular concern in cross-country
studies due to significant differences in market microstructure and macroeconomic conditions.6
Second, returns reflect all information, not just information in earnings. If more conservative
accounting, conditional or unconditional, is correlated with the production or dissemination of
alternative information sources (e.g., Gigler and Hemmer, 2001), then again the researcher faces an
omitted correlated variables problem.

6

Ball, Robin, and Wu (2003) emphasize the benefits of their sample – within East Asia – to mitigate the concern that
cross-country variation in ERCs reflects variation in the return generating process rather than differences in earnings
quality.
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Proxies for asymmetric timeliness based on the tendency of accruals to reverse avoid the
above noted problems associated with returns-based metrics. (Section 3.1.3 discusses these metrics,
proposed by Basu, 1997, and implemented in studies such as Ball and Shivakumar, 2005.) Similar
to the concern raised about accruals models, this attempt to control for the fundamental earnings
process is based on reported accrual-based earnings associated with the process (growth in sales
revenue, for example).

Benchmarking (Section 3.1.4): The benchmarking studies use small positive differences between
reported earnings and any benchmark as a measure of earnings quality. This literature includes
studies that examine the “kink” in the distribution of reported earnings around zero (e.g., Burgstahler
and Dichev, 1997), as well as studies of firms that report small positive profits or avoid small losses,
or “meet or beat” forecasts.
A common but controversial interpretation of the kink in the earnings distribution around
zero is that firms with small (unmanaged) losses intentionally manage earnings just enough to report
a small profit. The evidence on whether the kink in earnings around zero implies that small profits
likely contain a managed component is mixed at best. The relation between small profits and
earnings management proxies is supported mostly in accrual-specific studies. Taken together, these
results suggest that the use of small profits as a proxy for earnings management is setting-specific
and not generalizable.
Evidence that earnings are likely managed when firms just meet or beat an external target is
more persuasive. An important caveat to this evidence is that firms that are constrained in their
ability to manage earnings may not meet or beat a target (Barton and Simko, 2002). Thus, meeting
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or beating a target represents a censored measure of earnings management. In addition, the analyst
forecast target can also be managed.
The evidence on the quarterly patterns in earnings distributions are somewhat conflicting.
Kerstein and Rai (2007) and Jacob and Jorgensen (2007) find that the kink in earnings around zero is
strongest in the fourth quarter. Both papers emphasize their finding as evidence that the kink implies
earnings management because the incentives to manage earnings are greatest in Q4. Brown and
Pinello (2007), however, find that avoiding small negative analyst forecast errors is strongest in
interim quarters. They emphasize their result as evidence of greater earnings management in interim
quarters when the opportunities are greatest. The first two studies examine small profit firms while
Brown and Pinello (2007) examine firms that avoid missing analyst forecast targets. Differences in
the incentives and opportunities to meet these targets may explain the seemingly conflicting results.

2.2.2 Earnings response coefficients (Section 3.2)
Liu and Thomas (2000) conclude that the ERC can be viewed as a measure of higher quality
earnings (p. 73) based on the finding that the observed ERC will be high when the correlation
between unexpected earnings and forecast revisions is high. Their conclusion about the ERC as a
proxy for earnings quality is in the sense of Graham and Dodd (1934) in that a higher ERC is
associated with predictability of the fundamental earnings process. However, researchers should not
take the Liu and Thomas (2000) conclusion out of their context and assume they can use the ERC, or
the R2 from the ERC regression, as a proxy for quality in any context. Liu and Thomas (2000)
indicate, for example, that the degree to which the ERC captures quality is sensitive to the degree of
heterogeneity of the correlation between unexpected earnings and forecast revisions within the
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sample. Hence, sample specific characteristics that affect within-sample heterogeneity, such as
growth, are important.
For three reasons, researchers must be cautious when using the ex post observed ERC (or the
regression R2) as a proxy for ex ante earnings quality, interpreted as the ability of the financial
reporting system to capture relevant economic activities. First, because of the relation between
earnings quality and voluntary disclosure, the observed ERC does not reflect the cross-sectional
variation in ex ante earnings quality. This same criticism was discussed for asymmetric timeliness
and returns-based metrics in general. Second, the prediction that a more precise earnings report will
yield higher ERCs (Holthausen and Verrecchia, 1988) does not anticipate sources of variation in
investor estimates of precision unrelated to the earnings number, such as the heightened uncertainty
during a proxy contest (Collins and DeAngelo, 1990) or variation in the ability of equity markets to
assess quality (i.e., markets are not equally efficient). Finally, returns, which are the other element
of ERCs besides earnings, can exhibit cross-sectional and time-series variation (Johnson, 1999;
Hoitash, Krishnan, and Sankaraguruswamy, 2002). Hence, ERCs may work as a proxy for earnings
quality in a differences-in-differences analysis that can control for these alternative sources of
variation in the ERCs, but these problems generally pose significant challenges in most research
settings/designs.

2.2.3 External indicators of financial reporting quality (Section 3.3)
Studies using AAERs, restatements, and SOX internal control deficiency reports as proxies
for earnings quality help to validate various proxies for earnings quality. They are also a useful
setting to validate the theoretical determinants and consequences of quality that are investigated in
other contexts. Each sample, however, has limitations as a measure of earnings quality, in general,
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or of earnings management. The AAER sample includes earnings management cases that are
typically outside of GAAP and are identified by the SEC. This sample is likely to contain only the
most egregious misstatements and excludes many firms that are likely to be managing earnings. The
restatement sample includes some immaterial misstatements, corrections of unintentional errors, and
applications of some new pronouncements (e.g., SAB 101 required retroactive restatement). The
sample of firms that disclose internal control deficiencies could be affected by manager and auditor
incentives to discover and disclose the weaknesses. The restatement sample offers an opportunity to
explore variation in the implications of unintentional versus intentional misstatements in various
decision-making contexts, although that variation has not been exploited, with the exception of
Hennes, Leone, and Miller (2008).
The relation between internal control procedures and external auditors is not adequately
explored. An exception is Hogan and Wilkins (2008), who document that audit fees in the year
prior to the disclosure of an internal control deficiency are higher than the fees for a matched sample
that does not report deficiencies. One explanation for this finding is that auditors charge higher fees
for the extra audit effort required to audit firms with weak controls. In this case, we would observe
an association between fees and weak internal controls, but not necessarily between fees and
earnings quality. Another explanation is that auditors charge higher fees when the assessed audit
risk is higher, and weak controls are correlated with audit risk assessments (i.e., the fees represent a
pure risk premium). In this case, we would observe a relation between internal controls and earnings
quality. Hogan and Wilkins emphasize the second explanation while admitting that they cannot rule
out the risk premium story.
The studies that investigate the determinants and consequences of the external indicators of
financial reporting quality emphasize the incentives and opportunities for intentional and
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unintentional misstatements, which are two of the three elements of the fraud triangle, but they do
not investigate the third element: attitude. Recently, several studies have tried to examine the role of
executive characteristics in financial reporting decisions, including accounting fraud (Hribar and
Yang, 2007; Schrand and Zechman, 2009; Ge, Matsumoto, and Zhang, 2009).
2.3 Overview of the network and research opportunities
This section summarizes ten additional research-related conclusions.
1) Some studies treat the earnings quality proxies as substitutes and test hypothesized predictions
about a determinant or consequence of “earnings quality” using a proxy for earnings quality that
does not appropriately measure the theoretical construct. That is, not all studies carefully register
that the testable hypotheses about the determinants and consequences of earnings quality come from
decision models and the models suggest a specific form of decision usefulness (i.e., earnings
quality). We observe some mixed results that appear to be driven by a mismatch between the
theoretical construct for decision-usefulness and the proxies. A good example is the studies of
accrual quality (see Section 2.1.1.4). There is strong (mixed) [weak] evidence that internal control
procedures (audit quality) [governance characteristics] affect accrual quality. The order of the
strength of the evidence is consistent with the order of construct validity. Internal control procedures
are meant to detect and/or prevent both the ability to manipulate earnings as well as mistakes or
errors, and the accrual proxies used in these studies generally represent the types of errors that
internal controls could prevent. An auditor’s responsibility, however, is only to report on whether
the financial statements conform to GAAP, and the prediction that audit quality (typically measured
by a proxy for independence) would be associated with abnormal accruals is less compelling.
Finally, the predicted association between governance quality and accrual quality is particularly
tenuous. It is not clear why some commonly used indicators of governance quality, for example
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number of outside directors, should, can, or will have a detectable influence on the accounting
reporting system, in general, and the accrual process, in particular.
This construct validity issue extends to all the measures of earnings quality. When a paper
provides a model of the accrual process, or of persistence, or of ERCs as a direct proxy for earnings
quality, and states that the proxy exhibits “high quality” characteristics, researchers from that point
forward use the measure as a proxy for “quality” and it becomes accepted. The researchers that
originally developed the measure typically emphasize its short comings and conclude on its
decision-usefulness in a specific decision context, but the use of the proxy gets extended
inappropriately. Interestingly, Ball and Foster (1982) expressed a similar concern about the use of
size as a proxy for political costs.

(2) Two facts that are independently recognized in the literature are that (i) firms face multiple
objectives associated with reported earnings but they are constrained to report only one earnings
number,7 and (ii) firms can choose a set (or portfolio) of accounting choices to meet their objectives.
Equity markets are an obvious source of incentives, but research on the determinants of accounting
choices recognizes the financial reporting incentives that result from explicit or implicit contracts
with parties other than equity holders such as litigation, debt contracting, proprietary costs,
compensation, and internal information needs. Studies that recognize these non-equity market
incentives for financial reporting, however, typically examine their effects on accounting choices
independently, and predict an accounting choice, rather than examining the trade-offs among
multiple objectives.

7

See Sivakumar and Waymire (2003) for a well-articulated discussion of this issue. Theory that incorporates multiple
users predicts variation in accounting choice or contracting arrangements in the presence of financial statement users
with different information needs (e.g., Demski, 1973; Evans and Sridhar, 1996; Chen, Hemmer, and Zhang, 2007).
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Empirical studies have examined multiple incentives (most commonly financial reporting,
tax and regulatory objectives for financial institutions), but they typically examine accounting choice
related to one particular account (e.g., loan loss provisions). The studies do not consider the
alternative mechanisms that firms might use to achieve the firm’s multiple earnings objectives. On
the flip side, empirical studies have examined multiple accounting choices to achieve a single
objective (e.g., real earnings management vs. discretionary accruals), although studies of this type
are relatively limited.
There is almost no evidence on whether firms optimize over a set of accounting choices to
meet multiple objectives, despite variation across accounting choices, such as methods and accrual
estimations, with respect to their ability to meet a firm’s objectives.8 Certain accrual choices, for
example, may be sufficient to avoid debt covenant violation, but they also may produce a less
persistent earnings number, which affects the decision usefulness of earnings for equity markets.
Theory papers seem more progressive on this dimension than the empirical studies (e.g.,
Evans and Sridhar, 1996; Liang, 2004; Chen, Hemmer, and Zhang, 2007), including variations on
the optimal contracts with outsiders that affect the choice (Sridhar and Magee, 1996). However,
even these models are generally concerned with the implications of multiple objectives on a single
accounting choice, and they do not also address the issue that the firm makes a portfolio of choices
that in the aggregate affect earnings. Christensen, Feltham, and Sabac (2005), however, recognize
this issue: “Increasing the persistent components and reducing the reversible components are
generally desirable for valuation, but not for contracting. Eliminating transitory components of
earnings is generally desirable for valuation, but not necessarily for contracting.” Kirschenheiter

8

Notable exceptions are Beatty, Chamberlain, and Magliolo (1996) and Hunt, Moyer, and Shevlin (2000) examines both
multiple tools and multiple incentives.
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and Melumad (2002) similarly emphasize the important trade-off between reporting high “real”
levels of income, which are suggested to be more informative, and earnings smoothness.

(3) A consistent finding across studies that test a variety of theories in different settings and using
different proxies for EQ is that when investors are able to observe, or rationally infer, increased
estimation error (intentional or unintentional), they internalize its effect on price. Therefore, where
the manipulation is more transparent or where the incentives are more obvious, investors will
anticipate and discount potential earnings management or accounting distortions.
Numerous examples support this statement. For example, investors discount upward
earnings management when banks are highly levered and close to capital market constraints.
Investors discount downward earnings management when they are aware that managers will be
issued with repriced options. Investors discount the discretionary accrual component of earnings
when information on accruals is disclosed at the earnings release. Investors in the property and
casualty insurance industry understand and correctly price the accrual related to future payouts
because there are extensive disclosures related to this accrual’s errors and corrections. Meeting or
beating analyst forecasts on an ad hoc basis does not lead to higher valuations, but meeting or
beating regularly does. See additional examples in the discussion of equity market consequences in
Section 3.1.1.5.

(4) Taken together, the previous two observations – that firms might tailor accounting mechanism
choices to specific earnings objectives and that equity investors can rationally infer or observe
earnings management – suggests predictable patterns in the portfolio of a firm’s accounting choices.
If firms want to influence debt contracting outcomes but not at the expense of their cost of equity,
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there are (in theory) predictable accounting choices that can meet both objectives. For example, in a
world of imperfect debt contracting, many types of gains can prevent covenant violation, but if they
are made transparent, equity investors can undo their effect on earnings and they will not affect
“information quality.” This observation represents a research opportunity, but it also suggests that it
is difficult to interpret the evidence of studies that focus on only one determinant of an accounting
choice.
Recognizing that the single reported earnings number is the outcome of a complicated
number of choices, motivated by multiple incentives, has implications for understanding the
consequences of earnings quality. If equityholders understand a firm’s incentives for reporting
earnings, and if they understand its constraint to report only one earnings number, and if they have
the ability to interpret reported earnings and/or to substitute other information for reported earnings,
then we may not observe positive market responses to earnings that are of high quality with respect
to equity valuation decisions. In fact, equity markets might respond negatively to firms that do not
report a number that maximizes firm value, even if it distorts the ability of earnings to capture the
firm’s fundamental earnings process. In contrast, if equityholders do not recognize the earnings
management to meet non-equity market objectives, accounting choices will have a spillover effect to
the equity markets. Studies of accounting choice generally do not emphasize the trade-off between
the short-term benefits of opportunistic accounting choices at the time of an event (e.g., an IPO) and
the potential long-term reputation loss due to these one-off earnings management decisions.

(5) As noted previously, the determinants and consequences of abnormal accruals have received the
most attention. The literature tends to validate accruals models by showing that the abnormal
accrual is correlated with hypothesized predicted determinants or consequence of abnormal accruals.
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Other studies attempt to validate discretionary accruals from accruals models using external
indicators of financial reporting quality such as restatements, SEC enforcement actions, and SOX
internal control deficiency reports. The type II error rate in these samples, however, is extremely
high (most high discretionary accrual firms are not members of these samples). Therefore, positive
correlations are supportive evidence but far from conclusive.
Few papers, however, validate the accruals models by examining the “normal” component of
accruals. Our understanding of earnings quality would benefit from more direct evidence on how an
imperfect measurement system, when applied without intentional bias, distorts the measurement of a
firm’s fundamental earnings process. Examples of research along these lines include Landsman and
Shakespeare (2005) who put securitizations back on the balance sheet; Lev and Sougiannis (1996)
who capitalizes and expenses R&D; Ge (2007) who capitalizes operating leases; and Dutta and
Reichelstein (2005) who provide theoretical work on optimal capitalization policies.

(6) While it has long been recognized that accounting choices can be motivated by opportunism or
efficient contracting, we still do not have sufficient evidence on this issue (see Christie and
Zimmerman, 1994, Bowen et al., 2008). Again, the issue of multiple objectives arises, because a
single accounting choice may appear opportunistic if hypothesized to be related to one objective,
while the inference is invalid when allowing firms to have multiple objectives but constraining them
to choose only one earnings number. This issue was raised in studies that use properties of earnings,
accruals, and ERCs as proxies for EQ, yet the research is inconclusive.

(7) We are not aware of studies about a firm’s earnings-related accounting choices when the
anticipated impact of the choice on earnings properties is expected to be limited because the property
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is primarily driven by the firm’s fundamental earnings process. In other words, if the firm cannot
produce a persistent earnings number given the nature of operations, does it bother to make choices
to produce the most persistent number possible? Or, does the firm give up on producing a persistent
earnings stream and instead optimize according to another goal? Does the firm substitute for
fundamentally low quality earnings with additional disclosure, along the lines examined in Francis,
Nanda, and Olsson (2008)?

(8) Few papers attempt classical construct validity analyses. In fact, our database of papers contains
only one study that employs classical methods for construct validation: Ecker, Francis, Kim, Olsson,
and Schipper (2006), who perform a construct validity analysis of their “e-loading” proxy for accrual
(earnings) quality. Several studies run “horse races” across accruals models (e.g., Guay, Kothari,
and Watts, 1996), or consider extensions and improvements to specific models (e.g., Dechow, Sloan
and Sweeney (1996) and Leone, Kothari, and Wasley (2005) of the Jones model; McNichols (2002),
Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper (2005), and Wysocki (2008) on the Dechow/Dichev model).
These studies improve our understanding of the models, but additional analysis on construct validity
would be useful.

(9) Most of the theory-testing papers test a prediction about either a determinant of quality or a
consequence of quality, but not both. Figures 1 and 2 show that researchers have individually
established links between the various determinants and the EQ proxies, and separately between the
EQ proxies and the consequences. However, there is limited evidence on how a particular
determinant affects earnings quality and then on the consequences of the resulting earnings quality.
Bowen, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2008) provide a good example of this type of research. They
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examine both determinants (i.e., governance) and consequences (i.e., future performance) of
earnings management to disentangle two alternative explanations for earnings management:
unexpected managerial opportunism versus efficient contracting. Their “complete path” approach
offers insights that are not available from studies that examine only one side (i.e., determinant or
consequence) of earnings quality. In other words, external auditors and internal controls may both
affect abnormal accruals, and abnormal accruals may affect the cost of capital, but is the impact of
accruals on the cost of capital the same when the source is external auditors rather than controls?
Other good examples are Xie (2001) and Liu and Thomas (2000).

(10) Our survey indicates a number of inconsistencies in the tests of the determinants or
consequences of earnings quality. (Figures 1 and 2 reveal these inconsistencies.) We highlight
several in the following table:
Research question
Does incentive equity compensation provide
incentives to manipulate earnings?
Is better corporate governance associated with higher
earnings quality?
Does nonaudit service compromise audit quality?

Yes
Efendi et al., 2007

No
Armstrong et al., 2009

Klein, 2002

Larcker et al., 2007

Frankel et al., 2002

Ashbaugh et al., 2003

Are SOX 404 disclosures informative to investors?

Ashbagh-Skaife et
al., 2009

Ogneva et al., 2007

Does managerial opportunism or efficient contracting
drive earnings management?

Becker et al., 1998
(opportunism)

Bowen et al., 2008
(efficient contracting)

As shown in Figures 1 and 2, studies that examine a particular consequence or determinant
frequently use the same EQ proxy, so it is not differences in the quality proxy that lead to these
mixed results. A significant source of the differences appears to be differences in sample or
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methodology. Studies could make unique predictions across proxies. The predictions may be in
degrees: determinant X is predicted to have a stronger impact on quality proxy Y than on Z. Or, the
tests may be designed to assess divergent validity (i.e., counterfactual examples): determinant X is
predicted to be associated with quality proxy Y but not with Z. A greater focus on stronger
identification strategies in research designs could help sort out the mixed evidence given the various
methodological issues associated with distinguishing the fundamental component of earnings quality
from the process.

3. Proxies for earnings quality
This section juxtaposes the studies according to the proxy they use for earnings quality (see
Table 1, Panel A). We define three categories of proxies: 1) Properties of earnings; 2) Earnings
response coefficients (ERCs); and 3) External indicators of financial reporting quality (FRQ).

3.1 Properties of earnings
We distinguish four groups of earnings properties: Persistence, asymmetric timeliness and
timely loss recognition, smoothness of earnings, and “benchmarking.” Section 3.1.1 discusses
research that examines the persistence of earnings and accrual models. Studies that use the term
predictability and examine earnings usefulness to predict future cash flows are included in this
section as well. Section 3.1.2.examines research on earnings smoothness and variability. The
benchmarking category (Section 3.1.4) includes measures of earnings relative to any benchmark.
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3.1.1 Persistence of earnings and models of accruals
Studies of earnings persistence and cash flow predictability are motivated by an assumption
that persistence (or predictability) improves decision-usefulness in an equity valuation context, in
particular in models that are variants of neoclassical discounted dividend (DD) models. Model
variants based on dividends, cash flows, and earnings are theoretically equivalent under specific
assumptions about the relations between dividends, cash flows, and earnings (Penman, 1998;
Penman and Sougiannis, 2000; Lundholm and O’Keefe, 2001). While theoretically equivalent, the
models deviate in their ability to predict fundamental firm value in practice. The deviations depend
on the degree of conformity of observable model inputs with the model’s underlying assumptions
and on the sensitivity of the valuation to this conformity. In particular, the computation of the
terminal value, which is a significant component of the valuation, depends critically on assumptions
about growth and persistence.
Penman and Sougiannis (1998) provide evidence on the comparative decision usefulness of
the models, which in turn has implications for assessing the benchmark that should be used to
evaluate the decision usefulness of an earnings number. In summary, they conclude that over
various time horizons, in models with and without a terminal value assumption, models that apply
simple forecasting assumptions to earnings provide a better forecast of current market value than
models based on cash-flow or dividend forecasts. However, the point is that an assessment of
whether cash flow predictability or earnings persistence is a better measure of decision usefulness in
equity valuation depends as much on the proxy as it does on the decision model. In other words,
being able to predict one-year-ahead cash flows may be an irrelevant measure of quality if cash flow
based equity valuation models produce high prediction errors.
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The discussion of earnings persistence and predictability is organized as follows. Section
3.1.1.1 discusses research that examines the usefulness of earnings and accrual components to
predict expected future cash flows, where future cash flows are measured in a variety of ways, such
as one year-ahead cash flows, or market value. Section 3.1.1.2 discusses research that examines
earnings persistence, motivated by the notion that it is important to understand earnings persistence
as an input to equity valuation. The determinants and consequences of persistence are discussed in
Sections 3.1.1.3 and 3.1.1.4. Finally, Sections 3.1.1.5 and 3.1.1.6 discuss accruals models and
interpretation issues related to these models, as the resulting measures of abnormal accruals are a
large and distinct part of the literature. We leave a detailed discussion of the determinants and
consequences of abnormal accruals to later sections of the paper.

3.1.1.1 The usefulness of earnings and accrual information to predict future cash flows
Research that characterizes the predictive ability for future cash flows is motivated by the
assumption that the prediction of cash flows as inputs to equity valuation models will be useful.
Hence, a common measure of cash flow is one-year or two-year-ahead cash flows. The researcher
compares the R2s or the coefficients from models that include current earnings to those of models
that include other measures of performance such as dividends, cash from operations, or earnings
excluding various accruals (e.g., earnings before depreciation and taxes).
Barth, Cram, and Nelson (2001) find that cash flows are superior to earnings at predicting
future cash flows, and Bowen et al. (1986) find that earnings are at least not superior. Greenberg et
al. (1986), however, find that the predictive ability of aggregate earnings is superior to cash flows.
Finger (1994) finds that earnings and cash flow have similar predictive ability for longer horizons,
but cash flow is slightly superior to earnings for short horizons. A cash flow prediction model that
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disaggregates the working capital and other accrual components of earnings results in lower cash
flow forecast errors and improved predictability (Dechow, Kothari, and Watts, 1998; Barth et al.,
2001).9

3.1.1.2 The usefulness of earnings to predict future earnings
Research that characterizes the persistence of earnings is motivated by the assumption that
more persistent earnings will yield better inputs to equity valuation models. A simple model
specification estimates earnings persistence as:
Earningst+1=α+β1Earningst+εt
Researcher can add other financial statements elements or variables outside the financial statements
(e.g., market based measures or disclosures from the footnotes) to examine to examine their
incremental explanatory power to predict future earnings:
Earningst+1=α+β1Earningst+β2components of financial statements or other informationt + εt
If β2 is significant in either direction, then the researcher has identified a determinant of
future earnings that provides incremental information beyond current earnings. Alternatively,
researchers can decompose earnings into its components and examine whether the components have
different implications for future earnings. For example, Sloan (1996) examines two components of
earnings:
Earningst+1=α+β1CFt+β2Accrualst+εt

9

Some studies use this framework, measuring relative predictive ability, but model future earnings. These studies
consistently find that special items as a subset of accruals do not improve the ability of accrual earnings to predict future
earnings relative to cash based earnings (e.g., Barth et al., 2001; Dechow and Ge, 2006). Other studies model
contemporaneous stock returns (Ball and Brown 1968, Dechow 1994) or market value (Penman and Sourgiannis 1998).
Stock based measures generally find that accruals help improve earnings ability to reflect value (except if earnings
includes large write-downs or special items).
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and documents that β2 < β1, which implies that the cash flow component of earnings is more
persistent than the accrual component.
As noted in the introduction, reported earnings represents the firm’s fundamental earnings
process (X) and the measurement of that process (e). Thus, when researchers add financial
statement ratios to the incremental predictability model above, the ratios they add are generally
computed using reported accounting numbers. Thus, they do not disentangle the unobservable
fundamental earnings process (X) from the measurement of the process. Likewise, any
decomposition of accruals into its components decomposes them based on their reported amounts.
Clearly, we recognize the constraint that researchers face when they attempt to measure an
unobservable construct like the fundamental earnings process. By highlighting this issue, we hope
that researchers can search for better instruments than reported numbers to capture the effects of the
persistence of “X” on the persistence of earnings.

3.1.1.3 Determinants of persistence
This section discusses studies 1) that model the incremental explanatory power of variables
over current earnings for future earnings, and 2) that document the predictive ability of earnings
components as determinants of persistence. While it was just noted that predictability of future
earnings is likely to be driven to a large extent by the business in which the firm operates, there is
little work that uses the approach above to test for such determinants. Lev (1983) associates
persistence with product type, industry competition, capital intensity, and firm size, generally
motivating these variables as proxies for uncertainty of the business process. Baginski, Lorek,
Willinger, and Branson (1999) find that the relations documented in Lev (1983) are weak using
persistence metrics from lower-order time series models but exist when the measure of persistence is

30

a differenced, higher order model.10 Several studies predict and find that firms that differentiate their
products (measured by higher margins and lower turnover) have more persistent earnings than firms
following a cost leadership strategy (i.e., lower margins and higher turnover). See, for example,
Nissim and Penman (2000), Fairfield and Yohn (2001), and Soliman (2008). These results suggest
that creating barriers to entry by having a technology such that the firm can sell its product at lower
cost is more sustainable than creating a unique product to satisfy consumer desires. However, the
benefits of cost leadership are likely to be highly contextual.
Accruals, in various forms, as a component of earnings are the most studied determinant of
persistence. Sloan (1996) documents that the accrual component of earnings is less persistent than
the cash flow component of earnings. His definition of accruals is non-cash working capital accruals
plus depreciation. Richardson, Solimon, Sloan, and Tuna (2005) provide a more comprehensive
measure of accruals (intuitively, the change in net operating assets or the difference between
earnings and free cash flows) and show that this measure of “total accruals” is less persistent than
cash flows.
There have been further break-downs of accruals into various components, using similar
methodologies to assess predictability for future earnings.11 For example, Lev and Thiagarajan (LT,
1993) and Abarbanell and Bushee (AB, 1997) focus on inventory and accounts receivable. With
respect to inventory accruals, the quality metric, which measures poor quality, is significantly
negatively associated with future changes in EPS (AB, 1997) and contemporaneous returns (LT,

10

Early studies that analyzed the statistical process that underlies earnings include Foster, 1977; Watts and Leftwich,
1977; Albrecht, Lookabill, and McKeown, 1977; Beaver, 1970; and Griffin, 1977. Baginski, Lorek, Willinger, and
Branson (1999) emphasize that time-series modeling assumptions can create significant differences in parameter
estimates, and lead to different economic conclusions about persistence.
11
Melumad and Nissim (2008) provide an analysis of earnings quality by looking at specific accrual line items. We
discuss these examples to emphasize the conflicting evidence.
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1993).12 The studies find conflicting evidence on accounts receivable accruals. LT (1993) find a
negative relation between abnormal accounts receivable (receivables changes less sales changes) and
contemporaneous returns, and they interpret this result as evidence that disproportionate A/R
changes indicate difficulties in selling the firm’s products, related credit extensions, and premature
revenue recognition.13 AB (1997), however, find an unexpectedly positive relation between
abnormal receivables and one-year ahead earnings changes, which they interpret as evidence that
receivables growth indicates sales growth and not reliability or customer collection problems. More
research is needed to resolve these conflicting findings.
Dechow and Ge (2005) suggest that large negative accruals are less persistent than cash
flows because large negative accruals often reflect write-offs and impairment charges that “correct”
the balance sheet (see also Fairfield, Sweeney and Yohn 1996). They show that low accrual firms
have proportionally greater levels of special items, and that these non-recurring charges play an
important role in the lower earnings persistence for these firms. Nissim and Penman (2001) also
suggest that unusual items affect earnings persistence.
Researchers also suggest that the sources and uses of cash flows affect earnings persistence.
Dechow, Richardson, and Sloan (2005) show that retained cash flows have very similar implications
for persistence to accruals. Cash flows related to the payment or issuances of equity are the major
determinant of the higher persistence of the cash flow component of earnings relative to accruals.
Nissim and Penman (2003) decompose return on assets into an operating leverage component and a
financial leverage component. They suggest that an increase in operating leverage is likely to
12

Thomas and Zhang (2002) do not assess whether changes in inventory are a less persistent component of earnings
directly. However, the do find that the change in inventory is the strongest driver of accrual anomaly hedge returns.
LaFond (2005) also documents that inventory accruals explain hedge returns in 13 out of 17 countries. Allen, Larson,
and Sloan (2009) do show that growth in inventory result in less persistent earnings. Their results suggest that
measurement error plays an important role since write-downs of inventory is a key driver of the lower persistence.
13
LT also find no relation between the abnormal component of the provision for doubtful receivables and
contemporaneous returns, which they describe as surprising.
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depress current earnings but lead to future improvements in earnings. An increase in financial
leverage, however, tends to have an incrementally negative effect on future earnings (scaled by
equity).
Fairfield, Whisenant, and Yohn (2003a) suggest that growth and conservatism in accruals
could be determinants of the lower persistence of the accrual component of earnings. They show
that the change in PPE has similar implications for persistence as working capital accruals.
However, the measurement of PPE is itself a product of the accrual accounting system and the
growth in this variable could also reflect accounting measurement problems (see Zhang, 2007).
Richardson et al. (2005) further investigate growth. They decompose the change in net operating
assets (total accruals) into a growth component (proxied by sales growth) and an efficiency
component (net operating asset turnover ratio) and an interaction effect. They show that declines in
efficiency and growth both play a role in the lower persistence of the accrual component. While
their paper suggests that growth is not a complete explanation for the low persistence parameter on
accruals, it suffers from the same criticism that sales growth, as a proxy for growth, is itself a
product of the accrual accounting system.
Researchers have also attempted to directly examine whether forecast errors made by
management (that will affect the magnitude of accruals) and their subsequent corrections have
implications for earnings persistence. Dechow and Dichev (2002) develop a measure of accrual
quality based on accruals modeled as a function of past, present, and future cash flows (discussed
later in this section). Holding the magnitude of accruals constant, earnings persistence is negatively
associated with the Dechow/Dichev accruals quality measure. In contrast, holding the accruals
quality measure constant, the association between persistence and the magnitude of accruals is much
weaker.
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Xie (2001) uses the Jones model (discussed later in this section) to decompose accruals into a
normal and abnormal component. The abnormal component is likely to contain more measurement
error and managerial discretion. He finds the persistence parameters on cash flows, normal accruals,
and discretionary accruals are 0.73, 0.7, and 0.57. This result indicates that discretionary accruals
are less persistent than either normal accruals or cash flows, consistent with reliability and
measurement issue concerns. Richardson et al. (2005) develop a model of reliability and argue that
operating assets and liabilities are less reliably measured than financial assets and liabilities.
Consistent with their predictions, they find that working capital (operating) accruals have the lowest
reliability, accruals related to financial assets and liability have the highest, and long-term operating
accruals are in the middle. Broadly speaking, they find a positive relation between their ex ante
reliability rankings and return on assets.
Internal control violations under the Sarbanes Oxley act are suggestive of measurement error
and problems with the accounting system. Doyle, Ge, and McVay (2007a) find that firms that
disclose they have at least one material weakness during the 2002-2005 period, have less persistent
earnings. Finally, Wang (2006) finds a positive association between founding family ownership and
proxies for accrual quality and earnings persistence.

3.1.1.4 Consequences of persistence
The vast majority of papers on consequences of persistence examine equity market
consequences. A few papers discuss consequences that we refer to collectively as other-than-equitymarket consequences.
Equity market consequences: Researchers hypothesize two distinct equity market consequences of
persistence. The first prediction is that more persistent earnings will yield a higher equity market

34

valuation and, therefore, that increases in estimates of persistence will yield positive
(contemporaneous) equity market returns. Early research by Komendi and Lipe (1987), Collins and
Kothari (1989), and Easton and Zmijewski (1989) provide evidence that more persistent earnings
have a stronger stock price response and association.
However, subsequent research on the accrual anomaly suggests that investors do not fully
price the implications of the cash and accrual components for future earnings. (See Richardson,
Tuna, and Wysocki, 2009, for a complete review.) Sloan (1996) documents that a hedge strategy
that is long in low accrual firms and short in high accrual firms earns approximately a 12 percent
return per year. Subsequent studies have provided several explanations for the hedge returns
including (i) investor misunderstanding of abnormal accruals (Xie, 2001); (ii) investor
misunderstanding the extent of errors in accruals or reliability (Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and
Tuna, 2005; Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003); (iii) investor misunderstanding of the growth reflected in
accruals (Desai, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam, 2004; Fairfield, Whisenant, and Yohn, 2003a; and
Zhang, 2007); and (iv) mismeasurement of expected returns or other research design issues (Khan,
2008; Kraft, Leone, and Wasley, 2006).
Researchers have also examined whether equity market consequences to the persistence of
accruals varies with an investor’s information processing ability or with the availability of outside
information. Louis and Robinson (2005) find that stock split announcements add credibility to
accruals. Levi (2008) finds that the accrual anomaly exists only for firms that delay the release of
accrual information to their 10-Q and do not include cash flow and balance sheet information in
press releases. Collins, Gong, and Hribar (2003) find that firms with a high level of institutional
investors and a minimum threshold level of active institutional traders have stock prices that more
accurately reflect the persistence of accruals. While Collins et al. (2003) suggest that these

35

sophisticated investors do understand differences in accrual quality, Richardson (2003) finds no
evidence that short-sellers are clustered in high-accrual firms, which one would expect if they
understand that high accrual firms have less persistent earnings and lower future returns. However,
his sample period is 1990 to 1998, and the accrual anomaly did not become widely known until after
the publication of Sloan in 1996.
Researchers have also investigated how investors respond to investments that are expensed
rather than capitalized (such as R&D) since these decisions will have differing implications for
future earnings. The results suggest that investors do view R&D expenditures as assets but they do
not perfectly price the full implications of the R&D investment on future earnings (Lev and
Sougiannis, 1996, and Penman and Zhang, 2002). Similarly, off-balance sheet items such as leases
are valued by investors, but their implications for future earnings are not perfectly incorporated into
prices (Ge, 2007). This line of research suggests that investors appear to react to predictable changes
in earnings induced by different accounting treatments for investments.
There is also an extensive line of research examining the implications of write-offs (i.e., large
negative special items) that are transitory and hence reduce earnings persistence. Bartov, Lindahl,
and Ricks (1998) summarize the findings from the literature on write-offs through 1998. The early
research documented negative stock market reactions to the announcement of special items, but the
negative reactions were small (around one percent) and announcement period returns were positive
if the write-off was associated with a restructuring or an operational change. Bartov et al. (1998)
question the small stock price response at the announcement date and examine a sample of 317
write-offs in 1984 and 1985. They find annualized negative abnormal returns of -21% over a twoyear period following the announcements of the write-off, robust to various risk adjustments. As
previously discussed, Dechow and Ge (2006), however, find that firms with large negative accruals
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driven by special items have positive future returns, which suggests that investors overweight these
accruals.
Several studies also examine the consequences related to industry-specific loss accruals.
Beaver and Engel (1996) find that the normal component of banks’ allowances for loan loss reserves
is negatively priced and the abnormal component is incrementally positively priced. They interpret
the positive coefficient on abnormal accruals as follows: “…positive effects on security prices can
occur because discretionary behavior alters the market's assessment of the expected net benefits of
discretionary behavior or conveys management's beliefs about the future earnings power of the
bank.” McNichols and Beaver (2001) find that investors correctly price the loss reserve accrual even
though they incorrectly price other accruals in a manner consistent with Sloan (1996). Their finding
suggests that the extensive disclosures about loss reserve accruals of P&C insurers help investors to
estimate the persistence and valuation implications of this component.
Finally, Francis et al. (FLOS, 2005) find that firms with more persistent earnings have a
lower cost of debt and equity capital. FLOS use multiple earnings proxies and so for ease of
exposition and to reduce repetition, we provide an extensive review of the literature that predicts the
cost of capital as a consequence of earnings quality in Section 6.

Other than-equity-market consequences: Two papers examine compensation decisions as a function
of earnings persistence. Baber, Kang, and Kumar (1998) find that earnings persistence increases the
positive relation between unexpected earnings and the annual change in various components of
compensation. Nwaeze, Yang, and Yin (2006) find that firms with less persistent earnings have
lower weight placed on earnings relative to cash flows in compensation. Both papers attempt to
distinguish persistence driven by firm fundamentals from persistence associated with accounting
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measurement. Nwaeze, Yang, and Yin (2006) measure earnings persistence relative to cash flow
persistence. Baber et al. (1998) include stock returns in the model.
Evidence on other consequences is limited. Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2001)
document that sell-side analysts’ forecasts do not fully incorporate the predictable earnings declines
associated with high-accrual firms. In addition, high-accrual firms are not more likely to get
qualified audit opinions or to have auditor changes. Bradshaw et al. confirm that the high-accrual
firms indeed have subsequent earnings declines. Thus, they interpret their findings as evidence that
analysts and auditors do not appear to be aware of quality issues for high-accrual firms. Bhojraj and
Swaminathan (2007) find that bond investors misprice high and low accrual firms in a similar
manner to equity investors.

Related to persistence: Li (2008) documents that firms that have more readable financial reports have
more persistent earnings. Li recognizes causality as an unanswered question, and acknowledges that
the explanation for the relation is beyond the scope of his paper. It is an interesting question, and
one that the developing text analysis software may help us to resolve. Researchers also have
investigated the role of management guidance and earnings sustainability. The results generally
suggest that managers of firms with more volatile earnings are less likely to provide guidance (see,
for example, Verrecchia, 1990; Waymire, 1985, and Tucker, 2008).

3.1.1.5 Models of the accrual process
The objective of accruals models is to dissect accruals into a component that measures
accrual-based earnings that will be associated with the firm’s fundamental earnings process from
abnormal accruals, which are assumed to represent accruals that are discretionary or that are the
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result of intentional or unintentional accounting errors. Higher levels of accruals that are not
associated with the firm’s fundamental earnings process are assumed to reduce the quality of
earnings. As reported in Figures 1, 2, and 3, abnormal accruals have been used as a proxy to test
predictions in almost all of the determinants and consequences categories, hence we discuss the
models. Exhibit 2 summarizes the most widely used accruals models.
Jones (1991) explains working capital accruals and depreciation as a function of sales growth
and PP&E. The explanatory power of the Jones model is low, explaining only about 10% of the
variation in accruals. Consistent with the assumption that the residual represents greater discretion,
as mentioned earlier, Xie (2001) documents that the residuals from the Jones model have lower
predictive ability for year-ahead earnings than the non-discretionary (i.e., “normal”) accruals. On
the downside, the residuals are highly (80%) positively correlated with total accruals (Dechow,
Richardson, and Tuna, 2005), and they are positively correlated with earnings performance and
negatively correlated cash flow performance (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995). These
correlations are an important concern when the residuals are used to test theories of the determinants
or consequences of earnings quality, in which performance is an important potential omitted
correlated variable. In addition, Dechow, Larson, Ge, and Sloan (2009) show that discretionary
accruals are generally less powerful than total accruals at detecting earnings management in SEC
enforcement releases. This finding suggests that the discretionary accruals modeling process could
include some accruals representing earnings management in “normal” accruals.
Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) modify the Jones model to adjust for growth in credit
sales. Credit sales are frequently manipulated, thus this modification increases the power of the
Jones’ model to yield a residual that is uncorrelated with expected (i.e., normal) revenue accruals
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and better reflects revenue manipulation.14 However, this model suffers from the same performancerelated problems as described above for the Jones model.
Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan (1995) and Leone, Kothari, and Wasley (2005) suggest ways
to combat concerns about the correlation between performance and the residuals from the Jones
model and modified Jones model. They both suggest controlling for the normal level of accruals
conditional on ROA. Leone et al. (2005) identify a firm from the same industry with the closest
level of ROA to that of the sample firm and deduct the control firm’s discretionary accruals (i.e.,
residuals) from those of the sample firm to generate “performance-matched” residuals. Because the
models of normal accruals that generate the residuals explain only 10% - 12% of the variation in
accruals, this approach is likely to add noise to the measure of discretionary accruals and it is best
applied when correlated performance is an important concern. In addition, the performance
matching can extract too much discretion when earnings are being managed, resulting in low power
tests.15
Dechow and Dichev (2002) view the matching function of accruals to cash flows as being of
primary importance and thus model accruals as a function of current, past, and future cash flows
because accruals anticipate future cash collections/payments and reverse when cash previously
recognized in accruals is received/paid. The R2s from their specification are higher than those of the
modified Jones model (47% at the firm-level, 34% at the industry level, and 29% at the pooled
level). The standard deviation of the residuals from the model is their proxy for earnings quality.
14

The modified Jones model has many variants and adaptations. DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) estimate the
regression by industry rather than by firm to lessen firm-year requirements. Chambers (1999) suggests adding lagged
accruals to the model to capture predictable reversals. Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna (2003) estimate the normal
relation between credit sales and total sales to control for nondiscretionary credit sales. They also add future sales
growth to capture accruals made in anticipation of future growth. Their adjustments increase the R2 from around 9% to
20%. Guay, Kothari, and Watts (1996) provide a comparison of various models.
15
For example, assume ROA is 20% for firm A and B, with firm A using discretionary accruals to boost its ROA by 2%
to report 20%. Firm B is not manipulating earnings; it has achieved 20% ROA because it has higher non-discretionary
accruals than firm A. Matching firm B to firm A would suggest that firm A’s level of non-discretionary accruals should
be the same as firm B, but this match is incorrect since the correct match should be a firm with ROA of 18%.
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They show that firms with larger standard deviations have less persistent earnings, longer operating
cycles, larger accruals, and more volatile cash flows, accruals and earnings. They are smaller firms
and the firms are more likely to report a loss. They suggest that these firm characteristics are
indicative of a greater likelihood of estimation error in accruals and thus lower accrual quality.
Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2005) modify and extend the Dechow and Dichev
model in two ways. First, as suggested by McNichols (2002), they add growth in revenue and PP&E
to the model of normal accruals. Second, they decompose the regression residual into firm-level
measures of innate estimation errors and discretionary estimation errors, such that the discretionary
error is meant to represent the outcome of “managerial choices” (i.e., intentional errors).
Specifically, FLOS (2005) estimate their accruals prediction model by industry-year and calculate
the standard deviation of the residuals for each firm j in year t [σ(εj)t] based on the value of εj in
year’s t-4 through year t (five years). The standard deviation of the residuals σ(εj)t is a measure of
accrual quality (AQ); higher standard deviations are lower quality. To decompose AQ into an innate
component and a discretionary component, FLOS model AQ as a function of firm characteristics
identified in Dechow and Dichev (2002):

σ(εj)t = λ0,j+λ1,jSizej,t-1+λ2,jσ(CFO)j,t + λ3,jσ(Sales) j,t + λ4,jOperCyclej,t + λ5,jNegEarnj,t + νj,t

The predicted value of σ(εj)t represents the quality of accruals associated with the inherent
ability of an accrual system to capture the firm’s fundamental earnings process, and the residual (νj,t.)
represents discretionary accrual quality. An argument can be made that each of the innate
characteristics could also reflect estimation errors and corrections that would reduce the power of νj,t
(or induce bias) as a proxy for discretion.
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All of the accruals models can be estimated at the firm-level, which allows variation across
firms in the determinants of normal accruals. Firm-level estimation, however, assumes timeinvariant parameter estimates and typically imposes sample survivorship biases. The models often
are estimated at the industry-level. This specification assumes constant coefficient estimates within
the industry. Thus, some firms may have large residuals because of variation induced by industry
classification rather than because of earnings management or errors. Measurement error in the
residual will be related to industry characteristics, which can be a concern in some contexts. For
example, the model may have a poorer fit in growth industries and growth may be correlated with
the hypothesized determinant or consequence.
Several studies develop models of specific accruals and for homogeneous samples in order to
test the determinants or consequences of accrual quality. The motivation behind the research design
is that a better model of the normal component of an accrual generates a less noisy estimate of the
abnormal component (i.e., model residual), resulting in more powerful tests. As an example, Miller
and Skinner (1998) and Schrand and Wong (2003) both model the economic determinants of the
valuation allowance for deferred tax assets (DTAs) required under SFAS 109. Miller and Skinner
(1998) do not find much evidence of earnings management using the residual from their model
estimated for firms with large DTAs. Schrand and Wong (2003), however, are able to find evidence
of earnings management using a model of the DTA allowance specifically designed for banks. Of
course, the construct validity benefits of modeling specific accruals, especially within specific
industries, come at the expense of generalizability.
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3.1.1.6 Determinants and consequences and interpretation of discretionary accruals proxies
If “normal” accruals are the predicted value from a regression model of accruals associated
with the firm’s fundamental earnings process, then abnormal accruals represent estimation errors,
which can be intentional or unintentional. Almost one hundred papers in our database use abnormal
accruals as a measure of earnings quality and test predicted determinants or consequences. These
studies test the joint hypothesis that the residual from an accruals model reflects earnings
management and that the predicted determinant induces earnings management or that earnings
management has a predicted consequence. For ease of exposition and to reduce the amount of
repetition in this survey, we discuss the results of such tests in the relevant determinant or
consequence section.
In this section, however, we emphasize several general findings. First, while abnormal
accruals are less persistent than normal accruals, they do have positive persistence. Xie (2001) finds
that discretionary accruals have a significantly positive persistence coefficient of 0.57. In addition,
Subramanyam (1996) uses the modified Jones model to measure abnormal accruals and finds
incremental information content in abnormal accruals, which he interprets as evidence that abnormal
accruals are not opportunistic but that they communicate private information about equity value.
Also using the modified Jones model to measure abnormal accruals, Chaney, Jeter, and Lewis
(1996) suggest that discretionary accruals smooth earnings and they interpret their finding as
evidence that discretionary accruals are not opportunistic but that they communicate information
about the firm's long-term (permanent) earnings to equity markets. Subramanyam (1996) and
Chaney et al. (1996) assume that investors are able to isolate the abnormal accrual component. If
investors are naïve and fixate on earnings, then a positive stock price reaction could be documented
even if the accrual component is not value relevant.
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Second, investors seem to recognize the distinction between abnormal accruals and normal
accruals, but they do not fully incorporate the implications into price. DeFond and Park (2001), find
that abnormal accruals suppress the magnitude of market reactions to earnings surprises, suggesting
that investors do not find them as reliable as normal accrual components. However, even though
investors realize that abnormal accruals are less reliable, they still overreact to the information (i.e.,
the abnormal accrual component is negatively associated with future stock returns). Xie (2001) finds
that the accrual anomaly hedge returns are stronger for hedge portfolios based on abnormal accruals
measured using the Jones model.
Third, research that examines the complete path from a determinant of abnormal accruals
through to the consequences for future period earnings comes to a different conclusion than most
studies that independently study the links. Bowen, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2008) find an
association between lax governance and abnormal accruals,16 where governance quality is measured
by an overall governance score and by the “usual suspects” of individual governance characteristics.
Bowen et al. (2008) also find, however, that the accounting discretion associated with lax
governance is positively related to future performance (ROA), which they interpret as evidence that
abnormal accruals reflect future performance expectations, not opportunism.

3.1.2 Smooth earnings
Earnings smoothness or its inverse, variability, is a firm-specific time-series construct.17
While the concepts statements do not state that “smoothness” is a desirable property of earnings or
an objective of the accruals process, SFAC No. 1 does recognize that accrual earnings help mitigate
problems associated with a “mismatch” of cash receipts and payments when reporting accounting
16

Bowen et al. (2008) use an aggregate index of accounting discretion. The use of abnormal accruals is one component
of the index, along with a measure of accrual-based smoothing and the tendency to avoid negative earnings surprises.
17
Early discussions and analyses of smoothing include Beidleman (1973) and Ronen and Sadan (1975).
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information for finite periods, and it concludes that accrual earnings will provide “…a better
indication of an enterprise’s present and continuing ability to generate favorable cash flows than
information limited to the financial effects of cash receipts and payments.” Hence, predictability is
the objective, not smoothness, but the concepts statement suggests that the earnings process is
smoother than the cash collection/payment process. In other words, smoothness is a means to an
end.
Smoothness that improves predictability of fundamental earnings is of higher quality, ceteris
paribus, in an equity valuation context. The term “smooth” however, comes with baggage.
Earnings that are smooth relative to uninformative cash flow variation are more decision useful
under the assumption that the firm’s fundamental earnings process is smoother than the cash
receipt/payment process. But smoothed earnings or “artificial” smoothness in which the reported
earnings have less volatility than the fundamental earnings process, represent distortions. Theories
suggest that firms have incentives to make accounting choices that create smooth earnings including
choices of real activities (Lambert, 1984) or accruals (Demski, 1998; Kirschenheiter and Melumad,
2002).
Determinants of smoothness:
Beidleman (1973), Barefield and Comiskey (1971), and Dharan (1987) document how
unbiased application of specific GAAP methods affects earnings smoothness. Beidleman (1973)
measures smoothness as the difference between reported earnings and “normal” earnings, where
normal earnings is an average earnings level, estimated based on historical earnings and a constant
growth rate. Dharan (1987) is a simulation analysis that uses the variance of the simulated earnings
stream as a measure of smoothness. These papers suggest methods for which accrual earnings in
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fact improve predictability relative to cash earnings assuming, like the concepts statement, that the
fundamental earnings process is smoother than the cash receipt/payment process.
Most studies, however, explore the relation between incentives for smoothing and specific
accounting choices (or real activity choices) that generate smoother earnings. The focus is on the
mechanisms used to smooth earnings, but the analyses are joint tests of the incentives and of the
mechanism choice (e.g., White, 1970; Barnea, Ronen, and Sadan, 1976; Moses, 1987; Chaney, Jeter,
and Lewis, 1998; Hand, 1989). Studies of accrual choices frequently investigate specific accounts,
or even employ industry-specific small sample case studies (e.g., Dascher and Malcolm, 1970;
McNichols and Wilson, 1988; Kanagaretnam, Lobo, Yang, 2004). Smoothing is treated as a periodspecific accounting choice, thus these papers typically measure smoothing as the negative
correlation between a proxy for unmanaged earnings (e.g., non-discretionary accruals), and the
“discretionary accrual” that is being used to smooth earnings.

Consequences of smoothness:
The majority of the consequences studies examine the implications of smoothness in a crosscountry context. Section 4.2 discusses these studies. The advantage of the cross-country analyses is
the researcher’s ability to create a smoothness proxy that represents artificial smoothing or earnings
management. Smoothness has both a fundamental component, which is predicted to increase
quality, and an artificial component, which is predicted to decrease quality. The predicted
consequences of the two components are different, thus the research necessitates distinguishing nondiscretionary (normal) smoothness from discretionary (abnormal) smoothness. In the cross-country
studies, the notion is that the measurement error in the model of the fundamental component of
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smoothness is dominated by the cross-sectional variation in the discretionary component, which
makes the “abnormal smoothness” measure a reasonable proxy for earnings management.
Within the U.S., studies of the consequences of smoothness, artificial or otherwise, are
limited. Tucker and Zarowin (2006) find that smoothness improves earnings informativeness. The
analysis splits firms into a high smoothing group, defined as firms that have a stronger negative
correlation between discretionary accruals and unmanaged earnings (total earnings – discretionary
accruals), and a low smoothing group. Their measure of earnings informativeness is the extent to
which changes in current stock returns are reflected in future earnings, following Collins, Kothari,
Shanken, and Sloan (CKSS, 1994). The high smoothing group has a stronger CKSS relation. This
result holds after various controls for the smoothness of the fundamental earnings process. Their
conclusion is that the net smoothing effect of accrual accounting, which they predict would lead to
greater informativeness if accruals smooth noise but to reduced informativeness if managers
artificially smooth earnings relative to the fundamental process, is to improve informativeness and
not to garble earnings.

3.1.3 Asymmetric timeliness and timely loss recognition
We include in this section any studies that measure separately the timeliness of loss
recognition and profit recognition. A more timely recognition of losses is often associated with a
“conservative” accounting system (Basu, 1997; Pope and Walker, 1999). More recent studies
distinguish conditional conservatism, which is more timely recognition of bad news than of good
news in earnings, from unconditional conservatism, which describes an ex ante policy that results in
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lower book values of assets (higher book values of liabilities) in the early periods of an asset or
liability life.18
The most frequently used measure of timely loss recognition is the reverse earnings-returns
regression from Basu (1997).
Earningst+1=α0 + α1Dt + β0Rett+β1Dt Rett + εt
where D = 1 if Ret < 0, and a higher β1 implies more timely loss recognition. The specification is
reported in Exhibit 1. Basu (1997) provides a second measure that is not based on returns.

ΔΝΙτ =α0 +α1NEGDUM+α2ΔΝΙτ_1+α3(NEGDUM*ΔΝΙτ_1) + ετ
where ΔNIt is the change in income from year t-1 to t, scaled by beginning book value of total assets,
and NEGDUM is an indicator variable equal to one if ΔNIt-1 is negative. If bad news is recognized
on a more timely basis than good news, negative earnings changes will be less persistent and will
tend to reverse more than positive earnings changes. This translates into a prediction that α3 < 0,
and Basu (1997) finds support for this prediction. This tendency-to-reverse measure is used in some
papers when equity returns are not available (e.g., Ball and Shivakumar, 2005), and it is used in
other papers to check the robustness of the results.19
Our review of the asymmetric timeliness literature focuses on studies of the determinants and
consequences of asymmetric timeliness, specifically when it is a suggested measure of quality. Ryan
(2006) provides a recent and thorough review of the literature on conservatism, more generally
including measurement issues.

18

Basu (1997) uses the term conditional to describe his measure of conservatism, but he does not specifically call it
“conditional conservatism.”
19
The use of this measure to check the robustness of the results based on the Basu (1997) reverse regression measure has
increased since the publication of Dietrich, Muller, and Riedl (2007), which suggests that the reverse regression measure
is biased. Ryan (2006) questions the magnitude of the bias, but also provides some possible solutions.
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Determinants of asymmetric timeliness and timely loss recognition:20 The first determinant we
discuss is accounting standards. Loss recognition is more timely in common law than code law
countries (Ball, Kothari, and Robin, 2000, BKR). Using the Basu (1997) reverse regression, BKR
find that the R2 of the regression is higher and the β1 coefficient is lower in common law countries,
which suggests greater asymmetric timeliness recognition. Within bad news observations, loss
recognition is more timely in common law countries.
Loss recognition is more timely for firms that use IAS (Barth, Landsman, and Lang, 2008).
Using logit analysis, Barth et al. (2008) compare IAS adopters to non-adopters. The model includes
a dummy explanatory variable for large negative reported earnings and control variables for other
determinants of the choice to follow IAS. The coefficient on the indicator variable is positive. Barth
et al. (2008) also estimate a logit regression within the sample of IAS adopters with the dependent
variable equal to one if the observation is post IAS adoption and equal to zero pre-adoption. The
coefficient estimate on the indicator variable is positive, so IAS adoption is associated with a greater
frequency of reported losses within the same sample of firms across time.
Loss recognition is more timely when equity market incentives demand it. This conclusion is
based on four studies. Ball and Shivakumar (2005), using the Basu (1997) tendency-to-reverse
measure, find that loss recognition is more timely in U.K. public companies than U.K. private
companies. Ball, Robin, and Sadka (2008), using the R2 and β1 coefficient estimate from the Basu
(1997) reverse regression (as in BKR), find that loss recognition is more timely for firms in countries
with greater prominence of debt markets relative to equity markets. Ball, Robin, and Wu (2003),
also using the BKR metrics, find that East Asian countries, which share a common law origin but are
asserted to have lower equity capital markets incentives, do not have more timely loss recognition
20

Many of the studies of the determinants of asymmetric timeliness are cross-country studies, which also are discussed
in Section 4.
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than code law countries. The differences in timely loss recognition within countries (or regions)
with the same standards or legal origin suggest that timely loss recognition has an endogenous
component related to firms’ reporting incentives. It is not driven purely by a country’s accounting
system. Pae, Thornton, and Welker (2005), also using the BKR metrics, find that firm-level priceto-book ratios are a determinant of timely loss recognition and that the negative association is
correlated with the accrual component of earnings, which again supports the conclusion that equity
incentives, and not just mechanical application of accounting principles, are associated with
observed timely loss recognition.
Loss recognition is more timely when enforcement, either internal or external, is stronger.
Francis and Wang (2008) find that the positive association between common law countries as a
proxy for greater investor protection and timely loss recognition is higher only for firms with Bigfour auditors. García Lara, García Osma, and Penalva (2009) find a positive association between
commonly used governance proxies for effective monitoring and timely loss recognition. Chung and
Wynn (2008) find that D&O liability insurance coverage for Canadian firms is negatively associated
with timely loss recognition. One paper provides negative evidence: within a sample of U.S. firms,
Ruddock, Taylor, and Taylor (2006) find no relation between non-audit services, which could
impede independence and reduce auditor monitoring, and timely loss recognition. All four studies
use the Basu (1997) reverse regression to measure timely loss recognition; Chung and Wynn (2008)
and García Lara, García Osma, and Penalva (2009) additionally check the robustness of the results to
the use of the Basu (1997) tendency-to-reverse measure.
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3.1.4 Benchmarking
This section covers studies that use small positive differences between reported earnings and
any benchmark as a measure of earnings quality. A significant component of this literature is related
to the “kink” in the distribution of reported earnings around zero: a statistically small number of
firms with small losses and a statistically large number of firms with small profits (Hayn, 1995;
Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). A common but controversial interpretation of this pattern is that
firms with unmanaged earnings just less than the heuristic target of zero intentionally manage
earnings just enough to report a small profit. Thus, small profits (or avoiding small losses) are a de
facto indication of earnings management. Likewise, small earnings increases are a proxy for
earnings management based on the finding in Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) of a statistically
unusual number of firms with small decreases in earnings, and meeting or beating an analyst
forecast is a proxy for earnings management based on the finding in Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna
(2001) of a “kink” in earnings around consensus analyst forecasts.
The consequences studies frequently use small positive surprises (or avoidance of negative
surprises) as a proxy for managed earnings, and the authors make predictions about the
consequences of the assumed diminished quality. In the determinants studies, the most common
research question is whether the assumption that is made in the consequences studies – that small
positive surprises are more likely to represent managed earnings – is justified.
Determinants of small positive profits: Several studies suggest that small profits are not
evidence of earnings management. Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna (2003), in a large-sample study,
find no relation between realizations of small profits and increases in discretionary accruals. Beaver,
McNichols, and Nelson (2007) suggest that asymmetric taxes, rather than opportunistic choices, can
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explain the kink. Durtschi and Easton (2005) suggest that the kink is due to statistical and sample
bias issues.
Several types of results, however, suggest a relation between small profits and other
recognized proxies for earnings management. First, there is a correlation between small profits and
discretionary accruals in industry-specific and/or account-specific studies. Beaver, McNichols, and
Nelson (2003) find a positive correlation between earnings management of loss reserves and small
profit realizations at P&C insurers. Phillips, Pincus, and Rego (2003) find an association between
deferred tax expense and avoiding losses. In both studies, the results are subject to the caveat that
neither the accruals metric nor small profits represent earnings management, but the two variables
are correlated, perhaps as explained in Beaver et al. (2007). Firms that were able to use more
aggressive revenue recognition techniques, which might provide greater opportunities for earnings
management, are more likely to report small profits and are less likely to report small losses
(Altamuro, Beatty, and Weber, 2005). Second, the kink is strongest in the fourth quarter when
studies assert that the incentives for earnings management are predicted to be higher (Kerstein and
Rai, 2007; Jacob and Jorgensen, 2007). Third, low audit effort measured by hours worked, which
might mitigate opportunities for earnings management, is associated with small positive profits
(Caramanis and Lennox, 2008).
Determinants of meeting or beating targets: The literature on the determinants of meeting or
beating analyst forecasts and reporting small earnings increases includes three types of analyses. In
the first type, the study focuses on the mechanisms/tools that firms use to produce earnings that just
meet or beat a target. Firms make accounting choices such as managing tax expense (Dhaliwal,
Gleason, and Mills, 2004); managing the classification of items within the income statement
(McVay, 2006); and managing the creation and reversal of restructuring charge accruals/cushions
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(Moehrle, 2002). Firms also make real decisions such as repurchasing stock (Hribar, Jenkins, and
Johnson, 2006) or selling fixed assets or marketable securities (Herrmann, Inoue, and Thomas, 2003)
or repurchasing shares (Bens, Nagar, Skinner, and Wong, 2003). Ayers, Jiang, and Yeung (2006),
following the basic approach of Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna (2003), assess the relation between
discretionary accruals and meeting or beating analyst forecasts and reporting small earnings
increases. They find some evidence consistent with an association between earnings management
through the use of accruals and these targets.
In the second type of analysis, the study focuses on firms’ equity market incentives to meet or
beat a target. Matsumoto (2002) finds that firms with greater incentives, primarily given their
ownership structure, are more likely to just meet or beat a target.21 Beatty, Ke, and Petroni (2002)
find that public banks are more likely to use discretionary bank-specific accruals to report small
profit increases. Cheng and Warfield (2005) find that managers with high equity incentives are more
likely to just meet or beat a target, and McVay, Nagar, and Tang (2006) find insider trading
subsequent to just meeting or beating. Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) indirectly link earnings
management activities to equity market incentives assuming that analyst stock recommendations –
not meeting or beating a forecast – proxy for incentives.
In the third type of analysis, the study focuses on opportunities to meet or beat a target.
Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson (2002) find a positive (negative) correlation between non-audit (audit)
fees as proxies for auditor quality and independence and small earnings increases and the likelihood
of meeting or beating analyst forecasts. Brown and Pinello (2007) show that firms are more likely to
avoid negative earnings surprises relative to an analyst forecast at interim quarters when they
hypothesize the greatest opportunities to manage earnings. Barton and Simko (2002) find that firms

21

She supports this indirect evidence with direct tests that the firms appear to meet or beat via abnormal accruals and by
managing the forecast down.
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with overstated net asset values are constrained in their opportunities to manage earnings and are
less likely to meet or beat analyst forecasts.
Consequences of small earnings surprises: Three papers suggest that meeting or beating
targets has positive market consequences. Two papers document that firms that consistently report
earnings increases relative to the prior year or relative to the same quarter of the prior year receive a
price premium (e.g., Barth, Elliott, and Finn, 1999; Myers, Myers, and Skinner, 2007). These
studies do not provide evidence on whether the strings are achieved by artificial smoothing. Bartov,
Givoly, and Hayn (2002) find that meeting or beating analyst forecasts is associated with a higher
contemporaneous quarterly return. Bhattacharya et al. (2003) find that greater opacity, which he
measures as an increasing function of loss avoidance, is associated with a higher average cost of
equity and a lower level of trade, however, the loss avoidance proxy alone is not a significant
determinant.
The positive market consequences are mitigated if earnings management is suspected.
Kasznik and McNichols (2002) find that meeting or beating on an ad hoc basis does not lead to
higher valuations, but that meeting or beating regularly does. Gleason and Mills (2008) show that
when earnings management is more obvious and detectable, and thus investors are more able to
differentiate meeting or beating that represents earnings management from that which represents
value-relevant good news, there is a market discount for beating. Patterns in analyst forecasts/stock
recommendations as a consequence of meeting or beating targets, however, suggest that analysts do
not detect/anticipate earnings management to meet or beat targets (Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003;
Burgstahler and Eames, 2003).
A final consequence paper uses a unique measure of “surprise.” Affleck-Graves, Callahan,
and Chipalkatti (2002) compute an earnings predictability “score” based on analyst forecast errors
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and analyst forecast dispersion at the timing of the filing of the year y-1 10-K filing. The paper
predicts and finds that the high category of “surprise” firms has a greater conditional increase in
abnormal adverse selection costs measured using functions of short window bid-ask spreads around
quarterly earnings announcements.

3.2 Earnings response coefficients (ERCs)
Prior to Ball and Brown (1968) academic accounting research focused on evaluating the
“quality of earnings” in terms of conformity to a consistent measurement system or conceptual
framework.22 Beaver (1968), Ball and Brown (1967; 1968), and Martin (1971) changed the
perspective of academic research in terms of how “quality” was evaluated. They showed that
earnings news was correlated with various equity market attributes (long-window returns and
volume and volatility changes around earnings announcements). Because these outcomes result
when investors change their equity valuations, they conclude that information in earnings is
correlated with the information used by investors in their valuation decisions. Thus, it is not
surprising that a returns-based earnings response coefficient is a candidate proxy for decisionusefulness or earnings quality. (See Exhibit 2 for the regression model commonly used to estimate
the ERC).
In this section, we examine the robustness of the earnings response coefficient (ERC) as a
direct proxy for earnings quality. We make a distinction between these studies and studies that use
returns to infer the quality of earnings. The studies that use the ERC as a direct proxy for earnings
quality test a theory that predicts a determinant of quality (e.g., governance characteristics) or a
consequence of it (e.g., voluntary disclosure). The analyses are joint tests of market efficiency and
22

Much of the debate focused on whether earnings should be measured using historical cost with matching (e.g., Daines,
1929; Littleton, 1956; Paton and Littleton, 1940); replacement cost or entry values (e.g., Sterling, 1970); future
discounted cash flows (e.g., Fisher, 1907, 1930); or net realizable values or exit costs (e.g., Chambers, 1956, 1965).
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earnings quality. The studies specifically state (or at least strongly imply) that the ERC is a direct
proxy for earnings quality.
The studies commonly cite Holthausen and Verrecchia (HV, 1988) as the theoretical basis for
their prediction that ERCs are positively correlated with earnings quality. In the HV model, an
information signal communicates the true value of a firm’s liquidating dividend with noise, and the
variance of the noise term reflects the “quality” (HV’s term) of the information signal.
The assertion that ERCs measure precision of earnings information has some empirical
support. Imhoff and Lobo (1992) find a negative relation between ERCs and analyst forecast
dispersion, which they interpret as evidence that higher quality earnings are associated with lower ex
ante inherent uncertainty about earnings and the information the firm has provided to analysts.
Kinney, Burgstahler, and Martin (2002) also find a negative association between analyst forecast
dispersion and ERCs.
Liu and Thomas (2000) specifically state that the ERC can be viewed as a measure of higher
quality earnings (p. 73). They show that the ERC (coefficient estimate) and the R2 of the ERC
regression are affected by the relation between unexpected earnings (UE), measured as actual
earnings for t minus the forecast of period t earnings in t-1, and earnings forecast revisions for future
periods (FR), measured using information available at time t. When the correlation between UE and
FR is high, the observed ERC will be high. They attribute low values of the regression R2 to
heterogeneity of the correlation between UE and FR within the sample. Hence, the ERC captures
the notion of earnings quality in the sense of Graham and Dodd (1934), in that a higher ERC is
associated with predictability of the fundamental earnings process.
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Determinants of ERCs:
3.2.1 Accounting methods
Five papers examine the cross-sectional or longitudinal relation between earnings measured
under alternative methods and the resulting ERCs.23 Altamuro, Beatty, and Weber (2005) show that
firms that are required to significantly change their revenue recognition policies because of SAB 101
exhibit a decline in earnings informativeness. In the pre-adoption period, the SAB 101 firms have
significantly higher ERCs than matched sample firms with similar revenue generation processes.
The post-adoption ERCs do not appear to be different. Loudder and Behn (1995) compare ERCs for
a sample of R&D intensive firms that capitalized R&D costs pre-SFAS No. 2 and were forced to
expense after SFAS No.2 to the ERCs of a matched sample of firms that expensed R&D both preand post-SFAS No. 2. The capitalizing firms have significantly higher ERCs relative to the matched
sample in the pre-adoption period. Their ERCs decline when they are forced to expense. Collins
and Salatka (1993) document an increase in ERCs of multinational firms after adoption of SFAS No.
52 (accounting for translation gains and losses), which they suggest made earnings less noisy, but
not necessarily more or less aggressive.
Dharan and Lev (1993) find that firms that move to income-increasing methods have lower
R2s and ERCs in the year of the change relative to a control sample of non-change firms and a
sample of firms that move to income-decreasing methods. Pincus (1993) characterizes a portfolio of
accounting choices related to inventory, depreciation, investment tax credits, and leases with respect
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Early papers examined differences in market responses to earnings measured under different accounting methods
(Mlynarczyk, 1969; Gonedes, 1969; Ball, 1972; Cassidy, 1976), with a general notion of exploring the degree of market
efficiency. They did not assert that the earnings number under one method or another was more decision useful. Rather,
they assumed that both earnings numbers were different representations of the same firm performance and the research
question was whether markets understood this. These studies generally did not control for endogeneity of method
choice.
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to conservatism, which is defined as whether the methods are primarily income-accelerating.24
While there is some evidence that the ERCs of conservative and non-conservative firms differ,
Pincus acknowledges that it cannot be attributed to the methods per se.
The standard academic debate is whether managerial discretion over accounting method
choice, in the presence of information asymmetry, improves efficient capital allocation because
managers use the discretion to convey private information to investors (e.g., Healy and Palepu,
1993) or whether the discretion decreases efficiency because managers use it to bias financial
reporting. The papers discussed above provide inconclusive evidence on this debate. Dharan and
Lev (1993) interpret their evidence as suggesting that changing to income-increasing methods may
be a warning sign that there are fundamental problems at the firm that are being masked by the
accounting methods, which supports the bias story. Loudder and Behn (1995) and Altamuro et al.
(2005), however, suggest that earnings measured under the more “aggressive” policy, in the sense
that earnings recognition is earlier rather than later or expense recognition is delayed, is associated
with a higher market response. These studies challenge the premise that earnings aggressiveness
should be viewed as de facto evidence of lower quality.
Many studies examine whether ERCs have changed over time for the US economy. The
general finding is that the value relevance of earnings has declined over time.25 Conservatism in
accounting standards associated with intangible assets, and the increase in intangible-intensive firms,
is one explanation (e.g. Lev and Zarowin 1999). Another explanation is the increase in fair value
accounting (e.g. asset impairments, the recognition of pension liabilities), which results in the
24

Pincus (1993) is an example of a paper that specifically motivates his paper as one that investigates the “quality of
earnings” and cites Lev (1989) as the source of his inspiration.
25
See Collins, Maydew, and Weiss (1997); Francis and Schipper (1999); Lev and Zarowin (1999); Brown, Lo, and Lys
(1999); Givoly and Hayn (2000); Francis, Schipper, and Vincent (2002); Landsman and Maydew (2002); Core, Guay,
and VanBuskirk (2003); Ryan and Zarowin (2003); Dontoh, Radhakrishnan, and Ronen (2004); Beaver, McNichols, and
Rhie (2005); Kim and Kross (2005); Collins, Li, and Xie (2007); Jorion, Shi, and Zhang (2007); Dichev and Tang
(2008).
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recognition of more transitory losses in earnings (e.g., Givoly and Hayn 2000). Johnson (1999)
however, shows that the association between earnings and stock returns is larger in economic
expansions and smaller in economic recessions. This result raises the question of whether it is the
“return” component of ERCs or the “earnings” component of ERCs that is changing. If market
structures and asset pricing patterns are time-variant, one might observe time variation in ERCs in
the presence of stable earnings quality (Hoitash, Krishnan, and Sankaraguruswamy, 2002).

3.2.2 Firm characteristics
Governance characteristics: Using both short and long-window ERCs, Francis, Schipper, and
Vincent (2005) find that earnings are less informative for firms with dual class shares. Further
analysis suggests that markets view the earnings of firms with a dual class structure as less credible
primarily because of the separation of voting rights from cash flow rights, although the firms with
dual class shares also tend to have greater managerial ownership. Using long-window ERCs, Wang
(2006) finds a positive association between founding family ownership and earnings
informativeness, measured as the regression coefficient in an annual returns-earnings model.26
Debt Characteristics: Our database includes Dhaliwal, Lee, and Fargher (1991) and Core and
Schrand (1999), which find that leverage is associated with non-linearities in ERCs. Both papers
recognize that equity is a call option on the value of the firm and predict the shape of the earningsreturns relation as a function of the firm’s debt structure. These papers present researchers with a
measurement issue to consider when using ERCs as a measure of quality.
Auditors: Teoh and Wong (1993) report higher ERC coefficients for firms with Big-8 auditors,
which they use as a proxy for audit quality. Francis and Ke (2006) find that non-audit fees, which
26

Warfield, Wild, and Wild (1995) document a similar relation between managerial ownership and an identical
specification of the ERC, based on the same theoretical arguments. Warfield et al., however, use the term “earnings
informativeness” rather than “earnings quality” to motivate the test.
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they assert proxy for lower independence, are negatively related to ERCs. Hackenbrack and Hogan
(2002) find that the average short window (2-day) ERC for the two annual earnings announcements
after an auditor change that likely indicates a credibility decrease (e.g., to lower fees, because of a
disagreement over fees, or because of a disagreement with the auditors) is lower than the ERC for
the two annual pre-change earnings announcements. However, the average ERC is higher for firms
that switch for reasons that the authors classify as service related. Manry, Tiras, and Wheatley
(2003) report that quarterly returns have a stronger association with contemporaneous earnings
levels for firms that have timely auditor reviews of their interim earnings, but they have a stronger
relation with lagged earnings for firms that have retrospective auditor reviews.27
3.2.3 Information environment
Concurrent disclosure of non-earnings information generally improves the earnings-returns
relation for firms with poor earnings informativeness (e.g., Lougee and Marquardt, 2004). Baber,
Chen, and Kang (2006) reach a similar conclusion based on a finding that the market discount that
investors apply to earnings that are likely to be upwardly managed declines when balance sheet
information is disclosed concurrent with the earnings announcement.28 Amir and Lev (1996) confine
the analysis to an industry in which financial information “informativeness” is likely low –
independent cellular companies – and document that non-financial indicators (e.g., POPS, which is a
measure of population density) are value-relevant. Amir, Harris, and Venuti (1993), however,
characterize their evidence as “mixed” on whether 20-F earnings reconciliations improve earnings
informativeness using both long and short-window ERCs.

27

Due to data constraints, sample size limits the power of the tests. There are 328 observations with timely reviews and
84 retrospective reviews. The authors are unable to address selection issues and the authors acknowledge that the results
are “mixed” across quarters and specification of the earnings variable in levels or changes.
28
This analysis incorporates the findings of Chen, DeFond, and Park (2002), which models the firm’s decision to
voluntarily disclose balance sheet information in earnings announcements.

60

Francis, Schipper, and Vincent (2002) find a significant positive cross-sectional association
between abnormal returns to analyst announcements (aggregated over all announcements prior to the
earnings announcement) and the market response to subsequent quarter earnings. Evidence on the
association between mean abnormal returns and ERCs, however, is mixed. They interpret the
totality of their evidence as providing little support for the view that competing information from
analysts erodes the informativeness of earnings.
Collins and DeAngelo (1990) find that the market is more responsive to earnings during a
proxy contest. This finding rejects one proposed hypothesis which is that earnings during this period
are less precise because they are likely to be opportunistically managed. Rather, they interpret their
finding as evidence that a proxy contest is a period of heightened uncertainty and that the earnings
number is especially useful for valuation.
In summary, firms appear to supplement poor fundamental earnings informativeness with
additional information (Lougee and Marquardt, 2004; Chen, DeFond, and Park, 2002). However,
management forecasts are associated with historically stronger earnings informativeness (higher
ERCs), so the relation between disclosure and ERCs is not generalizable.

Consequences of ERCs
Figure 2 indicates that the only examined consequence of ERCs as a proxy for earnings
quality is voluntary disclosure. Two papers find that firms voluntarily disclose non-earnings
information when earnings are less informative. Chen, DeFond, and Park (2002) find that when
earnings informativeness is low or uncertain, firms have a greater propensity to voluntarily disclose
balance sheet information in earnings announcements. Lougee and Marquardt (2004) document that
firms with low historical ERCs are more likely to voluntarily disclose pro forma earnings. One
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paper, however, finds that firms are more likely to issue management forecasts of earnings when
earnings are more informative (Lennox and Park, 2006). Their explanation for the result is that
managers’ propensity to forecast is increasing in the manager’s confidence about forecast accuracy,
given reputation concerns.

3.3 External indicators of financial reporting quality (FRQ)
The external indicators of financial reporting quality that we review are: 1) SEC Accounting
and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs), 2) Restatements, and 3) Internal controls. We term
these external measures of financial reporting quality because the researcher does not measure a
characteristic of earnings to determine its quality, but rather obtains evidence from an outside source
(the SEC, or the management team themselves in the case of restatements, or the auditor in the case
of internal control disclosures). Two important distinctions of these variables as proxies for EQ is
that they often provide information about the quality of the financial statements as a whole, not just
earnings, and that they each involve potentially significant selection issues, as discussed below.

3.3.1 AAERs as a proxy for earnings management
The SEC issues accounting and auditing enforcement releases (AAERs) after it completes an
investigation and takes action against a firm, manager, or the auditor of the firm. Samples of
AAERs used in accounting research typically consist of cases where the SEC alleges that the firm
has misstated or overstated earnings. Samples usually exclude cases against auditors and pure
disclosure cases. Almost half of the AAER firms have overstated revenue, but overstatements of
inventory and other assets are also common (Dechow, Ge, Larson, and Sloan 2009). In most AAER
cases, the SEC typically accuses managers of intentionally misstating financial statements, which is
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the definition of fraud in SAS No. 99. In some cases, however, the SEC alleges that managers were
negligent (i.e., “reckless in not knowing” of the misstatement).
Because the AAER sample includes cases of egregious and intentional misstatements (i.e.,
earnings management), it is likely to have a lower Type I error rate than samples identified using
other methods such as abnormal accruals models. One issue of concern, however, is the potential for
selection bias related to how the SEC identifies the misstating firms. Given a constrained budget,
the SEC may not pursue cases that involve ambiguity and that it does not expect to win. The SEC
states that it will scrutinize firms that restate earnings because the firm has already admitted to
making a mistake. The SEC also states that it is concerned with market impact because their role is
to protect investors. Therefore, they scrutinize firms with large market capitalizations as well as IPO
firms and firms raising public debt or equity.

Determinants of AAERs
Managerial compensation: Dechow et al. (1996) and Beneish (1999) do not find an association
between the existence of an earnings-based bonus plan and the likelihood of accounting
manipulations. Johnson, Ryan, and Tian (2009) find that AAER managers face stronger incentives
from unrestricted stocks than those of control firms, however, Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew
(2006) and Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker (2009) do not find a positive association between
stock-based incentive compensation and the likelihood of accounting fraud. Dechow et al. (1996) do
not find abnormally higher stock sale activities for the officers and directors of the AAER firms
during the manipulation years, but two subsequent studies find that insiders of fraud firms tend to
engage in more stock sales during the manipulation period (Summers and Sweeney, 1998; Beneish,
1999).

63

Debt covenants: Dechow et al. (1996) find that manipulation firms have higher leverage ratios and
are more likely to violate debt covenants during and after the manipulation period than control firms.
Beneish (1999), however, does not find statistically significant differences between manipulation
firms and control firms in either leverage ratios or default risk.29
Capital market incentives: Dechow et al. (1996) find that manipulation firms have higher ex ante
external financing demands and higher ex post external financing activities than non-manipulation
firms. Beneish (1999) again provides conflicting evidence, but Dechow et al. (2009) confirm the
result using a more comprehensive sample of AAER firms.
Board of directors and CEOs: AAER firms tend to have a smaller percentage of outside members on
the board of directors, are more likely to have a CEO who also serves as chairman of the board or
founder of the company and are less likely to have an outside blockholder than control firms (e.g.,
Dechow et al, 1996; Beasley, 1996; Farber, 2005). In addition, Feng, Ge, Luo, and Shevlin (2009)
provide evidence suggesting that CFOs become involved mainly under CEO pressure rather than for
their own immediate financial benefits.
Audit committees and auditors: Dechow et al. (1996) find that AAER firms are less likely to have an
audit committee, but Beasley (1996) does not find a significant association. Farber (2005) shows
that fraud firms tend to have fewer audit committee meetings and fewer financial experts on the
audit committee.30 He does not, however, find an effect of audit committee independence on
accounting fraud. Neither Dechow et al. (1996) nor Beneish (1999) finds a significant difference
between the auditor quality of misstatement firms and control firms, using Big 4 status as an
29

Dechow et al. (1996) and Beneish (1999) find conflicting results in several cases. A possible explanation is the
difference between the samples. Beneish’s sample includes 10 “fraud” firms identified from a search of the financial
press that were not the subject of AAERs (yet, he argues). Dechow et al.’s sample consists of just over 90 AAER firms,
all of which overstate earnings.
30
McDaniel, Martin, and Maines (2002) in an experimental setting find that financial experts help audit committees
focus on monitoring more important financial reporting issues.
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indication of audit firm quality, but Farber (2005) finds that fraud firms are less likely to have Big-4
audit firms using a more recent sample. Geiger, Lennox, and North (2008) do not find empirical
evidence that auditor independence is associated with fraud, while Joe and Vandervelde (2007), in
an experimental setting, suggest that it is.

Consequences of AAERs
Manager turnover: Feroz et al. (1991) find that 42 of 58 AAER firms between 1982 and 1989 (72.4
percent) have management turnover (i.e., firing or resignation) after the public disclosure of the
misstatement. Beneish (1999) documents that only 35.9 percent of misstatement firms have CEO
turnover subsequent to the discovery of accounting misstatements (during the year of discovery and
four years following the discovery) for AAER firms between 1987 and 1993. Karpoff, Lee, and
Martin (2008) find that 93 percent of the individuals identified by the SEC as the responsible party
leave the company by the end of the enforcement period, and these culpable individuals suffer
serious legal penalties (e.g., criminal charges) and monetary losses.
Firm value: Feroz et al. (1991) and Dechow et al. (1996) find a stock return of -9 to -10 percent on
the first announcement day of the accounting misstatements (see also Miller, 2006a). Dechow et al.
(1996) document a significant increase in bid-ask spreads and a significant decline in analyst
following after the discovery of accounting misstatements. Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008b) find
that the enforcement firms on average lose a total of 38 percent of their market values measured over
all announcement dates related to the enforcement action. They suggest that two thirds of the
decline represents lost reputation, which they define as “the decrease in the present value of future
cash flows as investors, customers, and suppliers are expected to change the terms of trade with
which they do business with the firm.” The remaining one-third represents legal penalties, and
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readjustments in valuations associated with the “restated” financial information. Farber (2005) finds
that only firms that improve their corporate governance (e.g., by increasing the percentage of outside
members on the board) experience improved stock market performance in the three-year postdetection period after controlling for changes in operating performance.
Auditors: Feroz et al. (1991) find that large auditors of the AAER firms are less likely to be censured
by the SEC and suffer lighter penalties than small auditors. They suggest two explanations: large
auditors are associated with less extreme cases and/or large auditors can afford more resources to
negotiate with the SEC to lower penalties. Bonner, Palmrose, and Young (1998) document that
auditors face litigation in 38 percent of AAER firms in their sample. The litigation risk for auditors
is higher when the type of fraud occurs frequently across companies (i.e., common frauds) or when
the fraud is caused by fictitious transactions.

Conclusions based on studies of AAERs
AAER firms would seem to be a powerful place for researchers to investigate incentives to
manipulate earnings, but the evidence on the determinants of AAERs, and in particular on the role of
governance in monitoring manipulations, is mixed and weak. One explanation is large type II errors.
That is, firms that manage earnings for similar reasons are not identified by the SEC or firms manage
earnings just within the boundaries of GAAP and avoid SEC selection. This problem inhibits proper
matching. Other explanations include (i) small sample sizes that lack power, (ii) differences in
sample composition over time; or (iii) endogeneity of contracting variables (e.g., Armstrong et al.,
2009).
There is consistent and compelling evidence that investors react negatively to discovery of a
misstatement, but it is less clear how to interpret this result. Keeping in mind that most samples of
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AAERs consist of overstatement of earnings, there are at least four explanations for a negative
market reaction. First, investors could adjust their forecasts of future cash flow because the forecasts
are based on historical earnings and the AAER reveals that historical earnings are lower than
previously reported. Second, investors could reassess the multiplier (persistence parameter) they
apply to the firm’s fundamental earnings process (growth prospects) as well as change the discount
rate. Third, investors could increase the discount rate if the AAER causes them to revise downward
their expectations about the precision of the firm’s accounting information. Finally, investors might
revise their expectations of future cash flows because they expect the AAER to create additional
costs that the firm would otherwise not have incurred, such as litigation or reputation loss.
The third potential source of negative returns – that investors change their assessment of the
precision of the accounting measurement and reporting system – should be of particular interest to
accountants, but it is difficult to disentangle this explanation from the others. The AAER reactions,
however, have advantages for documenting revaluations due to changes in information risk. Many
of the announcements are a surprise, the event window is fairly short, and the events are not
clustered in calendar time. Karpoff et al. took a useful first step toward differentiating among the
possible explanations for the negative stock market reactions, and we would encourage the use of
this sample to identify the pricing of earnings quality.

3.3.2 Restatements as a proxy for earnings quality
There are four important differences between firms that restate earnings and the AAER
firms.31 First, restatement samples are significantly larger than samples of AAER firms in any given
year, which adds power to the empirical tests. Second, the restatement sample includes a wider

31

See Dechow et al. (2009) for a detailed discussion of the comparison between different databases related to accounting
misstatements.
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range of misstatements and they are primarily earnings restatements. Third, many restatements are
caused by internal errors in applying accounting rules rather than intentional misreporting, and the
proportion of such restatements in the database has increased in recent years (Plumlee and Yohn,
2008; Hennes, Leone, and Miller, 2008). Fourth, the selection problem in the restatement sample
differs from that in the AAER sample, although it is not clear which is a bigger concern. Different
selection criteria across the multiple sources that identify restatements might suggest that the
selection problem simply creates noise in the analysis rather than bias, but knowing that the SEC
selects the AAER cases may make it easier to control for the potential bias.

Determinants of restatements
Managerial compensation: Burns and Kedia (2006) find that the sensitivity of the CEO's option
portfolio to stock price is significantly positively associated with the likelihood of restatements, but
the sensitivity of other components of CEO compensation, (i.e., equity, restricted stock, long-term
incentive payouts, and salary plus bonus) is not related. Efendi et al. (2007) find that the likelihood
of restatements increases when the CEO has considerable holdings of in-the-money stock options.32
However, Armstrong et al. (2009) do not find any significant association between CEO equity
incentives and restatements after controlling for the compensation contracting environment.
Board of directors and auditors: Restatement firms tend to have CEOs who serve as chairman of the
board or have founder status, and have board or audit committee directors with financial expertise
(Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Efendi et al., 2007). Independence of the board or audit committee is
not a determinant of the likelihood of restatement (Agrawal and Chadha, (2005). Larcker,
Richardson, and Tuna (2007) find that only two out of fourteen dimensions of governance (insider
32

Efendi et al. (2007) also find that restatements are more likely when firms are constrained by an interest-coverage debt
covenant and when they raise external financing. This paper is the only one in our database that examines debt
contracting and equity market incentives as determinants of restatements.
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power such as percentage of insiders on board, and debt variables such as the ratio of book value of
debt to the market value of equity) are associated with restatements.
Non-audit fees, which are presumed to affect auditor independence and hence may
compromise auditor quality, are not associated with restatements on average (Agrawal and Chadha,
2005). Kinney, Palmrose, and Scholz (2004) also find no association between fees for financial
information systems design and implementation or internal audit services and restatements, but they
find some association between fees for unspecified non-audit services and restatements. When using
a sample of U.K. firms, Ferguson, Seow, and Young (2004) find a positive association between nonaudit fees and restatements.

Consequences of restatements
Managers/Directors: Managers at restatement firms experience significantly higher turnover (Desai,
Hogan and Wilkins, 2006; Hennes et al., 2008) and director turnover (Srinivasan, 2005) than control
firms. Desai et al. (2006) also find that it is more difficult for these displaced managers to find
subsequent employment than displaced managers of control firms. Srinivasan (2005) finds that
director turnover rate is higher for more severe restatements and for audit committee directors.
Firm value: Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz (2004) document an average market-adjusted return
of -9.2 percent over a two-day restatement announcement window; the average is -20 percent for
restatements associated with fraud.33 Lev, Ryan, and Wu (2008) document that the restatements that
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Desai, Krishnamurthy, and Venkataraman (2006) find that short sellers accumulate positions in restatement firms
before restatement announcements and unwind these positions after stock prices decline due to the restatement. Their
finding suggests that short sellers are able to identify firms that will likely restate in advance of the restatement
announcement. It does not, however, explain their assumptions regarding market efficiency. One possibility is that the
short sellers believe the stock is overpriced due to the valuation implications of the misstated earnings, they expect the
restatement to reveal the mispricing and the price to correct. Another possibility is that the short-sellers anticipate that
markets will react negatively to restatements on average, regardless of the implications of the restatement for valuation.
More research is needed to interpret the implications of this evidence for earnings quality.
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significantly change the historical pattern of earnings (e.g., shortening histories of earnings growth)
have more negative stock market consequences. Gleason, Jenkins, and Johnson (2008) find that
restatement announcements cause stock price declines for non-restatement firms in the same
industry. Hribar and Jenkins (2004) document a significant increase in a firm’s cost of equity
capital, measured based on the residual income model, in the month following a restatement. Kravet
and Shevlin (2009) document a significant increase in the pricing of information risk after
restatement announcements.
Litigation: Palmrose and Scholz (2004) find that 38 percent of restatements are associated with
litigation, including litigation actions against the company, officers, directors, and auditors. They
document that the likelihood of litigation increases with the impact of restatements on earnings
(magnitude) and the fraudulent nature of restatements. Restatements of core earnings (i.e., recurring
earnings from primary operations) and restatements that involve a greater number of accounts tend
to result in a higher likelihood of lawsuits and larger payments by defendants. Lev et al. (2008) find
that restatements that curtail histories of earnings growth or positive earnings have a higher
likelihood of class action lawsuits than other restatements.

Conclusions based on studies of restatements
Restatements measure both intentional and unintentional errors; they are not a good proxy for
intentional earnings management. In support of this conclusion, the compensation variables, that
would provide incentives for intentional earnings management, and the monitors that would
constrain such behavior, are not consistently associated with restatements. Support for this
conclusion also comes from a related study by Kinney and McDaniel (1989), which finds that firms
that correct previously announced quarterly earnings are smaller, are less profitable, have higher
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debt, are more slowly growing, and face more serious uncertainties. They interpret their evidence as
suggesting that accounting errors are the outcome of a weak accounting system (i.e., weak internal
control procedures) rather than opportunistic earnings management. The mixed results about the
determinants of restatements, however, could be due to selection bias associated with detection of
the accounting irregularity and the firm’s decision to report it.
Restatements reflect errors that cause investors to revise their beliefs about information
precision associated with the firm’s earnings (e.g., Hribar and Jenkins, 2004; Kravet and Shevlin,
2009). We found no studies that provide similar evidence about the effects of AAERs on investor
beliefs.
The restatement samples might be useful to examine the complete path from a predicted
determinant (i.e., weak internal control procedures) to a particular type of earnings quality and then
to a predicted consequence because of the variation in the types of errors reflected in the
restatements. For example, one could address whether the market consequences of a misstatement
are different if an internal control weakness rather than an agency problem causes it.

3.3.3 Internal control procedures quality as a proxy for earnings quality34
Under Section 302 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), which became effective on
August 29, 2002, management is required to certify in its 10-Qs and 10-Ks their conclusions about
the effectiveness of the firms’ internal control procedures. Section 404 of SOX, which became
effective on November 15, 2004 for accelerated filers, requires companies to include management’s
assessment of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures in its annual report;

34

Studies that examine whether internal control procedures are a determinant of another earnings quality proxy (e.g.,
discretionary accruals or persistence) are discussed in Section 5.2.3.
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the firm’s public accountants must attest to this assessment.35 Prior to these reports, companies (with
the exception of the banking industry) were required to disclose significant internal control
deficiencies in 8-Ks only when disclosing a change in auditors (Ge and McVay, 2005; Krishnan,
2005; Altamuro and Beatty, 2009). Earlier research consisted primarily of case studies or analysis of
survey data. For example, Willingham and Wright (1985) survey audit firm partners and do not find
an association between auditors’ assessment of internal control effectiveness and financial statement
errors detected by auditors.36 A couple of studies have shown a positive association between internal
control quality and various earnings quality measures such as discretionary accruals and earnings
persistence (e.g., Doyle et al., 2007b; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008). These studies provide some
justification for using the internal control deficiencies reported under SOX as an indication of
earnings quality.
Determinants of internal control procedures: Krishnan (2005) finds that independent audit
committees and audit committees with financial expertise are significantly less likely to be
associated with the incidence of internal control problems. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) and Doyle
et al. (2007a) find that firms with higher control risk associated with organizational complexity and
significant organizational changes are more likely to have internal control deficiencies. The
weakness firms also appear to be more constrained in their resources to invest in internal control
systems (i.e., firm size, financial strength).

Consequences of internal control procedures: Hammersley, Myers, and Shakespeare (2008) and
Beneish, Billings, and Hodder (2008) find that disclosures of internal control weaknesses under

35

Internal control disclosures under Section 404 are available in machine readable form from Audit Analytics. The early
papers collected the reports from Compliance Week.
36
Kinney (2000) also notes that lack of access to data was a barrier to research on internal control procedures. Some
very early work analyzed the design and tests of internal control system (e.g., Cushing, 1974; Kinney, 1975).
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Section 302 are associated with negative stock price reactions. In addition, Beneish et al. (2008)
find that Section 302 disclosures are associated with a decrease in analyst forecast revisions and an
increase in cost of equity capital. However, disclosures of internal control weaknesses under Section
404 are not associated with a negative stock price reaction, a decrease in analyst forecast revisions,
or an increase in cost of equity capital (Ogneva, Subramanyam and Raghunandan, 2007; Beneish et
al. 2008). Only one study by Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and LaFond (2009) documents a
significant increase of the cost of equity capital following Section 404 disclosures, arguing that
Ogneva et al.’s findings suffer from look-ahead bias in the classification of internal control quality.37

Conclusions based on studies of internal control procedures
The determinants and consequences of internal control deficiencies disclosed under SOX
Section 302 exhibit predictable patterns that suggest that such deficiencies measure the propensity
for misstatements. The use of this variable to proxy for variation in EQ, however, is subject to a
concern that disclosures of material weaknesses are correlated with manager and auditor incentives
to discover and disclose internal control weaknesses (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007; Hogan and
Wilkins, 2008).
The mixed findings on the consequences of internal control disclosures based on Section 404
reports cast doubt on whether the Section 404 disclosures are a source of information about financial
reporting quality to investors. There are several explanations for the difference in the consequences
of Section 302 and Section 404 reports. First, the threshold for Section 404 material weaknesses
may be lower than that for Section 302. Second, the Section 404 sample currently is limited to
accelerated filers that have a richer information environment. Third, there is ambiguity regarding
37

A related study by Chang, Chen, Liao, and Mishra (2006) finds that firms that have CEOs and CFOs certify their
financial statements under SOX experience a decline in bid-ask spreads.
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whether disclosure of material weaknesses is mandatory under Section 302, and as a result, less
severe material weaknesses are not disclosed (Doyle et al., 2007b). Fourth, the Section 404
disclosures are made in the annual report, while the Section 302 disclosures can be made on dates
without confounding announcements in the event window.
There is a wide range of different types of internal control weaknesses (e.g., weaknesses
resulting in restatements versus not, weaknesses resulting in accounting errors versus earnings
management, weaknesses driven by various determinants such as organizational changes). Thus
firms with internal control weakness disclosures are also a sample that researchers could use to
examine the complete path from a determinant to “earnings quality” to a consequence.

4. Cross country studies
This section discusses the papers in our database that examine determinants and
consequences of cross-country variation in earnings quality. Section 4.1 discusses studies on
determinants of country-level earnings informativeness to equity markets, using proxies such as
ERCs. Section 4.2 discusses studies that examine determinants of country-level earnings
management as a specific element of earnings quality. Section 4.3 discusses studies on
consequences of country-level earnings quality.

4.1 Earnings informativeness proxies for earnings quality
Four papers in our database examine variations in country-level value-relevance measures.
Alford, Jones, Leftwich, and Zmijewski (1993) document cross-country variation in long-window
ERCs and earnings-based hedge portfolio returns for 17 countries. They do not test hypotheses
about predictable differences in ERCs across countries. Rather, they provide the reader with a
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summary of important institutional cross-country differences (e.g., interim reporting frequency) to
help interpret the results ex post. Ali and Hwang (2000) compute the two measures of earnings
informativeness (ERC and earnings-based hedge portfolio returns) from Alford et al. (1993), plus
two additional measure – value relevance of accruals and combined value relevance of earnings and
book value of equity – across partitions of 16 countries that they predict to exhibit variation in
earnings informativeness ex ante. They investigate six country-level institutional factors, but the
results they emphasize are that earnings informativeness is lower in countries where financial
systems are bank-oriented rather than market-oriented and where the accounting rules are less likely
to be tilted toward preferences of equity markets because of the standard-setting process. Hung
(2000) uses earnings-based hedge portfolio returns to measure country-level earnings
informativeness. She finds across 21 countries that more extensive use of accrual accounting rather
than cash accounting is associated with lower earnings informativeness only in countries with weak
shareholder protection.38 DeFond, Hung, and Trezevant (2007), for 26 countries, document a
positive association between average country-level earnings quality, measured based on a score
developed in Leuz et al. (2003), and abnormal return variance during a two day annual earnings
announcement window. They interpret this finding as evidence that a high Leuz et al. quality score
implies greater earnings credibility and hence improves earnings informativeness. They also find
that abnormal return variance around earnings announcements is higher in countries with better
enforced insider trading laws, strong investor protection, and less frequent interim reporting.
Researchers commonly examine the variation in earnings quality between code law countries
(i.e., those with a “stakeholder” corporate governance model) and common law countries (i.e., those

38

Hung (2000) develops her own country-specific accrual accounting intensity index based on the accounting treatment
of: (1) Goodwill, (2) Equity method investments, (3) Deprecation, (4) Purchased intangibles, (5) Internally developed
intangibles, (6) Research and development costs, (7) Interest capitalization, (8) Lease capitalization, (9) Percentage of
completion allowances, (10) Pensions, and (11) Post retirement benefits.
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with “shareholder” corporate governance model) countries. Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) find
that earnings are less timely in recognizing economic losses in code law countries than in common
law countries, consistent with their prediction that institutions and practices in code law countries
have developed over time such that the demand for decision-useful information is lower.39 Ball,
Robin, and Wu (2003) examine a sample of firms in East Asian countries. They assert that the
accounting standards in these countries are of high quality (i.e., as they are more similar to U.K. or
U.S. GAAP or IAS than they are to standards in code law countries), but that these countries have
institutions with incentive structures more similar to those that evolve under the code law. They
show that earnings quality (measured by timely loss recognition) is lower in these countries and thus
conclude that the institutional and governance environment of code-law countries diminishes
managers’ and auditors’ incentives to provide high quality accounting information. Guenther and
Young (2000) similarly suggest that earnings quality is demand driven and institutional factors such
as legal system and tax conformity affect earnings quality. They operationalize earnings quality as
the association between cross-sectional average return on assets in a country and its real economic
growth measured by the percentage change in a country's real GDP. They document that this
association is high in the U.K., U.S. and Japan, and low in France and Germany.

4.2 Earnings management as an element of earnings quality
A common hypothesis in cross-country studies is that variation in investor protection affects
the aggregate level of observed earnings management in a country. Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki
(2003), who measure earnings management by accruals-based measures, smoothness, and small loss
avoidance, find less earnings management for countries with developed stock markets, dispersed
39

Ball et al. (2000) also find that U.K. earnings are less timely than U.S. earnings in incorporating economic losses.
Pope and Walker (1999), however, suggest that this result is sensitive to the consideration of extraordinary items. They
find that earnings after extraordinary items in the U.K. are more timely than U.S. earnings.
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ownership, strong investor rights, and strong legal enforcement. The Leuz et al. (2003) artificial
smoothness measures are commonly used in cross-country studies as a proxy for earnings
management. The first proxy, measured at the country-level, is the median of the firm-level standard
deviation of operating earnings divided by the firm-level standard deviation of cash flow from
operations. The second proxy is the contemporaneous correlation between changes in accounting
accruals and changes in operating cash flows. Both measures emphasize that smoothness represents
earnings management when it is measured relative to inherent or fundamental smoothness of the
firm’s operations. Operating cash flow smoothness is used to control for inherent smoothness.
Lang, Raedy, and Wilson (2006) compare the extent of earnings management between a
sample of non-U.S. firms that are cross-listed in the U.S. and a sample of U.S. firms. They
document that the cross-listed non-U.S. firms exhibit more evidence of smoothness, a greater
tendency to report small profits, and less timely recognition of losses, and lower ERCs than U.S.
firms and that this difference is greater for firms from countries with poor investor protection.40
Lang, Raedy, and Wilson (2006) do not use the Leuz et al. (2003) measure of artificial smoothness;
they develop their own measure of artificial smoothness that similarly attempts to control for
smoothness of the fundamental earnings process. They measure smoothness as the volatility of
earnings scaled by total assets, where “volatility” is the variance of the residuals from a regression of
annual scaled changes in net income on control variables for fundamental firm characteristics. Their
analysis also uses a matched sample design with matching based on past sales growth and industry,
which is an effort to control for fundamental variability.
Three later studies extend Leuz et al. by providing evidence on how the interactions between
different institutional factors influence the extent of earnings management. Haw et al. (2004)
document that earnings management (measured by the unsigned magnitude of discretionary
40

They use ERCs as one of their earnings management proxies.
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accruals) that stems from the conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders
is lower in countries with high protection of minority shareholders’ rights and strong legal
enforcement. Francis and Wang (2008) find that earnings quality (measured by the magnitude of
discretionary accruals, the likelihood of reporting a loss, and timely loss recognition) is positively
related to country-level investor protection, but only for firms with Big-four auditors. They suggest
that investor protection affects earnings quality through the incentives of Big-four auditors (i.e.,
litigation risk and reputation risk). Finally, Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz (2006) document
interactions between the effects of institutions on earnings management and the effects provided by
public equity markets interact. Using a sample of private and public firms from 13 European Union
countries, they find that private companies manage earnings more, consistent with less pressure for
earnings quality. Stronger legal institutions curb earnings management. The Burgstahler et al.
(2006) earnings management measures are similar to those used in Leuz et al. (2003).

4.3 Consequences of country-level earnings quality
The three papers in our database that examine consequences of earnings quality at the
country level focus on the earnings management element of earnings quality. Bhattacharya, Daouk,
and Welker (2003) find that high country-level earnings quality measured by earnings
aggressiveness (i.e., accruals), loss avoidance, and earnings smoothness (measured following Leuz
et al., 2003), are associated with higher country-level of cost of equity capital and lower trading
volume. Their hypothesis assumes that these features of earnings are associated with greater
opacity. Pincus, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2007) find that the accrual anomaly, while a global
phenomenon, is concentrated in four countries, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the
U.S., all of which are common law countries. The accrual anomaly is positively associated with the
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Hung (2001) index of accrual accounting intensity and negatively associated with share ownership
concentration. Somewhat weaker evidence suggests that the occurrence of the accrual anomaly is
negatively related to investor rights. Pincus et al. (2007) interpret the results, taken together, as
suggestive that earnings management is associated with the accrual anomaly. Biddle and Hilary
(2006) document that smoothness using the Leuz et al. (2003) measure is associated with lower
investment efficiency as measured by investment cash flow sensitivity metrics (see also Verdi, 2006).

4.4 Summary
The cross-country studies allow inferences about the impact of certain control mechanisms
that are not possible using a sample of U.S. firms because of a lack of variation in the control
mechanism within the U.S. This branch of studies generally concludes that earnings quality
(including earnings management) is influenced by investor protection, bank versus market-oriented
economy, code versus common law tradition, accounting standards, and managers’ and auditors’
incentives. There is not much conflicting evidence. The cross-country variation is generally
asserted to proxy for very broad theoretical constructs such as differences in the demand for
information or the ability of accounting rules to reflect fundamental value. The cross-country
studies are not designed to provide inferences about specific internal control mechanisms.
The cross-country studies commonly use return-based earnings quality measures such as
ERCs and timely loss recognition. There are many differences across countries that can affect these
returns-based metrics other than the institutional factors envisioned as determinants by the
researchers. The studies clearly recognize the potential for alternative explanations for the results,
and most studies either use empirical methods to control for un-modeled sources of cross-country
variation or model expected sources of variation such as industry concentration. However, even
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observable variables such as natural resource endowments and the level of economic development
are not frequently modeled, and less consideration is given to unobservable cultural differences such
as trust in governance mechanisms (Zingales, Sapienza, and Guiso, 2008). Somewhat surprisingly,
little effort is devoted to controlling for variation in the return component of the returns-based
proxies for earnings quality, despite evidence of variation in the relation between economic and
market development (Frost, Gordon, and Hayes, 2006).

5. The determinants of earnings quality
In this section, we juxtapose the studies according to the determinant of earnings quality that
is examined (see Table 1). There are six categories of determinants: 1) Firm characteristics, 2)
Financial reporting practices, 3) Governance and controls, 4) Auditors, 5) Equity market incentives,
and 6) External factors.

5.1 Firm characteristics as determinants of earnings quality
Several studies use multiple proxies for firm fundamentals, including simply industry
membership, and provide broad evidence that firm operating characteristics are associated with the
various proxies for earnings quality. Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) provide preliminary evidence
on the association between size, risk, capital intensity, and industry concentration and a firm’s
choice of accounting principles. LIFO adoption, in particular, is a common choice to examine (e.g.,
Jung, 1989; Lindahl, 1989). Lev (1983) relates (theoretically and empirically) multiple proxies for
the economic fundamentals of a firm’s operating environment to properties of its earnings (i.e.,
persistence and volatility). Dechow (1994) relates multiple characteristics of a firm’s operating
environment to the ability of accruals to capture underlying firm performance, where this ability is
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measured by stock returns. Four firm characteristics deserve a separate discussion: 1) Performance
and losses; 2) Growth and investment; 3) Debt; and 4) Size.

5.1.1 Firm performance
The most commonly studied firm characteristic that affects EQ proxies is performance. The
studies hypothesize that weak financial performance provides incentives for earnings management.41
Petroni (1992) documents downwardly biased discretionary reserves for claim losses for financially
weak P&C insurers. DeFond and Park (1997) document income smoothing in which firms manage
earnings upward (downward) when unmanaged performance is poor (good) and when expected
performance is strong (weak).42 Balsam, Haw, and Lilien (1995) suggest that firms use discretion to
time the adoption of income increasing accounting methods when the firm’s change in ROA is
lowest. Keating and Zimmerman (1999) suggest that poorly performing firms use the discretion
allowed in accounting standard adoption to their advantage. Financially weak firms also disclose
more internal control weaknesses (Doyle, Ge, and McVay, 2007a) and are more likely to correct
previously reported earnings, which is interpreted as ex post evidence of earnings management
(Kinney and McDaniel, 1989).
Francis, Hanna, and Vincent (1996) find no evidence that write-offs, after controlling for the
likelihood that assets are impaired, are associated with poor performance. The only study in our
database that finds negative evidence is done by DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1994). For a
sample of firms with persistent losses, they find that the accruals reflect the underlying economics

41

Lee, Li, and Yue (2006) create a stylized model in which firms with higher performance overstate earnings more. The
model predictions result from assumptions about the cost of earnings management and about how earnings performance
and earnings growth affect the proportion of true economic earnings in total reported earnings. Their empirical evidence
is mixed.
42
Elgers, Pfeiffer, and Porter (2003), however, suggest that the results in DeFond and Park (1997) are sensitive to the
method used to “back out” abnormal accruals.
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and do not appear to be made to boost earnings. They acknowledge, however, that their sample is a
unique sample of troubled firms, not just firms with weak performance.

5.1.2 Firm growth and investment
There is some debate as discussed in Section 3 over whether growth, the unobservable
construct, or accruals as a measure of growth, affects earnings persistence. The bottom line is that
high growth firms have less sustainable earnings (Nissim and Penman, 2000). This finding is not
surprising. Earnings summarize performance of the firm’s earnings process during the reporting
period. If the fundamental process changes (i.e., grows), so will earnings, and properties of earnings
like persistence and smoothness will be adversely affected. Studies like Penman and Zhang (2002)
provide more contextual evidence about how the accounting system affects the degree to which
growth matters. In addition to the impact of growth on the fundamental element of earnings
properties, growth also is associated with greater measurement error and more manipulation
opportunities (Richardson et al., 2005).
We are not aware of papers that specifically analyze the role of growth as a determinant of
timely loss recognition or benchmarking. Researchers have, however, examined growth as a
determinant of the external indicators of quality. AAER firms have high market to book ratios and
high accruals during manipulation years (see Dechow et al., 2009). Doyle et al., (2007a) and
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) find that young growth firms disclose more internal control
weaknesses. Lee et al. (2006), however, do not find evidence supporting the association between
restated amounts and growth.
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5.1.3 Firm debt43
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) suggest the debt covenant hypothesis: Firms closer to
violating debt covenants will make income-increasing accounting choices to avoid covenant
violations. Early research used debt-equity ratios or other indirect proxies for the existence of debt
covenants (e.g., Bowen, Noreen, and Lacey, 1981; Zmijewski and Hagerman, 1981; Daley and
Vigeland, 1983; Johnson and Ramanan, 1988).44 These papers provide consistent cross-sectional
evidence that more highly-levered firms choose income-increasing accounting methods.45 In
addition, Balsam, Haw, and Lilien (1995) suggest that firms time the adoption of income-increasing
accounting methods when leverage is highest. LaBelle (1990) finds that greater leverage and lower
interest coverage are associated with accounting method changes in Canada. Specifically in the oil
and gas industry, Johnson and Ramanan (1988) and Malmquist (1990) identify operating
characteristics associated with the choice of successful efforts vs. full cost accounting, and find that
leverage-related variables are incrementally important determinants of the choice.
Three papers examine choices other than accounting methods. Bartov (1993) finds that firms
time asset sales to use the gains to reduce earnings volatility and to avoid debt covenant violation.
The smoothing and debt covenant explanations for the real earnings management are incremental to
each other. Kinney and McDaniel (1989) find that more highly levered firms are more likely to
correct previously reported earnings, which implies that they had misreported, and Efendi et al.
(2007) find that firms with lower interest coverage ratios (higher ratio of interest to income) are
more likely to restate. In addition, Dechow et al. (1996) find higher leverage ratios for manipulation
43

We include debt as a firm characteristic, although debt may also be viewed in its role as a monitor, much like the
monitors discussed in Section 3.3.
44
Daley and Vigeland (1983) also find that the firms that choose income increasing voluntary accounting methods have
higher ratios of dividends to retained earnings, which is another proxy for the extent to which debt covenants are likely
to be binding.
45
See Christie (1990) for a rigorous statistical meta-analysis of existing studies of theories of accounting method choice.
He finds that size and leverage are consistently related to accounting choice.
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firms identified in the AAERs than control firms, but Beneish (1999) does not find this relation for
his sample of manipulation firms.
The aforementioned papers interpret the correlation between leverage and earnings
management as evidence that debt covenants provide incentives for firms to manage earnings, but
they do not examine debt covenants specifically.46 Subsequent research tested the debt covenant
hypothesis using data on specific debt covenants. Sweeney (1994) provides evidence that firms
make income-increasing accounting choices as they move closer to violating debt covenants.
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) find that working capital accruals and a measure of abnormal
accruals are both higher in the year prior to the year that a firm reports a covenant violation in its
annual report. In the year of violation, the accruals are high after controlling for management
changes and audit qualifications. Using a comprehensive sample of detailed debt covenants, Dichev
and Skinner (2002) show that an unusually large (small) number of loan quarters have financial
measures at or just above (below) covenant thresholds, consistent with the debt covenant hypothesis.
In contrast, DeAngelo et al. (1994), discussed previously, find relatively little difference between
accruals for firms with and without binding covenants.
While the conclusion is that firms closer to covenants, measured directly or indirectly, are
more likely to manage earnings, the implications of the conclusion for our assessment of earnings
quality are ambiguous. On the one hand, the fact that earnings are managed opportunistically
generally implies that the earnings are less reliable. On the other hand, the mechanisms used to
manage earnings under the debt covenant hypothesis are typically accounting method choices that

46

Zimmer (1986) shows that accounting choice is related to leverage even in the absence of debt covenants using a
sample of Australian firms. Specifically, he finds that higher leverage is associated with interest capitalization (incomeincreasing), but the significance is eliminated when he controls for whether firms use project-specific financing. He
interprets this as evidence that leverage does not capture covenants but rather that it is correlated with type of financing
used by companies.
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are fairly transparent.47 If the earnings management is transparent to decision-makers, either because
the accounting choices are obvious (e.g., accounting method changes) or because the decisionmakers rationally infer that income-increasing actions are taken to avoid covenant violation, then the
earnings quality – its decision usefulness – is not impaired from the perspective of the decisionmaker who detects it. Evidence in Aboody, Barth, and Kasznik (1999) suggests that equity markets
may rationally infer earnings management using cues about the firm’s debt market incentives. They
show that the relation between UK asset revaluations and equity market responses is weaker for
highly levered firms, which is interpreted as evidence that investors’ perceptions about whether the
revaluation is managed increases with leverage.
Leverage also is predicted to be associated with returns-based proxies for earnings quality,
such as ERCs, when equity is viewed as a call option on the value of the firm (Dhaliwal, Lee, and
Fargher, 1991; Core and Schrand, 1999). Plummer and Tse (1999) also distinguish the information
needs of equityholders and debtholders as a function of default risk. They find that ERCs
(contemporaneous returns and unexpected earnings) decrease as default risk increases for equity
returns, but the opposite result holds for bond returns.

5.1.4 Firm size
Early papers investigated the association between firm size and accounting choice motivated
by the political visibility hypothesis that predicts that large firms will make income-decreasing
accounting method choices in response to greater political/regulatory scrutiny (Jensen and Meckling,
1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). The evidence is mixed. Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) find
that size is positively correlated with the choice of two income-deflating methods (depreciation and
investment tax credit accounting), but not with two others (inventory and amortization for pension
47

The evidence in Bartov (1993) on real earnings management is an exception.
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past service costs). Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) document that larger firms are more likely to
choose a set of accounting policies that in the aggregate are income-decreasing, suggesting that
while size does not explain individual choice very well, it explains the firm’s overall strategy.
Bowen, Noreen, and Lacey (1981) find support for the political visibility hypothesis in the oil
industry (i.e., large firms avoid using the interest costs capitalization method), but contradictory
results in other industries. Moreover, Zimmer (1986) finds that larger firms capitalize interest in
Australia, which is inconsistent with the political cost argument. Moses (1987) finds that firm size
and market share (marginally) are associated with accounting method changes specifically to smooth
(as opposed to decrease) earnings.
Overall, in some specific settings, size is likely to be an important indicator of the type of
visibility that increases expected political costs. However, in other settings, the political costs may
be most severe for firms in a targeted industry (Han and Wang, 1998) or for young firms (Beneish,
1999). While there is fairly compelling evidence that political pressure can create incentives for
earnings management (Section 5.6), and size is often used as a proxy for pressure, the leap to an
association between firm size and any dimension of EQ would be inappropriate. Firm size could
proxy for factors other than political visibility such as information environment, capital market
pressure, or financial resources. For example, several studies hypothesize fixed costs associated
with maintaining adequate internal control procedures, and hence predict a positive relation between
firm size and internal control quality.48 These studies show that small firms are more likely to have
internal control deficiencies and are more likely to correct previously reported earnings (Kinney
and McDaniel, 1989; Ge and McVay, 2005; Doyle, et al., 2007a; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007).

48

Ball and Foster (1982) also make this point. One argument they make for not using size as a proxy for political costs
is that the cost of compliance may be fixed, such that small firms that bear the greatest cost.
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5.1.5 Summary of firm characteristics as a determinant of earnings quality
Our review yields the following insights. First, fundamental firm characteristics are
associated with accounting method choice. Any studies that predict accounting choices as an
indication of earnings quality must control for these fundamental differences before inferring
opportunism. Second, the evidence that weak performance provides incentives for earnings
management is fairly well-established. The extent to which opportunities constrain the behavior,
however, is a less actively researched topic (see DeAngelo et al., 1994). Third, while the evidence
suggests a relation between size and earnings management, it is impossible to generalize any sort of
implications for a relation between size and earnings quality on any dimension, given that firm size
could proxy for various underlying constructs (e.g., political visibility, information environment
etc.).
Finally, equity investors appear to unwind firm’s incentives arising from debt contracts to
manage earnings (Aboody et al., 1999). The evidence, however, on investors’ ability to unwind
incentives and to incorporate an expectation of rational earnings management into their pricing is
limited, even for debt-related incentives, which are among the strongest documented incentives for
earnings management and potentially the most transparent to investors. Other than Aboody et al.
(1999) and Shivakumar (2000), we do not have studies in our database that condition equity market
reactions to earnings on investors’ ability to unwind earnings management that represents a valuemaximizing activity that is the outcome of efficient contracting.
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5.2 Financial reporting practices as determinants of earnings quality
5.2.1 Accounting methods
We use the term “methods” broadly to include principles (e.g., full cost vs. successful
efforts), estimates that are associated with accounting principles (e.g., straight-line vs. accelerated
depreciation), or estimates (e.g., pension accounting assumptions).
Two early papers examined the relation between methods and earnings smoothness. Barefield
and Comiskey (1971) find that straight-line depreciation relative to accelerated depreciation creates a
smoother earnings stream. Beidleman (1973) concludes that firms’ pension and retirement expense
and R&D expense choices normalize (smooth) earnings, however their choices related to remitted
earnings from unconsolidated subsidiaries, SG&A expenses, and income effects from plant
retirements do not. The studies acknowledge that accounting methods are endogenous, but the
empirical analyses do not address the issue. Gonedes (1969) examined the association between
method choice49 and the cost of equity capital as a measure of the “…degree of risk (uncertainty)
perceived by decision-makers…”, which he proposed as a proxy for the informativeness of earnings.
Two later papers generate simulated data to compare the mechanical earnings-related
properties across accounting methods. Dharan (1987) generates earnings streams using the
installment method for revenue recognition and using the sales method, which includes the
hypothetical manager’s estimate (with error) of future cash collections. He finds that the sales
method generally produces lower earnings volatility and cash flow forecast errors. The relative
benefits of the accrual model are larger when sales are easier to predict, and the benefits decline as
the standard deviation of the residuals from a deterministic model of sales increase. Healy, Myers,
and Howe (2002) find that application of the (pseudo) successful efforts method to R&D
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The three “method” choices examined were amortization of the investment credit, interperiod tax allocation, and the
presentation of funds flow statements in annual reports.
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expenditures in the pharmaceutical industry provides earnings streams that are more closely
associated with fundamental values than immediate expensing or full capitalization. Moses (1987)
attempts a direct assessment of the impact of methods on earnings quality proxies in a large sample.
He suggests that firms change accounting methods to achieve smoother earnings. His analysis
includes all methods changes; they are primarily associated with inventory and pension accounting.
Income-increasing changes are more likely than income-deceasing changes, and the propensity for
changing is positively associated with firm size, existence of a bonus plan, and incentives for
meeting earnings targets.
Five studies examine choices of specific accounting methods. Loudder and Behn (1995) and
Altamuro, Beatty and Weber (2005) suggest that R&D capitalization and pre-SAB 101 revenue
recognition practices, both of which are generally income increasing, result in more informative
earnings as measured by ERCs. Lev and Sougiannis (1996) use a clever research approach to
understand the implications of method choice for earnings quality. They use real firm data to
“simulate” earnings outcomes if R&D were (pseudo) capitalized and show that the capitalized
amounts are associated with information used by equity markets to value high-R&D firms (i.e.,
value-relevance). Aboody, Barth, and Kasznik (1999) find that asset revaluations in the UK are
positively related to future operating income and cash flows and investors respond positively to
revaluations. Sivakumar and Waymire (2003) exploit a change in fixed asset accounting rules in the
early 1900s and find evidence of increased asymmetric timeliness using the Basu metric
(conservatism), but no evidence of smoothing, where smoothing techniques could incorporate
artificial accounting accruals or real cost management.
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5.2.2 Other financial reporting practices
McVay (2006) suggests that firms use discretion over income statement classification within
a period to shift expenses into categories that would be perceived as less persistent. Several papers
indicate that firms time income recognition across periods within a fiscal year. Kerstein and Rai
(2007) and Jacob and Jorgensen (2007) document that the kink in earnings is strongest for fiscal
years for which the incentives for earnings management are greatest relative to annual periods
ending at the first three fiscal quarters. Brown and Pinello (2007) suggest that firms use more
earnings management to avoid negative earnings surprises at interim quarters than at fiscal years
because the financial auditing process increases opportunities for earnings management in interim
periods.

5.2.3 Principles based vs. rules based methods and earnings quality
A potential advantage of principles-based standards is that removing alternative accounting
treatments for a transaction in favor of single principle that reflects underlying performance would
result in a more informative earnings number because it reduces earnings management. Managers
cannot opportunistically apply an inappropriate method or estimate but claim that they were
following GAAP as a defense. A potential disadvantage is that principles-based standards constrain
a manager’s ability to provide relevant information?50
Two studies conclude that principles-based standards likely will not diminish opportunistic
earnings management. Cuccia, Hackenbrack, and Nelson (1995) conduct a field experiment that
asked “managers” to make tax reporting decisions. Nelson, Elliott, and Tarpley (2002) conduct a
survey of auditors that not only assessed the likelihood that a manager would manage earnings but
also the likelihood that an auditor would adjust for discretion. However, Barth, Landsman, and Lang
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See Barth, Landsman, and Lang (2008) for a thorough discussion of the debate.
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(2008) hypothesize that International Accounting Standards (IAS) increases earnings quality in part
because the standards are principles-based, and they find evidence that use of (IAS) is associated
with less earnings management, more timely loss recognition, and greater value relevance.51 They
are careful to acknowledge that these ex post characteristics of earnings also are a function of
differences in institutions, which affect the demand for information, enforcement, and fundamental
firm characteristics of the IAS adopters. While they attempt to control for these differences, the
results are still subject to their caveat.

5.2.4 Summary
There is relatively sparse evidence on the ability of accounting methods to capture firm
fundamentals, either across different methods or across different fundamentals. We were at first
surprised by the small number of papers in this category, but research design issues seem to be the
explanation. If firms follow different methods, it is because they have chosen to, which creates an
endogeneity problem. When accounting methods are mandatory (i.e., exogenous), there is no crosssectional variation to examine. An alternative is to study firms in different mandatory reporting
regimes (i.e., different countries or different time periods), which creates an omitted correlated
variables problem. After the mid-1970s, the limited set of papers we found use either simulations or
examine specific methods, which improves internal validity but at the expense of generalizability. In
summary, the results on the implications of accounting methods for earnings quality are method
specific.
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The degree of earnings management is measured based on earnings variability, earnings variability relative to cash
flow variability (Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003), the correlation between accruals and cash flows, and meeting
earnings targets. Timely loss recognition is measured by the frequency of large losses, and value relevance is measured
as the contemporaneous association between stock prices and earnings and equity book value.
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The notion that accounting method choice is opportunistically used for earnings management
purposes, thus reducing the overall quality of earnings, does not get much support. It is not the case
that cash flow methods dominate accrual-based methods that involve estimation (Dharan, 1987) or
that more “aggressive” income recognition methods are viewed as opportunistic (Loudder and Behn,
1995; Altamuro et al., 2005). Moreover, investors appear to efficiently adjust their valuation
decisions to reflect information that is not reported (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996). Investors also
appear to adjust their valuations when they anticipate earnings management (Aboody et al., 1999).

5.3 Governance and controls as determinants of earnings quality
Using the terminology of Jensen and Meckling (1976), internal controls include monitoring
mechanisms, optimally chosen by the principal in the principal-agent relationship, as well as
bonding mechanisms, optimally chosen by the agent at some cost. The mechanisms we discuss in
this section include: 1) The Board of directors (BOD); 2) Internal control procedures,52 3)
Managerial share ownership; 4) Managerial compensation; and 5) Managerial change. The studies
associated with the BOD and internal control procedures view internal controls as monitors of the
financial reporting system that constrain a manager’s opportunity or ability to manage earnings,
while the studies of managerial share ownership and managerial compensation are predicted to affect
earnings quality because they provide incentives for earnings management.53 In both cases, internal
controls affect earnings management, and discretionary accruals and accounting misstatements are
popular measures of earnings quality.
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We emphasize the distinction between “internal controls” as the term is used by Jensen and Meckling (1976), which
includes what researchers commonly refer to as corporate governance mechanisms, from internal control “procedures.”
We will use the term internal control procedures for the tasks performed to monitor the financial reporting system.
53
See Ng and Steockenius (1979), Lambert (1984), Verrecchia (1986), Dye (1988) and Liang (2004).
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5.3.1 The Board of directors and earnings quality
Several papers document that more independent boards, measured by a greater proportion of
outsiders for example, and higher audit committee quality, measured by independence and meeting
frequency for example, are associated with less earnings management, measured by discretionary
accruals, the likelihood of the firm avoiding an earnings decline and negative earnings surprises,
accounting manipulations, and internal control quality (e.g., Beasley, 1996; Klein, 2002; Vafeas,
2005; Farber, 2005; Abbott, Parker, and Peters, 2004). Krishnan (2005) documents a positive
association between audit committee quality and quality of internal control procedures. García
Lara, García Osma, and Penalva (2009) find a positive association between commonly used
governance proxies for effective monitoring and asymmetric timeliness.
Larcker et al. (2007) start with 39 governance variables and use principal component analysis
to extract governance factors. They find mixed and weak evidence of associations between the
fourteen governance factors and earnings quality measured by discretionary accruals and
restatements. Larcker and Richardson (2004) find that strong governance mitigates the negative
relation between audit fees and accruals.
The studies consistently suggest a positive association between audit committee quality and
earnings management (with the exception of Larcker et al., 2007). This result is not surprising
because the audit committee’s primary responsibility is to oversee the financial reporting process.
Thus inferences from studies that predict an association between audit committee quality and
accruals quality have the greatest internal validity ceteris paribus. The theory that underlies tests of
an association between BOD quality and earnings management, however, is weaker. Directors are
usually involved with decisions at a high level such as setting overall strategy (Adams, Hermalin,
and Weisbach, 2008). Hence, while it may be reasonable to argue a correlation between BOD
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quality and the quality of M&A decisions, the argument that cross-sectional variation in many BOD
characteristics can explain cross-sectional variation in earnings management is less compelling.
Tests based on an overall governance score as a proxy for internal controls that might constrain
earnings management must assume that variation in the score is correlated with the quality of
mechanisms that specifically affect earnings management opportunities or incentives. Tests that
assume that the monitoring role of governance affects dimensions of earnings quality other than
earnings management, such as conservatism, face even greater challenges (e.g., Garcia Lara et al.,
2009).
Many internal control mechanisms are substitutes or complements. For example, Krishnan
(2005) emphasizes the complementarity of two internal control mechanisms (i.e., audit committees
and internal control procedures). Larcker et al. (2007) more thoroughly address the problem and
argue that this causes econometric problems (e.g., inconsistent coefficient estimates) when using
only a limited set of corporate governance measures.

5.3.2 Internal control procedures
Using internal control disclosures under SOX, Doyle et al. (2007b) find that firms with
material weaknesses in internal control procedures over financial reporting have lower accruals
quality (measured based on Dechow and Dichev, 2002), higher discretionary accruals, lower
earnings persistence, and a higher likelihood of restatements than other firms. Ashbaugh-Skaife et
al. (2008) further find that firms that have remediated their internal control weaknesses tend to have
improved accruals quality.54 The predicted association between internal controls and accruals and
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Both Doyle et al. and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. attempt to control for the self-selection bias associated with a manager’s
choice of internal controls. The selection bias associated with using internal control deficiency reports under SOX as a
proxy for poor quality is a separate issue and is discussed in Section 2.4.3.
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restatements follows directly from the prediction that internal controls lower intentional and
unintentional errors.

5.3.3 Managerial ownership
There are two competing theories about the incentives that managerial ownership provides
for accounting choices: an entrenchment effect (i.e., controlling shareholders extrapolate private
benefits at the expense of minority shareholders) and an incentive alignment effect (i.e., controlling
shareholders’ benefits are closely tied to firm value). These two effects predict different directions
for the association between ownership concentration and earnings quality. The evidence on which
effect dominates is mixed.
Two early studies find that management controlled firms are more likely to choose an
accounting method (e.g., the depreciation method) that increases reported earnings or smoothes
earnings than owner controlled firms (Smith, 1976; Dhaliwal, Salamon, and Smith, 1982), which
supports the entrenchment effect. Warfield, Wild, and Wild (1995) find that managerial ownership
is negatively related to the magnitude of discretionary accruals and is positively related to
informativeness of earnings. Wang (2006) documents identical results for founding family
ownership. Similarly, Gul, Chen, and Tsui (2003) document that managerial ownership has a
mitigating effect on the positive association between audit fees and discretionary accruals. These
results support the incentive alignment effect. In contrast, Larcker et al. (2007) find that insider
power, primarily measured by managerial ownership, is positively associated with discretionary
accruals and restatements. LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) find a negative relation between
managerial ownership and asymmetric timeliness, which they characterize as supporting a demand
for conservatism to mitigate the potential entrenchment effect.

95

In countries with high ownership concentration, however, the primary agency problem is
between the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Fan and Wong (2002) document
that firms in East Asia with concentrated ownership have lower ERCs. Kim and Yi (2006) find that
the magnitude of discretionary accruals increases with the difference between controlling
shareholders’ voting rights and cash flow rights for Korean firms. Both Fan and Wong (2002) and
Kim and Yi (2006) conclude that their findings are consistent with the entrenchment effect.55

5.3.4 Managerial compensation
Bonus plans and earnings-based compensation: Christie (1990) provides a meta-analysis of early
research that examined whether managers choose accounting methods to maximize earnings-based
compensation (e.g., Hagerman and Zmijewski, 1979; Bowen, Noreen, and Lacey, 1981) and
concludes that earnings-based compensation, typically measured with a dichotomous variable, is
associated with income-increasing accounting method/estimation choices. Skinner (1993) provides
evidence that the association between earnings-based compensation and accounting choice holds
after controlling for the firm’s investment opportunity set.
Healy (1985) finds that working capital accruals are lower when the upper and lower bounds
of bonus plans are binding and are higher when the bounds are not binding. Several papers
challenge this early finding. Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan (1995), using a confidential database of
executive short term bonuses for which upper and lower bounds are known, find evidence that
earnings do appear to be reduced by discretionary accruals based on a modified version of the Jones
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The findings for the Asian firms are different from the findings based on U.S. data. There could be two explanations
for the differences between Wang’s results and those in Fan and Wong (2002). First, founding family firms could be
different from other firms with concentrated ownership because of the incentive to protect the family’s reputation.
Second, Wang’s findings are based on data from the U.S., where legal protection for minority shareholders is stronger
than in other countries (e.g., Korea).
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(1991) model when bonuses are at their maximum. However, they do not find evidence of
downward earnings management when earnings are below the minimum necessary to receive a
bonus. Gaver, Gaver, and Austin (1995) find a negative correlation between discretionary accruals
and non-discretionary earnings for 102 firms that are known to have bonus plans for the 1980-1990
time period. They suggest that this finding is more consistent with smoothing than with the big bath
behavior at the lower bound. Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) note that Healy’s finding also is
consistent with a negative correlation between cash flows and accruals and a positive correlation
between earnings and accruals given his proxies for the upper and lower bounds.
Using business-unit-level data on earnings and managerial bonuses, Guidry, Leone, and Rock
(1999) find results consistent with Healy’s bonus-maximization hypothesis. They use several
proxies for discretionary accruals, including a measure related to inventory, total accruals (Healy,
1985), and discretionary accruals generated from a modified version of the Jones (1991) model
(Dechow et al., 1995).
Equity-based compensation including executive stock options (ESOs): Bergstresser and Philippon
(2006) find that firms in which the CEO’s total compensation consists mainly of the value of stock
options report large discretionary accruals and that these CEOs tend to exercise more stock options
and sell more shares in high-accrual years. Burns and Kedia (2006) document a positive association
between the likelihood of restatements and the sensitivity of the CEO’s option portfolio to stock
price. Efendi et al. (2007) find that firms that restate financial statements at the end of the 1990’s
market bubble are more likely to have a CEO with a significant holding of in-the-money stock
options.56 Johnson et al. (2009) document stronger compensation incentives from unrestricted stock
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Several studies suggest that managers attempt to deflate the firm’s stock price, and hence the ESO’s strike price, prior
to a grant via the timing of disclosures around grant dates. Aboody and Kasznik (2000) examine firms’ voluntary
disclosures and find that under a fixed granting schedule, bad news tends to precede grant dates and good news tends to
follow. They also find that stock returns are systematically lower prior to grant dates and increase afterwards (Chauvin
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for the AAER firm executives than for those of control firms. Erickson et al. (2006) and Armstrong
et al. (2009), however, find no evidence of an association between equity-based incentive
compensation and accounting manipulations.
Balsam et al. (2003) find that discretionary accruals are lower prior to option grant dates,
and the effect is stronger in settings in which the grant date is not predictable (Baker et al., 2003).
Coles et al. (2006) examine discretionary accruals in quarters between the date of cancellation and
subsequent reissue of options. Discretionary accruals are relatively income-decreasing leading up to
the reissue. Likewise, McAnally et al. (2008) finds that firms intentionally miss earnings targets
prior to known option grant dates, which reduces stock price (Skinner and Sloan, 2000), but that
firms do not miss earning targets repeatedly in advance of grants.
Insider trading: Beneish (1999) and Summers and Sweeney (1998) find that managers are more
likely to sell their shares and redeem SARs during periods of overstated earnings, where these
periods are identified ex post by AAERs. Beneish (1999) acknowledges that these are cases of
extreme earnings management and that his results might not be generalizable to periods of less
extreme earnings management that nonetheless affects earnings quality. Darrough and Rangan
(2005) find that insider selling is positively related to discretionary current accruals and negatively
related to changes in R&D spending in the year of an IPO. They interpret both results as consistent
with opportunistic earnings management.

5.3.5 Managerial change
Moore (1973), Pourciau (1993), and Geiger and North (2006) find evidence that incoming
managers are more likely to exercise discretion in managing earnings (measured by abnormal

and Shenoy, 2001; Yermack, 1997). A related line of research examines backdating, in which grant dates are
retroactively assigned to historically low share prices (Heron and Lie, 2006, Narayanan et al., 2006).
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accruals) downward in the year of the change. Pourciau (1993) also shows that earnings tend to be
managed upward in the year following management change. Incoming managers can blame
departing managers for asset impairments. In addition, they can lower the earnings benchmark
against which future results are evaluated or create hidden reserves to manage future earnings.
Dechow and Sloan (1991) document that departing CEOs are more likely to cut R&D
expenditures when they are closer to retirement. The shorter career horizon creates stronger
incentives to focus on short-term operating performance at the expense of long-term operating
performance. Pourciau (1993), however, does not find evidence that managers use accruals that
increase earnings during their last year with the firm.
DeAngelo (1988) finds evidence that managers use accounting discretion (i.e., abnormal
accruals) to report favorable accounting earnings during a proxy contest for board seats after having
been targeted by dissidents for poor earnings performance. She also finds evidence of big-bath
earnings management behavior when dissidents are elected following proxy contests. In follow-up
research, Collins and DeAngelo (1990) find that the market is more responsive to earnings during
the proxy contest, which is opposite to the expected result if investors anticipate that managers are
using accounting discretion to boost earnings.
The question of managerial turnover and more generally the impact of individual
characteristics of a manager on earnings management is important but the evidence is limited (see
Francis, Huang, Rajgopal and Zang, 2008; Schrand and Zechman, 2009; Ge, Matsumoto and Zhang,
2009). Studies of the implications of manager change face two hurdles. First, it is difficult to
control for factors such as performance that could cause management turnover/selection and
simultaneously affect EQ proxies. Second, in studies of departures, it is difficult to identify whether
and when managers expect to depart. This difficulty might explain the difference in results in
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Dechow and Sloan (1991), who study retirees with expected departure dates, and Pourciau (1993),
who studies non-routine executive turnover.

5.3.6 Summary of governance and controls as determinants of earnings quality
The evidence that internal control procedures are associated with less earnings management
and that managerial turnover is a disciplining mechanism associated with earnings management, as a
specific dimension of earnings quality, is generally consistent. The evidence on how other
governance mechanisms and controls (i.e., BOD characteristics, managerial ownership, and
managerial compensation) affect earnings management is weak or mixed.
A notable deficiency of this literature is that our database contains no studies that attempt to
understand whether managers internalize the earnings quality implications of investment and
financing decisions. Governance mechanisms and controls (other than internal control procedures)
may not have a direct effect on earnings management, but these mechanisms likely do affect other
managerial decisions, which in turn can affect dimensions of earnings quality. For example,
characteristics of the BOD will affect investment decisions, and investment can affect earnings
persistence and sustainability (Penman and Zhang, 2002). Likewise, an extensive literature
documents an association between equity-based compensation and investment decisions, but our
database does not contain any studies that attempt to predict that equity-based compensation will
have consequences for EQ proxies other than earnings management. This omission is surprising
given that variation in compensation contract form is commonly predicted to affect variation in
investment risk-taking (e.g., Shevlin and Rajgopal, 2002), which is associated with earnings
sustainability and persistence, two prominent measures of earnings quality.

100

Despite the long-standing recognition that optimal contracts, and more generally internal
controls as defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976), may lead to accounting choices that benefit the
agent at the expense of the firm (i.e., opportunistic earnings management) or to efficient accounting
choices that maximize the value of the firm, the debate is still open.57 Christie and Zimmerman
(1994) and Bowen et al. (2008) examine which of these two alternative explanations is dominant in
explaining observed discretionary accounting choices. Both papers conclude that contracting
efficiency is the main explanation. In addition, Bowen et al. (2008) find that accounting discretion
associated with poor controls is positively related to future operating performance (i.e., operating
cash flows and return on assets), which they interpret as evidence that earnings management is
beneficial to shareholders.
Their findings raise the question of whether and when equityholders recognize that
discretionary accounting choices are ex post efficient vs. opportunistic. Christie and Zimmerman
(1994) assume that the takeover market would discipline opportunism and use this to identify a
sample of firms that are likely to be opportunistic. While it is reasonable to assume that participants
in the takeover market can unwind earnings management, it is an empirical question whether equity
investors, or other parties such as analysts, are able to unwind earnings management. The stock
option grant papers provide evidence that equity investors infer that earnings may be managed
around grant dates and incorporate an expectation of rational earnings management into their
pricing. However, research that explores the extent to which equity investors infer rational earnings
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Dye and Verrecchia (1995), Fischer and Verrecchia (2000), and Stocken and Verrecchia (2004) use varied modeling
techniques to yield predictions about accounting method choice and conditions that affect efficiency. The predictions
about accounting choices, including disclosure, depend on the parameterization of the model and the assumptions about
the contracting environment, information asymmetry, and the costs to the manager of various firm decisions. Managers
sometimes choose accounting methods to convey information and sometimes choose methods that intentionally increase
the noise in financial reports. Discretion sometimes improves efficiency but sometimes decreases it. The choice of a
more noisy financial reporting system can be associated with increased efficiency, which may seem to be an unintuitive
result.
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management related to incentives provided by control mechanisms, and perhaps react favorably to it,
is limited.

5.4 Auditors as determinants of earnings quality
The impact of auditors on EQ derives from their role in mitigating intentional and
unintentional misstatements. The ability of an auditor to mitigate misstatements is a function of both
the auditor’s ability to detect a material misstatement and to adjust for or report it (DeAngelo, 1981).
Researchers predict that an auditor’s ability to detect errors is a function of auditor effort and
effectiveness. Researchers predict that an auditor’s incentives to report or correct errors depends on
factors such as litigation risk, reputation costs, and auditor independence (e.g., Caramanis and
Lennox, 2008).
The two most commonly studied features of auditors are audit firm size and fee structures.
Both features can be correlated with an auditor’s ability to detect errors and an auditor’s incentives
to report, which makes it difficult to disentangle the reason for the auditor’s impact on quality.

5.4.1 Studies of auditor size
Firms with Big-X auditors58 have significantly lower discretionary accruals than firms with
non-Big-X auditors (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam, 1998; Francis, Maydew, and
Sparks, 1999; Kim, Chung, and Firth, 2003). Petroni and Beasley (1996) do not find that the
accuracy and bias of the loss reserve account in property-casualty insurers in the insurance industry
varies based on audit firm size, but Gaver and Paterson (2001) find that weak insurers do not
understate their reserve account when they have both Big-six auditors and Big-six actuaries. While
these studies consistently suggest that effective auditing limits earnings management, Dechow et al.
58

Big-eight, Big-six, or Big-five, depending on the timing of the study.
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(1996) suggest that having “Big” auditors does not prevent extreme accounting manipulations. One
explanation for the difference in results is that the dichotomous partition of audit firms based on
audit firm size is too crude to capture auditor effectiveness in a small sample.
Audit firm size also is correlated with EQ proxies other than accruals. In a cross-country
analysis, Francis and Wang (2008) document that the positive association between country-level
investor protection and EQ, measured by abnormal accruals, the likelihood of reporting a loss, and
asymmetric timeliness, is higher only for firms with Big-four auditors. Teoh and Wong (1993) find
that firms with Big-eight auditors have significantly higher ERCs. Hackenbrack and Hogan (2002)
find that firms that switch auditors for service-related reasons have increasing ERCs after the auditor
change. However, firms that switch auditors for non-service-related reasons, related primarily to
fees and fee disputes, have decreasing ERCs.
DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) attempt to explain why the ex post incidence of litigation
against auditors is lower for Big-six auditors (see also, Palmrose, 1988). One explanation is that big
auditors force more conservative accounting, which leads to a lower litigation rate. In a sample of
firms that switch auditors, they show that Big-six predecessor auditors are more conservative in their
accounting choices (i.e., income decreasing discretionary accruals), and they provide weak evidence
that non-Big 6 successor auditors are less conservative.

5.4.2 Studies of auditor fees
Srinidhi and Gul (2007) document a positive association between the magnitude of fees for
audit services and accruals quality measured based on Dechow and Dichev (2002). Larcker and
Richardson (2004) document a positive association between total fees (i.e., the sum of audit and
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nonaudit fees) and discretionary accruals.59 A branch of the literature focuses on nonaudit fees.
Greater nonaudit services could compromise auditor independence, reducing the auditor’s incentives
to report/adjust misstatements. However, greater nonaudit services could increase audit quality by
increasing an auditor’s ability to detect errors assuming information transfer across service lines.
Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson (2002) find that firms with higher nonaudit fees tend to have higher
discretionary accruals and smaller earnings surprises. Three subsequent empirical studies confirm
the findings in Frankel et al., employing alternative measures of earnings quality (i.e., accruals
quality, ERCs, restatements) or a different sample (Srinidhi and Gul, 2007; Ferguson, Seow, and
Young, 2004; Francis and Ke, 2006). Consistent with these empirical observations, an experimental
study by Joe and Vandervelde (2007) finds that auditors identify fewer fraud risk factors in an audit
task when they also perform a nonaudit task than when the nonaudit task is performed but by another
firm.
Several papers challenge or add context to the results on nonaudit fees as a determinant of
EQ. Chung and Kallapur (2003) make adjustments for several hypothesized methodological issues
in Frankel et al. and find no association between nonaudit fees and discretionary accruals. Larcker
and Richardson (2004) show that the positive association between measures of nonaudit fees and
discretionary accruals holds for only about 8.5% of the sample and that these firms tends to have
weak corporate governance. They find a negative association between nonaudit fees and
discretionary accruals when using alternative measures for nonaudit fees. Two other studies use
alternative measures of earnings quality, performance-adjusted discretionary accruals and
restatements, and also find conflicting results (Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew, 2003; Ruddock,
Taylor, and Taylor, 2006).
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Gul, Chen, and Tsui (2003) find a positive association between audit fees and discretionary accruals. However, they
do not attribute their results to auditors’ economic bonding with clients. They suggest that high discretionary accruals
increase auditors’ assessment of risk level, and auditors accordingly charge higher fees.
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5.4.3 Studies of other auditor characteristics
Auditor effort: Direct studies of the effects of auditor effort are generally not possible because effort
is unobservable, but experimental settings and surveys provide some evidence on auditor effort.
Phillips (1999) suggests that auditors increase their effort when the risk of misstatements is high;
accordingly, the presence of auditing can deter financial reporting irregularities (e.g., Schneider and
Wilner, 1990). Hirst (1994) finds that auditing judgments reflect earnings management incentives
from management buyout and bonus plans, which suggests that an auditor’s ability to detect errors
varies with his effort to understand incentives. Nelson, Elliot, and Tarpley (2002) survey 253
auditors from one of the Big-five audit firms who identify 515 experiences of attempted earnings
management. The surveyed auditors suggest that they do adjust for attempted earnings management,
especially when attempted earnings management increases current-year earnings. Using a unique
archival dataset, Caramanis and Lennox (2008) document a significant negative relation between
audit hours worked, as a proxy for auditor effort, and discretionary accruals for a sample of audits
from Greece.60
Industry expertise: Krishnan (2003) finds that the magnitude of discretionary accruals is lower for
clients of auditors with industry expertise.
Litigation risk: In an experiment, Barron, Pratt, and Stice (2001) find that auditors are more likely to
adjust errors that overstate earnings than errors that understate earnings, and they are more likely to
correct errors when litigation against the auditor of a competitor to the client firm for a similar
misstatement resulted in a loss to the auditor. They conclude that auditors are more likely to correct
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However, an “in-basket” task experiment that asked managers to make discretionary accrual decisions and that varied
the manager’s perceptions of internal and external auditor aggressiveness based on fabricated correspondence included in
the experimental materials found no support for the hypothesis that internal and external auditors act as a deterrent to
aggressive financial reporting (Uecker, Brief, and Kinney, 1981).
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errors when litigation risk is high. Using archival data, Heninger (2001) finds that shareholder
lawsuits against auditors increase with discretionary accruals.
Auditor tenure: Johnson, Khurana, and Reynolds (2002) find no evidence that long auditor tenure is
associated with low earnings quality, measured by the magnitude of discretionary accruals and the
persistence of accruals. Chen et al. (2008) show that audit partner tenure is negatively associated
with the magnitude of discretionary accruals in a sample of Taiwanese companies.
Revolving-door auditors: Menon and Williams (2004) report that hiring former auditing partners as
officers, which they suggest might compromise auditor independence, is associated with two proxies
for lower EQ: higher discretionary accruals and a higher likelihood of meeting analyst forecasts.
However, using a longer sample period, Geiger, Lennox, and North (2008) find no evidence that
such appointments are associated with lower financial reporting quality, as measured by
discretionary accruals and the likelihood that the firm is the subject of an SEC enforcement action.

5.4.4 Summary
We began this section by discussing the theoretical foundation for the prediction that auditor
effort/effectiveness can mitigate accounting misstatements. Auditor effort/effectiveness, however, is
unobservable. Evidence from experiments and surveys suggest that greater effectiveness,
specifically related to recognizing audit risk and adjusting the audit process,61 decreases observed
earnings management. The most direct empirical proxies for effort/effectiveness such as hours spent
auditing and auditor industry expertise, also are negatively associated with earnings management.
However, one must use caution when interpreting the evidence that uses indirect proxies for auditor
effort/effectiveness such as fees and audit firm size. To mitigate misstatements, auditors must both
61

Uecker, Brief, and Kinney (1981), however, conclude that the perceived aggressiveness of the auditor (both internal
and external) does not deter earnings management behavior by management based on a field experiment that employed
business managers.
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detect and report material misstatements.62 Fees and size can measure both the auditor’s ability to
detect errors and his incentives to report the misstatement.
Larger audit firms are negatively associated with discretionary “low quality” accruals. This
outcome appears to result from both greater expertise (effectiveness) and stronger incentives to
constrain misreporting (DeAngelo, 1981). The auditor size results do not identify whether greater
detection ability or greater reporting incentives affect misreporting. The studies on auditor fees and
tenure provide some evidence to identify the effects of detection ability versus reporting incentives.
Higher audit fees are predicted to be positively correlated with auditor expertise, and hence with
detection ability, but they also are predicted to be negatively associated auditor independence and
hence with decreased reporting incentives (DeAngelo, 1981). The preponderance of the evidence
suggests that higher audit fees and longer auditor tenure are associated with higher accrual quality
(or at least not associated with lower quality). This evidence would seemingly suggest that the
detection ability effect dominates the independence concerns on average. Studies that attempt to
further parse out the independence concerns support this conclusion given that the evidence on
revolving door practice and non-audit fees certainly isn’t conclusive that independence is a
significant concern.
The auditors’ role in affecting earnings quality is limited to a conclusion that auditors
specifically constrain income-increasing discretionary accruals. This inference is valid given the
auditor’s role in the financial reporting process. Tests that use proxies for EQ other than indicators
of earnings management, however, such as ERCs or statistical properties of earnings, are more likely
62

The empirical prediction that auditor characteristics would be associated with an actual number in the income
statement (e.g., discretionary accruals) is based on the stronger assumption that auditors not only report the error but that
they adjust for it. Evidence in Whittred (1980) calls into question this stronger assumption. Whittred (1980) finds that
reporting delays, which could be due to longer auditor-client negotiations and more effort in auditing, are associated with
qualified reports. Thus, the auditor has exerted greater effort and detected the error, but the outcome is that earnings
quality as reported in the income statement is lower for these firms. The auditor reports the lower quality via the opinion
decision.
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to suffer from omitted correlated variables problems. A significant portion of the cross-sectional
variation in ERCs or variables related to properties of earnings (e.g., timely loss recognition and the
likelihood of reporting a loss used in Francis and Wang, 2008) comes from the ability of the
accounting system to capture the firm’s fundamental earnings process and not from the controllable
and auditable dimension of quality. Hence, while the empirical evidence in studies that use ERCs or
properties of earnings as proxies for EQ are consistent with the predicted positive relation between
auditor effort and earnings quality, the studies must deal with substantial concerns about alternative
explanations for results, including auditor self-selection and omitted correlated variables.
A notable underrepresented element of the literature is studies that recognize the important
roles of entities other than auditors, such as actuaries, that can interact with the auditor to affect the
earnings quality outcome (Gaver and Paterson, 2001). Likewise, there are entities other than
auditors that have a similar role in the financial reporting process, and thus may affect earnings
quality, although research in this area is limited. Morsfield and Tan (2006) document that IPO firms
backed by venture capitalists exhibit lower discretionary accruals than other IPO firms in the IPOyear. Jo, Kim, and Park (2007) document that SEOs that have underwriters with higher reputations
are associated with lower discretionary accruals than other SEOs. Studies also suggest that
institutional investors affect EQ (Bushee, 1998), but the motivation is different. Institutions are
predicted to affect EQ because of their anticipated information demands, not because they are
directly involved in the financial reporting process.

5.5 Capital market incentives as determinants of earnings quality
The papers in this section discuss how capital market incentives influence firms’ accounting
choices and hence are potential determinants of earnings quality.
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5.5.1 Incentives when firms raise capital
The premise of this literature is that the cost/benefit trade-offs of accounting choices change
during periods when a firm raises capital. Greater litigation risk, for example, may increase the costs
of opportunistic accounting choices. Greater utility associated with the availability or price of
capital may increase the benefits of opportunistic accounting choices. Hence, the firm’s accounting
choices, and thus its earnings quality, may differ when a firm is raising capital.
A firm’s initial public offering (IPO) is a commonly examined setting. Friedlan (1994) and
Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998) find that firms have income increasing discretionary accruals prior to
setting the offer price in an IPO. Aharony, Lin, and Loeb (1993) find little evidence that accruals
are abnormally high prior to a firm’s IPO. To the extent there is evidence suggesting earnings
management, they find it more prevalent among smaller and more levered firms and those that use
lower quality underwriters and brokers. Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998), however, find unusually high
abnormal accruals in the IPO issue-year and lower allowances for doubtful receivables. Similar to
Aharony et al. (1993), Morsfield and Tan (2006) find that monitoring is a mitigating factor; IPO-year
abnormal accruals are lower for IPO firms with venture capitalists than for other IPO firms.
We also observe evidence outside the IPO setting that firms’ accruals choices are affected by
capital market incentives. Haw, Qi, Wu, and Wu (2005) find that Chinese firms that meet or just
miss the 10% ROE requirements to qualify to make a stock rights offering in China between 1996
and 1998 have higher accruals. Erickson and Wang (1999) find evidence of income increasing
earnings management via accruals prior to stock-for-stock merger agreements. In a management
buyout (MBO), when the incentive is to understate performance to justify lower offer prices to
existing shareholders, DeAngelo (1986) finds no evidence of income-decreasing discretionary
accruals in the MBO year for 64 deals prior to 1982 using the year-over-year change in working
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capital accruals as a proxy. Perry and Williams (1994), however, estimate discretionary accruals
using the Jones model and find lower discretionary accruals prior to the buyout relative to an
industry and size matched control sample for 175 MBOs from 1981-1988. Results using outcomebased measures of earnings management such as AAERs and restatements also suggest that capital
raising activities are associated with earnings management (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1996;
Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson, 2007).
Two studies infer capital market incentives for accounting choices. Bowen, Davis, and
Rajgopal (2002) find that internet firms with greater cash burn rates, which they use as a proxy for
external financing needs, are more likely to report advertising barter arrangements on the gross
basis on the income statement, which is preferable for managers who believe they are being
evaluated based on revenues. Lang, Raedy, and Yetman (2003) infer capital market incentives from
cross-listing status and document differences in multiple proxies for EQ across cross-listed firms and
a matched sample of firms from the same country.63 Cross-listed firms appear to engage in less
earnings management (measured by earnings smoothing, accruals, and frequency of small positive
earnings), report more conservative earnings (measured by timeliness of loss recognition), and have
higher ERCs. The differences are caused by both changes around cross-listing and differences in
accounting quality before listing. Ndubizu (2007) similarly finds that foreign firms appear to boost
accruals at the time of cross-listing their stock in the U.S., however, he finds no differences between
firms that raise capital at the time of cross-listing and a control group of cross-listing firms that do
not. Finally, Dietrich, Harris, and Muller (2000) find that firms make accounting method choices
regarding fair value estimates of investment properties to boost earnings and time asset sales to help
smooth earnings before raising debt.

63

The quality metrics are measured for both samples based on accounting data reported in local markets using locally
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).
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Reviewing these studies together yields the following conclusions:
1) Evidence consistently suggests that incentives to influence equity market valuations affect firms’
accounting choices, in particular their accrual choices. The hypothesis that equity markets would
provide incentives for these accounting choices assumes that equity markets cannot detect the
earnings management, although the papers do not test this. The papers provide evidence only on
whether managers believe that the specific mechanism they examine is detectable.
2) The papers generally focus on event-driven incentives for accounting choices. These accounting
choices, however, can have long-term consequences, such as a diminished reputation for
transparency that adverse selection models predict should have a negative impact on the firm’s cost
of capital.64 The studies generally do not emphasize the trade-off between the short-term benefits of
the accounting choice at the time of the event (e.g., the IPO) and the potential long-term reputation
loss due to these one-off earnings management decisions.
In fact, the finding that IPO cross-listed firms and non-IPO cross-listed firms have similar
levels of accruals management (Ndubizu, 2007) suggests that the expected benefits of investor
recognition (or visibility), rather than capital raising activities, provides incentives for accounting
choices. Similarly, Bowen et al. (2002) find a positive association between levels of activity on
Motley Fool and use of the gross basis of reporting for advertising barter arrangements, which
suggests that firms use accounting choice to influence visibility. Like reputation discussed in the
previous paragraph, investor recognition is a long-term objective that may influence a firms’
accounting choices. While the importance of investor recognition is recognized in other areas of
accounting research (e.g., studies of investor relations and analysts), little research directly examines
64

Christie and Zimmerman (1994) find that takeover targets are more likely to be using income increasing accounting
choices than an industry matched sample. The choices they examine have only a small effect on income but have a
substantial impact on retained earnings over long periods. They argue that these choices reflect “economic Darwinism.”
Firms that use suboptimal accounting choices, or that select the accounting rules for opportunistic reasons rather than
signaling reasons, are more likely to be taken over.
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how the incentives provided by the potential benefits of investor visibility affect accounting choices
and earnings quality.
3) Only one paper in our database examines whether raising capital in debt markets provides
incentives for accounting choice. More work within public debt markets and on the trade-offs
between debt and equity market incentives would be useful.

5.5.2 Incentives for accounting choice provided by earnings-based targets65
Phillips, Pincus, and Rego (2003) provide evidence that firms manage deferred tax expense
to avoid losses and to avoid earnings declines. Rowchowdhury (2006) provides evidence of real
earnings management to meet various earnings-based targets. Das and Zhang (2003) suggest that
firms use working capital accruals to be able to round up EPS to meet analysts’ forecasts, report
positive earnings, or to sustain recent performance. Kasznik (1999) finds that firms that provide
management forecasts are more likely to manipulate discretionary accruals to meet their forecasts
when they are concerned with litigation risk or fear a loss of reputation accuracy. Barton and Simko
(2002) suggest that incentives to meet targets are an important determinant of earnings management,
but that opportunities constrain the firm’s choice. They find that constrained firms with already
overstated net asset values are less likely to report small negative earnings surprises or large positive
earnings surprises and infer that the constrained firms could not manipulate earnings.
Earnings targets undoubtedly provide incentives for earnings management. The contribution
of these studies is that they provide evidence on specific tools that firms use to manage earnings.
However, the studies do not provide evidence on how firms choose among earnings management

65

Section 4.1.4 also reviews evidence related to benchmarks/targets. In that section, we review studies that use meeting
a target as a proxy for earnings quality. Those studies test the determinants of reporting earnings that meet a target or the
consequences of doing so. The papers in this section, in contrast, treat meeting a target as the independent variable and
examine the incentives that targets provide for earnings management.
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tools. Barton and Simko (2002) pursue the idea that a firm’s choice with respect to a particular tool
might be constrained, but they do not pursue the alternatives when the firm is constrained.
A well-recognized problem with studies that use analyst forecasts as a benchmark is that the
analyst is an economic agent with his own incentives. Beating an analyst forecast depends not only
on the firm’s accounting choices, which may affect earnings quality, but also on the analyst’s
forecasting actions. The studies interpret a relation between “meeting or beating” the forecast and
earnings management as evidence that the firm managed earnings, while the alternative explanation
is that the analyst managed the forecast (Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki, 2004). To the extent the
analyst’s actions are influenced by earnings quality considerations (unmanaged), the net impact on
earnings quality arising from these incentives is indeterminate

5.6 External factors as determinants of earnings quality
External factors include political processes, tax and non-tax regulation,66 and macroeconomic
conditions.

5.6.1 The political process
Eight papers in our database predict that political processes motivate managers to engage in
income-decreasing earnings management, commonly measured by discretionary accruals, during
periods of political pressure because profits generate regulatory or political attention/scrutiny that
can lead to costly intervention or because profits are a direct input to a political/regulatory decision.
The settings examined include: 1) U.S. International Trade Commission import relief investigations
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Regulators and regulation may be viewed as external monitors like auditors and boards, discussed in Sections 3.3 and
3.4. Consistent with the Kose and Kedia (2006) framework for internal controls, however, regulation is discussed as a
distinct determinant of earnings quality because it is a force imposed on the firm rather than a monitoring choice made
by the firm.
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(Jones, 1991); 2) Department of Justice/Federal Trade Commission antitrust investigations (Cahan,
1992); 3) Political pressure on HMOs (Mensah, Considine, and Oakes, 1994); 4) Congressional
hearings on the U.S. cable television industry (Key, 1997); 5) Oil companies during the 1990 Gulf
crisis (Han and Wang, 1998); 6) New Zealand’s Price Justification Scheme and the Stabilisation of
Prices Regulation in the 1970s (Navissi, 1999); 7) Gold price inflation, proposed taxes, and gold
firms in Australia (Monem, 2003); and 8) Environmental Protection Agency pressures on potentially
responsible parties (PRP) under the Superfund Act (Johnston and Rock, 2005).
The studies investigate a wide variety of settings, but they consistently document that
expected political costs affect accounting choices (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). An assumption
common to these studies is that the decision-maker uses the reported earnings number in his decision
and does not undo the effects of the accounting choice.67 Thus, it is not surprising that these papers
investigate discretionary accruals rather than other potentially more transparent accounting choices
such as accounting method changes.

5.6.2 Capital regulations
Four papers focus exclusively on the relation between incentives to meet capital requirements
and earnings management behavior. They use either levels or changes specifications to test for the
relation: 1) Petroni (1992) finds that P&C insurers experiencing financial difficulty underestimate
policy loss reserves, consistent with incentives provided by insurance industry net worth
requirements; 2) Kim and Kross (1998) and Ahmed, Takeda, and Thomas (1999) find that the
magnitude of loan loss provisions for banks with low capital ratios significantly decreased after new
capital standards became effective in 1989; 3) Schrand and Wong (2003) find that well-capitalized
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The firm may only need to fool a politician’s constituents, which provides the politician with enough justification to
support his position, even if the politician is able to unravel the underlying facts.

114

banks use the valuation allowance against deferred tax assets to create hidden reserves that they can
later use to smooth earnings.
An additional five papers study the impact of capital requirements relative to other
incentives: 1) Moyer (1990) finds that bank’s use adjustments to the loan loss provision, loan
charge-offs, and securities gains and losses to avoid violating capital adequacy requirements but she
finds no support for the political sensitivity hypothesis (i.e., attempt to reduce income when revenue
is high); 2) Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolo (1995) use a simultaneous system of five equations to
examine whether bank managers optimize over a variety of incentives including capital
requirements, tax, and earnings goals, and they investigate multiple accruals accounts; 3) Mensah,
Considine, and Oakes (1994) suggest that financially weak HMOs understate “incurred but not
reported expenses” (IBNRs), consistent with incentives to avoid violation of net worth requirements,
but they find no support for the hypothesis that political visibility (measured by size) increases the
regulatory pressure; 4) Chen and Daley (1996), for a sample of Canadian banks from 1977 to 1987,
find strong support for capital maintenance incentives, weaker support for tax incentives, and no
support for equity valuation incentives; and 5) Gaver and Paterson (1999) find that changes in
insurers’ choices on the realization of capital gains and stock transactions reflect changing
incentives in risk-based capital requirements in 1994, while loss reserve estimates do not. Rather,
loss reserve decisions are consistent with tax incentives throughout the period of changing capital
regulation.
In a related vein, Muller (1999) finds that the decision by British firms to capitalize a brand
rather than to write it off immediately at the time of an acquisition is influenced by whether the
choice would result in shareholder approval for future acquisitions under London Stock Exchange
requirements, which are capital-based.
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5.6.3 Tax regulations
Several studies exploit the LIFO conformity rule in the U.S. tax system to test whether
incentives to minimize tax costs (i.e., present value of tax payments) affect accounting method
choice, which in turn affects EQ. For example, Lee and Hsieh (1985), Hunt (1985), and Dopuch and
Pincus (1988) document both tax (e.g., the magnitude of tax savings) and nontax explanations (e.g.,
contracting costs) for the choice of inventory accounting methods. Keating and Zimmerman (1999)
exploit a natural experiment due to a 1981 tax law change that mitigated the impact of tax
considerations on financial reporting depreciation choices and find an increase in the frequency of
income-increasing depreciation estimate choices and a decrease in the frequency of incomeincreasing depreciation method changes after the 1981 tax law change. Guenther, Maydew, and
Nutter (1997) exploit a change in book-tax conformity associated with the Tax Reform Act of 1986
(TRA) and find that firms that are required to switch from the cash method to the accrual method
have higher (lower) accruals than firms that already use the accrual method prior to (following) the
rule change.
Five papers in our database examine the effects of rate changes associated with the TRA and
suggest that the rate change had a one-time impact on accruals choices around the period of the
change. Scholes, Wilson, and Wolfson (1992), Guenther (1994), and Maydew (1997) conclude that
firms shift income from the pre-TRA period to the lower tax-rate regime period by deferring revenue
and accelerating expenses. The evidence on income shifting in the opposite direction to avoid the
U.S. corporate alternative minimum tax (AMT), however, is inconsistent (Boynton, Dobbins, and
Plesko, 1992; Choi, Gramlich, and Thomas, 2001).
Two additional studies suggest that changes in tax incentives associated with the TRA led to
a shift in accounting choices that will affect EQ on an on-going basis. The TRA increased the
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marginal tax rate for companies with long-term manufacturing contracts, and Calegari (2000)
documents that companies with long-term manufacturing contracts increase their leverage and
decrease discretionary accruals with high book-tax conformity following the TRA. Klassen, Lang,
and Wolfson (1993) provide evidence that suggests that the U.S. tax rate reduction in 1987 results in
geographic income shifting to the U.S. for multinational companies.68

5.6.4 The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002
Studies of SOX assert that it increased the expected costs of earnings management
(especially accounting fraud) and thus managers are likely to engage in less earnings management
after the implementation of SOX. Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008) document that earnings management
activities using accruals declined following SOX but that real earnings management activities
increased after SOX. Koh, Matsumoto, and Rajgopal (2008) provide evidence that managers switch
from using discretionary accruals to expectation management in order to meet analyst forecasts.

5.6.5 Other
Three papers in our database study other external factors that provide incentives for earnings
management, but that do not fit into the categories defined above. Hall and Stammerjohan (1997)
find that firms in the oil industry that are facing potentially large litigation damage awards choose
income-decreasing non-working capital accruals relative to a control sample. Bowen, DuCharme,
and Shores (1995) find that firms with greater incentives provided by ongoing implicit claims with
third parties including customers, suppliers, employees, and short-term creditors make more income
increasing inventory and depreciation accounting choices. As an example of their proxies for the
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See Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) for a comprehensive review of income shifting by multinationals, particularly
following the TRA.
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importance of implicit claims, they propose that implicit customer claims are positively associated
with product uniqueness, and they measure variation in uniqueness by R&D expense. Rosner (2003)
finds that firms that subsequently declare bankruptcy have greater income-increasing abnormal
accruals compared to a matched sample and suggests that the firms engaged in earnings management
in an effort to avoid bankruptcy.

5.6.6 Summary
Capital regulations, specifically in the banking and insurance industries, provide strong
incentives to manage earnings, and loss provisions are most commonly used to meet these
regulations. Other incentives are of second-order importance when capital requirements are likely to
be binding.69
The studies document that firms manage discretionary accruals during periods of heightened
pressure (either external or internal) or in response to specific regulatory changes. Thus, the results
suggest that earnings quality is time-varying. External factors such as changing pressures from
antitrust regulation during merger discussions will create firm-specific time-varying EQ patterns.
However, the majority of the external factors discussed are clustered in calendar time (e.g., the TRA
or bank capital requirement changes) and the resulting effects on EQ will be clustered in calendar
time as well. External factors that affect accounting method choice, in contrast, will lead to crosssectional variation in EQ, but not time-variation (Calegari, 2000; Klassen, Lang, and Wolfson,
1993).
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This conclusion on net worth requirements, however, may not generalize to other settings. The financial services
industry has greater power to detect specific earnings management responses to regulations given the direct link between
the capital requirements and the loss provision accounts and the significance and variation of the loss provision accounts
across banks/insurance carriers.
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Equity market incentives receive little support as a determinant of accounting choices when
measured relative to incentives provided by external factors. However, the tests of equity market
incentives are likely to be of low power relative to tests of incentives provided by regulatory capital
requirements to manage specific accounts such as the loan loss provision.
The earnings management activities associated with these external factors may potentially
mislead other financial statement users. We did not catalogue any studies on how/whether firms
communicate to equity markets during periods of regulatory scrutiny to offset the negative message
they falsely send to regulators/politicians, or the extent to which firms may forgo accessing capital
during these periods. We also did not catalogue any studies that assess equity market reactions to
earnings during these periods when investors might rationally infer the earnings management.70
Several papers provide evidence that firms use multiple tools in response to a single
incentive. These results emphasize a point we have made previously: accruals management, ceteris
paribus, may impair earnings quality, but it represents only one choice within the firm’s portfolio of
accounting and real choices. Hunt, Moyer, and Shevlin (2000) examine both multiple tools and
multiple incentives.
Finally, there is (surprisingly) limited research on macroeconomic conditions as a
determinant of EQ. Although we had initially defined a category to collect these papers, our journal
search found only one paper that focuses primarily on macroeconomic factors as a determinant of
earnings quality (Liu and Ryan, 2006) and one paper that gives them significant albeit secondary
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Two studies, however, provide related discussions/evidence. Ronen and Aharoni (1989) develop a model that shows
that higher tax rates are associated with choices of income-increasing accounting methods, excepting accounting
methods subject to book tax conformity. A key assumption of the model is that equity market participants will see
through the earnings management and value the firm’s equity correctly. Beatty and Harris (1999) compare security gains
and losses in public banks to those in private banks, both of which are subject to capital requirements, to determine how
earnings management differs under the assumption that public banks have greater incentives to engage in earnings
management than private banks due to equity market incentives. However, this paper does not test how and when banks
trade-off the equity market incentives against other earnings management incentives that firms face.
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attention (Aboody et al. , 1999).71 Both studies predict that macroeconomic factors are correlated
with increased incentives for earnings management. We did not find any studies that hypothesize
macroeconomic conditions as a determinant of earnings quality for other reasons, for example,
because of variation in the ability of accruals to capture performance fundamentals when the
“fundamentals” are different.

6. The consequences of earnings quality
6.1 Capital market consequences of earnings quality
The hypothesized capital market consequences of earnings quality include: short-window
stock price returns around the earnings announcement date, contemporaneous long-window returns,
and future stock price performance after the release of earnings-related information (Section 6.1.1);
market-multiples (Section 6.1.2); cost of equity capital (Section 6.1.3); and cost of debt capital
(Section 6.1.4).72

6.1.1 Return responses to earnings quality
Contemporaneous short-window returns: In the short-window returns tests, information is assumed
to be of higher quality if it has a higher association with returns. Inferring variation in EQ from the
association between unexpected earnings and returns has been a prevalent research methodology
since the publication of Kormendi and Lipe (1987) and Easton and Zmijewski (1989). The key
findings are:
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Wilson (1987) finds that his results are driven by two observations (1981 and 1982) and conjectures that the cause
might be a “macroeconomic phenomenon,” given that both were years of significant economic downturn. Bernard and
Stober (1989), however, find no evidence for this conjecture.
72
Many of the studies that examine market consequences use multiple measures and are cited more than once.
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1) The market responds more favorably when earnings are composed of cash flows than accruals
(Wilson, 1987). Bernard and Stober (1989), however, find that the results in Wilson (1987) are
driven by two quarters.
2) Investors discount discretionary accruals if they are made aware of them or if they can infer that
they are more likely to represent earnings management (DeFond and Park, 2001; Balsam, Bartov,
and Marquardt, 2002; Baber, Chen, and Kang, 2006; Gleason and Mills, 2008; Coles, Hertzel, and
Kalpathy, 2006). Louis and Robinson (2005) similarly find that when managers combine
discretionary accruals with another credible signal (i.e., a stock split), investors do not discount
them.
3) Negative special items (write-offs or write-downs) are generally associated with a small negative
stock price reaction of around one percent (Elliott and Shaw, 1988). When a firm has a history of
special items, the response coefficient associated with earnings before special items receive a lower
weight (Elliot and Hanna, 1996). Variation in reactions to inventory write-offs and restructuring
charges suggest that they convey information about expected future performance (Francis, Hanna,
and Vincent, 1996).
4) Investors respond more strongly to pro-forma earnings than to GAAP earnings on average
(Bhattacharya, Black, Christensen, and Larson, 2003). The coefficient is only significant for firms
with relatively less informative GAAP earnings, as measured by historical ERCs (Lougee and
Marquardt, 2004).
5) Indicators of general financial reporting quality concerns are associated with negative stock price
reactions. There is a strong negative stock market reaction to announcements of restatements and/or
AAERs (Feroz et al., 1991; Dechow et al., 1996; and Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz, 2004). The
evidence is consistent, but the implications for EQ are ambiguous (see Section 3.3). The revelation
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of internal control procedure deficiencies as required under SOX Section 302 generate small
negative stock responses of around 2 percent (Hammersley, Myers, and Shakespeare, 2008; Beneish,
Billings, and Hodder, 2008). Announcements about audit fees that may indicate to investors that
earnings are of low quality are associated with negative short window returns (Frankel, Johnson, and
Nelson, 2002; Hackenbrack and Hogan, 2002).
6) Earnings with qualified audit opinions are associated with either negative price reactions
(Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich 1986; Choi and Jeter 1992; Chen, Su, and Zhao, 2000) or no
reaction (Chow and Rice, 1982; Dodd et al., 1984).
Contemporaneous long-window returns (association studies): Many early studies examine whether
earnings measured under different methods result in different market consequences. A series of
early papers conclude that investors interpret financial statement information conditional on the
accounting method used (Mlynarczyk, 1969; Archibald, 1972; Ball, 1972; Gonedes, 1975 and 1978;
Harrison, 1977; Sunder, 1975). Other studies, however, challenge these results or present new
analyses that suggest that analysts and other subjects tend to be functionally fixated on earnings
(Dyckman, 1964; Kaplan and Roll, 1972; Cassidy, 1976; Harrison, 1977). These studies make
cross-sectional predictions about which methods reflect underlying economics to infer investor
rationality. More recently, Loudder and Behn (1995) use a similar methodology and conclude that
investors understand R&D accounting based on predicted patterns in long window ERCs. Altamuro,
Beatty, and Weber (2005) however, assume that markets rationally interpret revenue recognition
practices and interpret patterns in long-window ERCs as evidence that pre-SAB 101 earnings are
more useful for firms that were required to switch than earnings measured based on SAB 101.
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Audit quality is positively associated with contemporaneous long-window returns, where
audit quality is measured either by greater independence (Francis and Ke, 2006) or Big-8 status
(Teoh and Wong, 1993).
Future returns: Several studies examine the association between EQ proxies measured in one period
and future-period stock returns; predictable future returns suggest mispricing. Large-sample studies
suggest mispricing of various accrual metrics and components of accruals: total accruals (Sloan,
1996); discretionary accruals (Xie, 2001); accruals and growth in long-term net operating assets as
separate components of Sloan’s total accrual measure (Fairfield, Whisenant, and Yohn, 2003); and
special items and accruals (Dechow and Ge, 2006). Dechow, Richardson, and Sloan (2008) show
that investors correctly price various cash components of earnings except for the change in the cash
balance. Cheng and Thomas (2006) find that abnormal accruals are associated with future stock
returns after controlling for cash flows, which they interpret as evidence that the accrual anomaly is
not subsumed by the value-glamour anomaly.
For specific accruals, Lev and Sougiannis (1996) show that firms with high R&D reserves
are underpriced, and Penman and Zhang (2002) find that conservative accounting as it relates to
LIFO reserves and R&D and advertising expenditures and changes in investment are associated with
future returns. Beaver and McNichols (2001), however, find that development accruals for P&C
insurers are not associated with future stock returns.
The mispricing is greater for less reliable accruals, where reliability is determined by the
researchers (Richardson et al., 2005). It is mitigated when investors are given balance sheet
information at the earnings release date that can help them back out discretionary accruals (Louis,
Robinson, and Sbaraglia, 2008; Levi, 2007); and when firms have large positive book-tax
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differences, which investors rationally interpret as a "red flag" for decreasing persistence (Hanlon,
2005).
The mispricing even exists at the time of an IPO or SEO (Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998;
DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik, 2004). These results contradict the notion that investors
anticipate earnings management in cases when it is likely. More consistent with investor
anticipation, Shivakumar (2000) finds evidence of abnormal accruals prior to SEOs but not
mispricing. DuCharme et al. (2004) find that the likelihood of litigation is positively associated with
abnormal accruals around equity offerings, which begs the question whether issuers anticipate the
litigation risk.

6.1.2 Market valuation
Discretionary loss reserves are associated with lower market valuations in the P&C insurance
industry (Petroni, Ryan, and Wahlen, 2000; Beaver and McNichols, 1998) and in the banking
industry (Beaver and Engel, 1996). Firms that consistently meet or beat prior period earnings have
higher price-earnings ratios or market-multiples than matched samples (Barth, Elliott, and Finn,
1999; Myers, Myers, and Skinner, 2007) even if there is evidence of earnings management to
achieve the results (Myers, Myers, and Skinner, 2007). Kasznik and McNichols (2002) document
that firms that meet analyst expectations do not get rewarded with higher relative valuations unless
they meet them consistently. When firms eventually miss a target, they are likely to immediately
lose the extra valuation (e.g., Skinner and Sloan, 2000; Myers, Myers, and Skinner, 2007).
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6.1.3 Earnings quality and cost of equity capital
The proxies used for cost of capital include: 1) A firm’s implied or ex ante cost of equity
capital, which is the discount rate that equates current market value with the sum of the present value
of expected future cash flows in an equity valuation model; 2) bid-ask spreads; and 3) beta.73 We
conclude this section with a discussion of the emerging literature on accrual quality as a priced risk
factor.

Implied cost of equity capital: Francis et al. (2004), discussed extensively in Section 3, find that
accrual quality, earnings persistence, smoothness, value relevance, and timeliness are associated
with cost of equity capital in the predicted direction, while predictability and conservatism are not.74
Accrual quality has the largest cost of equity capital effects. Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker
(2003) find evidence of an association between country-level earnings quality measures including
earnings aggressiveness (i.e., accruals), loss avoidance, and earnings smoothing, and country-level
measures of total cost of capital.
Hribar and Jenkins (2004) suggest that restatements are associated with increases in the
implied cost of equity capital. There is mixed evidence on whether revelations of internal control
deficiencies affect a firm’s cost of equity capital (Beneish et al., 2008; Ogneva et al., 2007;
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009). Auditor independence is associated with a lower implied cost of
equity capital for the audit client (Khurana and Raman, 2006).

73

See Frankel and Lee (1998), Botosan and Plumlee (2002), Kasznik (2004), Brav et al. (2004), Easton and Monahan
(2005), and Botosan and Plumlee (2005) for specifications and discussions of implied cost of equity capital metrics. See
Callahan, Lee, and Yohn (1997) and Mohanram and Rajgopal (2009) for discussions of spreads (and PIN) as measures of
the adverse selection component of the cost of capital. See Section 3.1 for an extensive discussion of Francis et al.
(2005), which provides evidence on accrual quality as a priced risk factor.
74
However, McInnis (2009) does not find evidence of higher average stock returns for firms with high earnings
smoothness. He suggests that the association between earnings smoothness and cost of equity capital documented in
prior research is driven by optimism in analysts’ long-term earnings forecasts.
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Bid-ask spread: Evidence on the association between earnings quality and bid ask spreads is mixed
and appears to depend heavily on the EQ proxy. Dechow et al. (1996) find an increase in residual
bid ask spread for AAER firms. Chang et al. (2006) find that SOX requirements concerning
CEO/CFO certifications are associated with lower spreads. Palmrose et al. (2004), however, do not
find evidence of a significant change in spreads subsequent to restatements.
There is a negative association between earnings predictability and bid-ask spreads (AffleckGraves et al., 2002), but a U-shaped relation between smoothness and spreads (Jayaraman, 2008).
The smoothness measure is the difference between earnings volatility and cash flow volatility, so the
result suggests that when earnings are too smooth relative to cash flows, or much more volatile, then
market prices appear to reflect greater asymmetry.
Beta: Loss reserve revisions of P&C insurers as a measure of discretionary accruals (Petroni, Ryan,
and Wahlen, 2000) and internal control deficiencies (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009) are positively
associated with beta.

Accrual quality as a priced risk factor: Francis et al. (2005) (FLOS) rank their measure of accrual
quality (discussed in Section 3.1.1) into quintiles and show variation across the quintiles in the cost
of debt (interest to average debt), industry adjusted EP ratios, and betas from CAPM type
regressions. They also calculate the difference in returns each month between the top two quintiles
and the bottom two quintiles and determine whether the AQ factor is priced (has a significant
coefficient):
Rj,m- Rf,m = αj+βj(RM,m- Rf,m)+sjSMBm + hjHMLm + ejAQfactorm + εjm
FLOS find a significant coefficient on ej. When the AQ factor is decomposed into the innate and
discretionary component, they find that the result is driven mainly by the innate component although
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the discretionary component is still significant. FLOS’s interpretation is that accrual quality plays an
economically meaningful role in determining the cost of equity capital.
The results and the theoretical underpinnings for the analysis have generated considerable
controversy. FLOS motivate the prediction that information uncertainty risk is priced using a model
by Easley and O’Hara (2004), which suggests that information risk is not diversifiable and is priced
in the presence of uninformed investors who are not able to adjust their portfolio weights in the same
way as informed investors. Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2007, pp. 396-397), however, argue that
when the number of traders becomes large, the information effect is diversified away. A similar
conclusion can be drawn from Hughes, Liu, and Liu (2005) who suggest that the cross-sectional
effect of asymmetric information on cost of capital may be fully diversified away in a pure exchange
economy with a large number of assets.
In addition, Core, Guay, and Verdi (2008, p7) comment on the interpretation of the
regression results:
It is crucial to note that the average positive coefficient on the AQ_factor in these contemporaneous regressions of stock
returns on factor returns does not imply that AQ is a priced risk factor. Rather an average positive regression coefficient
means that, on average, firms have a positive contemporaneous exposure to the AQ_factor mimicking strategy. For
example, the significant coefficient on the market portfolio does not suggest that the market factor is priced, but only
confirms that the average beta in a sample of firms is positive and mechanically close to one. (italics added)

Daniel and Titman (1996) make this same point for the Fama and French market-to-book and
size factors. Just because high market-to-book firms covary contemporaneously with each other
does not imply that investors price this covariance risk.75
In order to show that the AQ_factor is a priced risk factor, researchers must show, for
example, that when ranking firms on AQ, firms with low accrual quality earn higher future returns;
or that the AQ_factor beta explains the cross-section of expected returns/future returns; or that low
accrual quality stock that are highly correlated with the AQ_factor have higher expected returns than
75

Daniel and Titman document that the return premium to high book-to-market is not due to their covariance with HML.
This suggests that the market-to-book factor is not a priced risk but a “characteristic” that explains future returns.
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low accrual quality stock that are not highly correlated with the factor. This is the point made by
Fama and French (1992) who suggested that beta was “dead” as a priced risk factor because market
beta does not appear to explain the cross-section of future returns.
Core et al. (2008) perform such tests and suggest that the AQ_factor is not priced. In other
words, low quality accrual firms may covary with each other, but investors do not price this
covariance risk and so do not demand a higher expected return/cost of capital. Ecker, Francis, Kim,
Olsson, and Schipper (2006) examine whether sorting on AQ provides differences in returns.
However, Core et al. counter that the equally-weighted portfolio formation along with daily
rebalancing is likely to overstate the returns, particularly since AQ appears to be correlated with firm
size. Kravet and Shevlin (2009) argue that even well-accepted risk factors such as market, size, and
book to market factors are also often insignificant in the second stage regression, as reported in Core
et al., suggesting that the insignificance of the AQ factor coefficient does not necessarily rule out AQ
factor as a priced risk factor. Kravet and Shevlin follow the FLOS approach and document a
significant increase in the pricing of the AQ factor (especially the discretionary component of the
AQ factor) after restatement announcements, consistent with restatement leading to increased cost of
equity capital.76
Aboody, Hughes, and Liu (2005) perform tests to determine whether accrual quality is a
priced risk factor. They investigate whether the systematic component of earnings quality (a proxy
for information asymmetry) is priced and whether privately informed/insider earn higher profits
when trading on stock with a higher exposure to the earnings quality factor. They use four related
measures of earnings quality: (i) the absolute value of abnormal accruals from a modified Jones
model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1996); (ii) the absolute value of abnormal current accruals
76

In addition, Liu and Wysocki (2006) show that AQ loses significance in the earnings-to-price and interest rate
regressions when measures of operating volatility are introduced.
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(that excludes depreciation); (iii) the absolute value of the residual from a Dechow and Dichev
model; (iv) the standard deviation of the residual from (iii) using the time-series of the firm’s
residual (i.e., as in FLOS). Aboody, Hughes, and Liu (2005) find that a mimicking portfolio strategy
that buys firms with high AQ beta earns positive abnormal returns earns positive abnormal returns.
Core et al., however, find that this result is sensitive to the time period examined. They find no
results when using a longer time horizon. In addition, Aboody et al. conclude that the AQ_factor
loading is weak, particularly compared to the returns on their insider trading results.

6.1.4 Debt market consequences of earnings quality
Only three consequences papers in our database extend the definition of earnings quality to
decision usefulness in debt markets. Francis et al. (2005) find that firms with lower quality accruals
have a higher cost of debt measured by: 1) the ratio of interest expense to interest-bearing
outstanding debt (i.e., an ex post measure), and 2) S&P Issuer Credit Ratings (i.e., an ex ante
measure). Anderson et al. (2004) find that firms with higher board independence, higher audit
committee independence, and larger board size have lower costs of debt measured as the yield
spread. They cite prior empirical studies (e.g., Klein, 2002) to justify these indirect proxies for
financial reporting quality. Bhojraj and Swaminathan (2007) find that one-year ahead bond returns
of firms with high operating accruals are significantly lower than those of firms with low operating
accruals, consistent with bond investors mispricing high and low accrual firms in much the same
way that equity investors do.
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6.1.5 Summary
To summarize, the evidence that there is a lower market reaction when earnings are of lower
quality and that the market reacts negatively to evidence of a decline in quality (Section 6.1.1) is
fairly consistent across all earnings quality proxies. An open question, however, is whether the
negative response reflects a decline in the quality of the firm’s fundamental earnings process or a
decline in the quality of the information to measure the process. Researchers typically assert the
latter explanation.
The evidence in Section 6.1.2 on market valuations suggests that firms that consistently beat
benchmarks are rewarded with higher valuations, but firms that manage earnings through
discretionary loss reserves are not. There are several explanations for this combination of results: 1)
the market rewards some types of earnings management and not others; 2) greater market mispricing
of less transparent earnings management; and 3) “rational bubbles” caused by an association
between reported growth and investor synchronization risk (see, for example, Abreu and
Brunnermeier, 2002). More research on this observed phenomenon is necessary to disentangle these
explanations.
The evidence to date generally finds a negative association between earnings quality proxies
and the cost of equity capital with the exception of the findings by Core et al. (2008). Research on
the relation between earnings quality and the cost of equity capital will surely evolve as the theories
that relate information precision about diversifiable and non-diversifiable sources of risk to the cost
of capital evolve.
Finally, while the evidence from debt markets is limited, it is nonetheless consistent with
evidence about earnings quality proxies in equity markets. Debt markets provide a useful
opportunity to validate the findings in equity markets. In addition, variation in the decision-
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usefulness of earnings in debt markets relative to equity markets provides an opportunity 1) to
examine accounting choices that are irrelevant to quality characteristics of interest to equity markets,
and 2) to assess trade-offs between multiple incentives for producing high-quality earnings.

6.2 Non-market consequences of earnings quality
The categories of non-market consequences of EQ are: 1) litigation against the firm, 2)
compensation, 3) executive and director turnover, 4) audit opinions, 5) analysts’ forecasts, and 6)
real activities including disclosure decisions and investment/financing activities. A noteworthy
feature of these categories is that many of them are also the “determinants” variables that were
discussed in Section 5, which emphasizes the importance of considering causality when interpreting
the evidence.

6.2.1 Consequences of earnings quality for litigation
Palmrose and Scholz (2004) find that the likelihood of litigation increases with restatements,
and Lev, Ryan, and Wu (2008) find that a restatement that depicts a different pattern of earnings
than was previously reported is associated with a greater likelihood of shareholder litigation. Gong,
Louis, and Sun (2008) and DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik (2004) exploit high-risk settings –
stock-for-stock swaps and IPOs and SEOs, respectively – to examine whether abnormal accruals are
associated with litigation propensity. They find a positive association between abnormal accruals in
the period leading up to the transactions and post-transaction litigation.
Because the restatement studies (Palmrose and Scholz, 2004; Lev et al., 2008) control for the
magnitude of the restatement, they conclude that it is the restatement itself that affects litigation
propensity. They suggest that a restatement is the type of evidence that increases the likelihood that
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plaintiffs will prevail in shareholder litigation. DuCharme et al. (2004) similarly interpret their
finding as evidence that abnormal accruals are correlated with a plaintiff’s assessment of the
probability that he will prevail.
Gong et al. (2008) and DuCharme et al. (2004) focus on settings in which firms have
significant incentives to manage earnings and hence assert that the abnormal accruals are likely to
represent material misstatements outside the boundaries of GAAP. There is no direct evidence that
abnormal accruals within the boundaries of GAAP increase the likelihood of litigation.

6.2.2 Consequences of earnings quality for compensation
Several studies provide evidence on variation in the weights placed on different components
or properties of earnings, that is, their respective pay-for-performance sensitivities. Balsam (1998)
finds that operating cash flow and non-discretionary and discretionary accruals are positively and
significantly related to CEO cash compensation after controlling for returns; the highest association
is with operating cash flow. The weight on positive discretionary accruals is significantly greater
when the accruals are used to reduce or eliminate a loss.
Baber, Kang, and Kumar (1998) find a stronger absolute pay-for-performance relation
between cash compensation changes and unexpected earnings for more persistent earnings, while
Nwaeze, Yang, and Yin (2006) document that the weight placed on earnings relative to operating
cash flow is lower for firms with lower earnings persistence, higher earnings variability, and higher
total accruals.
Gaver, Gaver, and Austin (1995) find that transitory gains are included in earnings for
compensation purposes while transitory losses are excluded. Dechow, Huson, and Sloan (1994) find
that compensation appears to be adjusted for nonrecurring charges (e.g., restructuring charges).
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Dechow, Myers and Shakespeare (2008), however, find that compensation is as sensitive to highly
discretionary securitization gains as it is to other components of earnings.
Bushman, Chen, Engel, and Smith (2004) conclude that firms use more equity-based
compensation when earnings are less informative. Their main proxy for earnings informativeness is
timeliness. Cheng and Farber (2008) find that the proportion of option-based pay in a CEO’s
package declines following a restatement.
The compensation results suggest that expected earnings quality is associated with ex ante
compensation contract composition, in levels, and changes in earnings quality are associated with ex
post recontracting. Boards also seem to incorporate the implications of discretionary accounting
choices on pay-for-performance such as bonuses when the accounting choice is transparent and
likely contractible. For example, Balsam (1998) interprets his evidence as follows: “…it appears
compensation committees distinguish between the components of income and reward managers
when their accounting choices achieve the firms' goals.”

6.2.3 Consequences of earnings quality for executive and director turnover
Desai, Hogan, and Wilkins (2006) find that at least one executive is terminated in 60% of the
sample firms that had restatements during 1997 or 1998, compared to a rate of 35% in a matched
sample. Only 15% of these executives are rehired in comparable positions. Beneish (1999) found
no evidence of abnormal turnover for CEOs or executives of the misstatement firms, although he did
not identify whether the executives were implicated in the fraud. Karpoff et al. (2008a) find that
93% of individuals identified as having responsibility for a misstatement leave their jobs by the end
of the enforcement period. Srinivasan (2005) reports a 48% turnover rate for directors following an
income decreasing restatement. A matched sample has a turnover rate of 33%. Technical and
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income increasing restatement firms have director turnover rates of 18% and 28%, respectively, and
pre-restatement turnover is 14-16% in all three samples.77 Menon and Williams (2008) find
evidence of abnormally high turnover for CEOs and CFOs following auditor resignations. Engel,
Hayes, and Wang (2003) find a stronger sensitivity of turnover decisions to accounting information
when earnings is more informative, where informativeness is measured by asymmetric timeliness.
Taken together, the evidence suggests significant negative labor market consequences for
individuals involved in accounting misstatements. However, these public announcements of
misstatements have direct implications for the firm’s credibility, which may be an additional factor
in the turnover decision. Moreover, these studies may not provide evidence that is useful for
understanding whether a Board would view earnings management within the boundary of GAAP as
impairing earnings quality. Engel et al. (2003) is the only study that provides evidence on the
turnover consequences of earnings informativeness rather than extreme, and detected, earnings
management.

6.2.4 Consequences of earnings quality for audit opinions
Francis and Krishnan (1999) find that high-accrual firms are more likely to get modified
audit opinions, particularly from Big-six auditors and when the accruals are income-increasing.
Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2001), however, find no evidence that abnormally high working
capital accruals are associated with adverse audit opinions or auditor turnover.78 Butler, Leone, and
Willenborg (2004) find that the relation between accruals (total accruals or abnormal total accruals)
77

While the results directionally suggest higher director turnover following restatements relative to a matched sample,
the significance of the difference is not reported. Moreover, the increase in turnover for the matched sample from 1416% in the hypothetical pre-restatement period to 33% in the post-restatement period is unexplained and raises questions
about the impact of calendar time data clustering on the results.
78
One explanation for the mixed results is that Francis and Krishnan (1999) examine reports in 1987 - 1988, which
precedes the issuance of SAS 58 and 59, whereas Bradshaw et al. examine reports in 1988 – 1998.

134

and audit opinions is primarily driven by a relation between large negative accruals and going
concern opinions.
The mixed results appear to be related to the definition of accruals. Bradshaw et al. (2001)
state: “… a third interpretation of our auditor results is that earnings quality issues of the type that
we investigate are beyond the scope of the audit. In other words, auditors may understand that
inflated accruals imply a greater likelihood of future earnings declines and GAAP violations, but are
not required to communicate this information to investors through their audit opinions.”

6.2.5 Consequences of earnings quality for analysts’ forecasts
Brown (1983) examines the impact of five accounting method choices on earnings
predictability, measured by analyst forecast errors. He finds that lease capitalization (SFAS 13)
improves predictability and changes in actuarial assumptions for pensions impair predictability. He
finds no evidence that changes in foreign currency accounting (SFAS 8), interest capitalization
(SFAS 34), or LIFO adoption affect predictability. Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) document greater
forecast errors when a firm’s home country GAAP differs more significantly from IAS and that
analyst forecast errors decreased after adoption of IAS. Bhattacharya, Black, Christensen, and
Larson (2003) show that analyst forecast revisions are more highly associated with unexpected pro
forma earnings than with unexpected GAAP operating earnings. Kim and Schroeder (1990)
document predictable patterns in analysts’ forecasts related to discretionary accruals that managers
use to maximize bonus compensation, which suggests that analysts anticipate managers’ accounting
choices.
The following studies, however, suggest that analysts’ forecasts do not always incorporate
information related to earnings quality. Elliott and Philbrick (1990) document that analysts’ forecast
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revisions do not fully account for the current year's earnings effect of a variety of changes in
accounting method, although the association between forecast errors and the earnings effect is
generally insignificant. Bradshaw, et al. (2001) show that analyst forecast errors are large for firms
with abnormally high working capital accruals, after having verified that their accruals metric is in
fact associated with subsequent earnings declines. Finally, Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) show that
analysts’ stock recommendations are associated with abnormal accruals, which suggests that
analysts fundamentally understand the lower earnings quality, but that analysts do not incorporate
this predictable earnings management into their forecasts.
In summary, if we assume that analysts are unbiased and qualified predictors of future
earnings, we can use variation in their forecasts to infer attributes of earnings that improve its
predictability.79 Brown (1983), Elliott and Philbrick (1990), Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001), and
Bhattacharya, et al. (2003) provide evidence on specific accounts/methods/estimates that improve
predictability. The analyses are joint tests of analyst “efficiency” and earnings quality.
The fundamental assumption that analysts are unbiased and expert forecasters, however, is
questionable. Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) suggest that analysts understand the implications of
accruals for earnings predictability, but that forecasts are biased. Kim and Schroeder (1990) and
Coles et al. (2006) suggest that when analysts can rationally anticipate accruals management, they
appropriately incorporate the implications of accruals into their forecasts. Large sample studies,
however, do not reveal this pattern (Bradshaw, et al., 2001).80 Overall, the extent to which earnings

79

Using analyst forecasts and an assumption of analyst efficiency to infer earnings quality rather than market prices and
an assumption of market efficiency has the advantage that the forecast relates only to earnings. Market prices reflect
information other than earnings. Hence, tests that infer earnings quality using market prices and assuming market
efficiency confound interpretation of the impact of earnings quality alone on decision usefulness. A disadvantage,
however, is that analysts’ incentives to issue accurate and unbiased forecasts may differ (Francis, Chen, Philbrick, and
Willis, 2004). Equity market investors, however, presumably have incentives to make unbiased forecasts of firm value
and to incorporate these into their trading decisions.
80
Two papers provide related evidence. Burgstahler and Eames (2003) investigate the “kink” in the distribution of
earnings around analyst forecasts and show that on average analysts anticipate earnings management that will avoid
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management affects predictability depends on the analysts’ ability to detect the earnings
management.

6.2.6 Consequences of earnings quality for real activities (including voluntary disclosure)
Lougee and Marquardt (2004) document that firms with low earnings informativeness,
measured by ERCs, are more likely to voluntarily disclose pro forma earnings. Chen, DeFond, and
Park (2002) document that firms with low or uncertain earnings informativeness have a greater
propensity to voluntarily disclose balance sheet information in earnings announcements. Chen et al.
use multiple ex ante indicators to identify firms with low earnings informativeness (e.g., industry,
loss firms, analyst forecast errors, capital market incentives, and firm age). Lennox and Park (2002)
find that when earnings are more informative (i.e., high ERCs), firms issue management forecasts as
a particular form of voluntary disclosure. They predict this finding assuming that managers forecast
when they are reasonably confident about their accuracy due to reputation concerns. The Lennox
and Park finding is directionally opposite to the negative correlation between informativeness and
disclosure in Lougee and Marquardt (2004) and Chen et al. (2002).
These studies show that disclosure decisions are endogenously determined by earnings
quality. Assuming that equity market participants set prices based on all available information, not
just earnings, these findings raise questions about the validity of inferences from tests that measure
the association between earnings quality proxies and market-consequences without considering the
endogenously-determined availability of non-earnings information. This concern is complicated by

small losses. Analysis of forecast errors further refines their conclusions about the exact types of earnings management
analysts can anticipate. Hirst and Hopkins (1998), in an experimental setting, find that buy-side analysts do not adjust
valuations for earnings management, specifically cherry-picking sales of AFS securities. When the gains are aggregated
with net income, analysts treat do not treat the managed gains differently from unmanaged earnings at control firms. As
they manipulate the transparency of the reporting about the gains, the analysts are more likely to discount the managed
earnings in their valuations. Thus, analysts’ ability to understand earnings management is technique and setting specific.
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the fact that some disclosures are inversely related to commonly used proxies for earnings quality
(Lougee and Marquardt, 2004; Chen, DeFond, and Park, 2002), while others are positively related
(Lennox and Park, 2002).
We found three papers that predict a real consequence of EQ other than disclosure. Biddle
and Hilary (2006) suggest that high accounting quality (i.e., conservatism, loss avoidance, and
earnings smoothing) would reduce information asymmetry between managers and outside suppliers
of capital and therefore would improve investment efficiency (see also Verdi, 2006). They
document that accounting quality is negatively associated with investment-cash flow sensitivity.
McNichols and Stubben (2008) show that firms overinvest during misstatement periods. They
suggest that overinvestment likely arises from believing in misreported growth trends. Finally,
Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008) infer from losses in market valuation following AAERs that firms
incur substantial reputational penalties for the misstatement, presumably including the negative
effects on the firm’s future cash flows due to lower sales and higher contracting and financing costs.

6.2.7 Conclusions from reviewing the literature on non-equity market consequences
Comparing the results across these categories emphasizes the importance of considering the
context when determining the appropriate proxy for decision-usefulness. An investor’s decision to
litigate depends on whether an earnings misstatement is severe or transparent enough to increase the
probability of prevailing as a plaintiff. The auditor’s reporting decision, in contrast, depends on
whether an earnings misstatement is severe or transparent enough to decrease the probability of
prevailing as a defendant. A Board’s compensation contract design problem depends on the ex ante
informativeness of available signals of the agent’s performance, while its variable cash compensation
and recontracting decisions depend on the ex post informativeness of the available signals.
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7. Conclusion
Our approach in this review is to define earnings quality broadly to be decision usefulness –
in any decision by any decision maker. As such, the number of relevant articles numbers over 300,
and by necessity our discussion is broad.
An alternative approach might have been to limit the scope of the review to studies of
decision-usefulness only in an equity valuation context, in accordance with the original use of the
term in financial statement analysis. Under that approach, we would have argued that using the term
earnings quality outside of the equity valuation context is inappropriate, and we would have
criticized the studies that do so and simply ignored them in our review. We would have demanded
that researchers and others not use the term earnings quality outside the context of equity valuation
models. But we believe that ship has sailed and such a recommendation would therefore serve no
purpose. Rather we attempt to understand earnings quality more broadly in its current use.
We emphasize two significant conclusions based on our survey of the earnings quality
literature as a whole. First, because all of the proxies for earnings quality that involve earnings (i.e.,
properties such as persistence, timely loss recognition, smoothness, and small profits, as well as the
ERCs) have at their core the reported accrual-based earnings number, these proxies are affected by
both the firm’s fundamental earnings process and by the measurement of that process. The current
research does not adequately recognize the distinction between the fundamental earnings process and
the measurement of the process, which limits the conclusions we, as a profession, can make to
statements about “earnings quality” rather than about the contribution of accounting measurement to
the quality of reported earnings.
Second, although all of the proxies based on reported earnings are affected by both the
unobservable process and the measurement, the proxies are not equally affected by these two factors.
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Therefore, the proxies are not measures of the same underlying construct, but rather they measure
different elements of decision usefulness. We hope the breadth of the discussion of each proxy has
shed light on the context-specific dimensions of quality captured by each proxy and on the
sometimes subtle distinctions between them.
We introduced Figures 1 and 2 in the introduction to illustrate the earnings quality proxies
that have been used to test the theoretical determinants and consequences of earnings quality. Our
objective in providing Figures 1 and 2 is not to suggest that researchers fill in the mosaic. A
significant point of this review is that the earnings quality proxies measure different facets of quality,
and an implication of this statement is that not all of the cells in the figures represent sensible
hypotheses. It may be worth investigating certain cells, not because the theory predicts a relation,
but because not finding a relation would provide useful counterfactual evidence.
The figures do, however, highlight some potential opportunities for future research. For
example, SOX internal control deficiency firms provide a relatively new opportunity to examine the
consequences of financial statement reliability. The implications of benchmarking for compensation
and analysts’ decisions also are interesting areas for future research. We emphasize, however, that
careful research design and a clearer understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of these proxies
in the setting examined is important for establishing a meaningful result. Throughout the review, we
noted situations where we think the inferences are weak because we question the hypothesized
relation between a particular determinant and EQ or between EQ and a particular consequence.
Most of the problem stems not from a weak theory but from treating the earnings quality proxies as
substitutes for each other and not precisely matching the theory to the construct.
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Figure 1. Summary of the investigated determinants of earnings quality
Figure 1 summarizes the explanatory variables for (“determinants” of) the various earnings quality proxies. The rows represent the most frequently hypothesized
determinants of earnings quality and correspond to the organization of the discussion in Sections 5.1 through 5.6. The columns represent our categories of
commonly used earnings quality proxies. A shaded box indicates that researchers have investigated whether the determinant explains variation in the earnings
quality proxy. The first number in a shaded box indicates the number of papers in our database that examine the association between a determinant and an EQ
proxy. The second number in a shaded box (if there is one) indicates the number of papers that provide negative evidence (inconsistent with the theory).
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Figure 1. Summary of the investigated determinants of earnings quality, continued
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Figure 2. Summary of the investigated consequences of earnings quality
Figure 2 summarizes the outcomes resulting from (“consequences” of) the various earnings quality proxies. The rows represent the most frequently hypothesized
consequences of earnings quality and correspond to the organization of the discussion in Sections 6.1 and 6.2. The columns represent our categories of
commonly used earnings quality proxies. A shaded box indicates that researchers have investigated whether the earnings quality proxy explains variation in the
consequence variable. The first number in a shaded box indicates the number of papers in our database that examine the association between a consequence and
an EQ proxy. The second number in a shaded box (if there is one) indicates the number of papers that provide negative evidence (inconsistent with the theory).
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Figure 3: Key links between determinants, earnings quality proxies, and consequences
Figure 3 summarizes the key links between determinants, earnings quality proxies, and consequences. Dark lines represent four or more papers and dotted lines
represent two or more papers examining link. Links that are made by only one paper are not included.
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Figure 4: Construct validity across earnings quality proxies
The links shown in this figure provide a graphical representation of proxies that have been validated using other proxies in papers within our database.
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Table 1. Categories of “Earnings quality” proxies, determinants of EQ, and consequences of EQ
This table outlines the sub-categories of the three categories of earnings quality proxies, the six categories of determinants of earnings quality, and the two
categories of consequences of earnings quality. For each, we report the section number in this document in which the item is discussed.

Panel A: Earnings quality proxies
Property of earnings
Persistence and accruals
Smoothness
Asymmetric timeliness and
timely loss recognition
Benchmarking

3.1
3.1.1
3.1.2

Earnings response coefficients
Accounting methods and ERCs
Firm characteristics and ERCs
Information environment and ERCs

3.2
3.2.1
3.2.2
3.2.3

External indicators of financial
reporting quality
AAERs
Restatements
Internal control procedures

3.3
3.3.1
3.3.2
3.3.3

3.1.3
3.1.4

Panel B: Determinants of EQ

Panel C: Consequences of EQ

Firm characteristics
Performance and losses
Growth and investment
Debt, capital structure
Size

5.1
5.1.1
5.1.2
5.1.3
5.1.4

Capital markets
Returns
Market valuations
Cost of equity capital
Debt pricing

6.1
6.1.1
6.1.2
6.1.3
6.1.4

Financial reporting practices

5.2

Governance and controls
Board of directors
Internal control procedures
Managerial ownership
Compensation
Manager change

5.3
5.3.1
5.3.2
5.3.3
5.3.4
5.3.5

Non-equity market consequences
Litigation
Compensation
Executive turnover
Audit opinions
Analyst decisions
Real activities

6.2.1
6.2.2
6.2.3
6.2.4
6.2.5
6.2.6

Auditors
Auditor size
Auditor fees
Other auditor characteristics

5.4
5.4.1
5.4.2
5.4.3

Capital market incentives
When raising capital
Earnings-based targets

5.5
5.5.1
5.5.2

External factors
Political process
Capital regulations
Tax regulations
SOX

5.6
5.6.1
5.6.2
5.6.3
5.6.4
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Table 2. Spearman correlations between earnings quality proxies (Sample period: 1987-2007)
Table 2 reports the spearman correlation coefficients between commonly used specifications of earnings quality proxies, as defined in Exhibit 1. Persistence is
measured as the estimated β in the firm-level regression: Earningst+1=α+ βEarningst + εt. Total accruals is defined as the difference between earnings and cash
flows from operations. |Accruals| is the absolute value of Total accruals. Estimation errors is defined as the firm-level mean absolute value of the residual from
∆WC =α+β1CFOt-1 +β2CFOt+ β3CFOt+1+εt. σ(residual) is the firm-level standard deviation of the residual from the above regression. σ (EARN)/σ (CFO) is the
firm-level standard deviation of earnings divided by the standard deviation of cash flow from operations. Corr(ΔACC,ΔCFO) is the firm-level correlation
between change in total accruals and change in cash flow from operations. Timely loss recognition is defined as (β1+β2)/β1 from the firm-level regression:
Earningst+1=α1+α2Dt+β1Rett+β2Dt·Rett +εt where D=1 if Ret<0. ERC is defined as the estimated β from the firm-level regression of annual returns on earnings:
Rett= α+βEarningst+εt. The sample consists of 3,733 firms (47,187 firm-years) with eight or more consecutive annual observations. Significance levels are
shown in italics. Each earnings attribute is winsorized at 1% and 99%. Timely loss recognition is trimmed at the value of -5 and 5, resulting in 2,487 firms.
Total accruals, |Accruals|, Estimation errors, and σ(residual) represent the additive inverse of these variables such that all variables are increasing in their
hypothesized quality.

Persistence
Total accruals
|Accruals|
Estimation errors

σ(residual)

Total
accruals
0.082
<.0001

Accruals
|Accruals|
Estimation
errors
0.128
0.128
<.0001
<.0001
0.700
-0.080
<.0001
<.0001
0.308
<.0001

σ(residual)
0.129
<.0001
-0.079
<.0001
0.303
<.0001
0.993
<.0001

σ (EARN)/
σ (CFO)
Corr(ΔACC,ΔCFO)
Timely loss
recognition
ERC coefficient
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Smoothness
Corr(ΔACC,
ΔCFO)
-0.151
-0.254
<.0001
<.0001
-0.214
-0.275
<.0001
<.0001
-0.241
-0.264
<.0001
<.0001
-0.299
-0.250
<.0001
<.0001
-0.297
-0.249
<.0001
<.0001
0.709
<.0001

σ (Earn)/
σ (CFO)

Timely loss
recognition
0.014
0.485
0.003
0.880
-0.007
0.742
0.026
0.202
0.029
0.149
-0.059
0.004
-0.072
0.000

ERCs
Coefficient
0.191
<.0001
0.128
<.0001
0.174
<.0001
0.214
<.0001
0.217
<.0001
-0.339
<.0001
-0.321
<.0001
0.200
<.0001

R2
0.079
<.0001
0.032
0.052
0.030
0.069
0.048
0.004
0.053
0.001
-0.152
<.0001
-0.125
<.0001
0.172
<.0001
0.551
<.0001

Exhibit 1: Summary of earnings quality proxies
This exhibit lists the commonly used proxies for earnings quality and the most common specification(s) of the variable. The exact specification of the proxies
can vary by study. For each, we summarize the theory for its use as a measure of quality and an abbreviated summary of the strengths and weaknesses of the
proxy. Details are in the review in Section 3.
Empirical proxy

Theory

Strengths and weakness

Persistence

Firms with more persistent earnings
generate more accurate DCF-based
equity valuations.

Pros: Fits well with a Graham and Dodd view of earnings as a summary
metric of expected cash flows useful for equity valuation.
Cons: Difficult to control for persistence of the fundamental earnings process,
but this persistence is likely to be a large contributor to persistence of reported
earnings. Thus, it is difficult to make statements about the effect of
measurement on persistence. Greater persistence may be achieved via
opportunistic earnings management.

Managers opportunistically smooth
earnings. Therefore, greater
smoothness is artificial relative to
the fundamental process; or,
smoothness reduces noisy variation
in cash flows as a measure of the
process.

Pros: In cross-country tests, measures of artificial smoothness appear to
capture meaningful variation in earnings management.
Cons: It is difficult to disentangle smoothness of reported earnings that
reflects smoothness of the fundamental earning process from artificial
smoothing.

There is a demand for TLR to
combat management’s natural
optimism. TLR represents high
quality earnings.

Pros: Aimed at disentangling the measurement of the process from the
process itself.
Cons: The net effect of TLR on earnings quality is unknown because TLR
results in lower persistence during bad news periods than during good news
periods (Basu, 1997). Both persistence and TLR affect the decision
usefulness of earnings. TLR is a returns-based metric, see comments on
ERCs.

Unusual clustering in earnings
distributions indicates earnings
management around targets.
Observations at or slightly above
targets have low quality earnings.

Pros: The measure is easy to calculate, the concept is intuitively appealing,
and survey evidence suggests earnings management around targets.
Cons: In addition to statistical validity issues, evidence that kinks represent
opportunistic earnings management is mixed, with credible alternative
explanations including non-accounting issues (e.g., taxes). It is difficult to
distinguish firms that are at kinks by chance versus those that have
manipulated their way into the benchmark bins.

Earningst+1=α+ βEarningst + εt

β measures persistence.

Smoothness
σ(Earnings)/ σ(Cash flows)
A lower ratio indicates more
smoothing of the earnings stream
relative to cash flows.
Timely loss recognition (TLR)
Earningst+1=α0+α1Dt+β0Rett
+β1DtRett +εt
where D = 1 if Ret < 0. Higher β1 is
greater TLR.
Benchmarks
∗ Kinks in earnings distribution
∗ Changes in earnings distribution
∗ Kinks in forecast error distribution
∗ String of positive earnings increases
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Exhibit 1, continued
Empirical proxy

Theory

Strengths and weakness

Accruals

Extreme accruals are low quality
because they represent a less
persistent component of earnings.

Pros: The measure gets directly at the role of an accruals-based accounting
system relative to a cash-flow based system.
Cons: The fundamental earnings process differs for firms with extreme
accruals versus less extreme accruals, which hinders interpretation.

Residuals from accrual models
represent management discretion or
estimation errors, both of which
reduce decision usefulness.

Pros: The measure attempts to isolate the managed or error component of
accruals. The use of these models has become the accepted methodology in
accounting to capture discretion.
Cons: Tests of the determinants/consequences of earnings management are
joint tests of the theory and the abnormal accrual metric as a proxy for
earnings management. Correlated omitted variables associated with
fundamentals, especially performance, are of utmost concern given the
dependence of normal accruals on fundamentals and the endogeneity of the
hypothesized determinants/consequences with the fundamentals.

Investors respond to information
that has value implications. A
higher correlation with value
implies that earnings better reflect
the fundamental earnings process.

Pros: The measure directly links earnings to decision usefulness, which is
quality, albeit specifically in the context of equity valuation decisions.
Cons: Assumes market efficiency. In addition, inferences are impaired by
correlated omitted variables that affect investor reaction (including
endogenously determined availability of other information), measurement
error of unexpected earnings, and cross-sectional variation in returngenerating processes.

Accruals= Earningst - CFt
Accruals=Δ(noncash working capital)
Accruals= Δ(net operating assets)
Specific accrual components
Residuals from accrual models
Error term from regressing accruals
on their economic drivers
(See Exhibit 2)

ERCs
Rett+1= α+β(EarningsSurpriset)+εt
More informative components of
earnings will have a higher β. More
value relevant earnings will have a
higher R2.
External indicators of
financial reporting quality
∗ AAERs identified by SEC
∗ Restatements
∗ SOX reports of internal control
deficiencies

Firms had errors (AAERs and
restatement firms) or are likely to
have had errors (internal control
deficiencies) in their financial
reporting systems, which imply low
quality.

Pros: Unambiguously reflect accounting measurement problems (low Type I
error rate). The researcher does not have to use a model to identify low
quality firms.
Cons: For AAERs: small sample sizes, selection issues, and matching
problems due to type II error rate. For restatements and SOX firms: problems
with distinguishing intentional from unintentional errors or ambiguities in
accounting rules that lead to errors.
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Exhibit 2: Summary of widely used models of accruals
This table summarizes commonly used models to estimate normal levels of accruals. Residuals from the model are used as a measure of “abnormal” accruals.
Accrual model

Theory

Notes

Accruals are a function of revenue growth and
depreciation is a function of PPE. All variables are
scaled by total assets.

Correlation or error with firm performance can bias
tests.

Jones (1991) model
Acct=α+β1ÌRevt+β2PPEt+εt

Modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995)
Acct=α+β1(ÌRevt - ÌRect) +β2PPEt+εt

Adjusts Jones model to exclude growth in credit sales in
years identified as manipulation years.

R2 around 12%. Residual is correlated with accruals,
earnings and cash flow.

Performance matched (Kothari, Leone, and Wasley, 2005)
DisAcct - Matched firm’s DisAcct

Matches firm-year observation with another from the
same industry and year with the closest ROA.
Discretionary accruals are from the Jones-model (or
Modified Jones model).

Can reduce power of test. Apply only when
performance is an issue.

Accruals are modeled as a function of past, present, and
future cash flows given their purpose to alter the timing
of cash flow recognition in earnings.

σ(εt) or absolute εt proxies for accrual quality as an
unsigned measure of extent of accrual “errors.”

Dechow and Dichev (2002) approach

ÌWC =α+β1CFOt-1+β2CFOt+
β3CFOt+1+εt

Discretionary estimation errors (Francis, LaFond, Olsson, Schipper, 2005)
TCAt=α+β1CFOt-1+ β2CFOt +
β3CFOt+1+β4ÌRevt+β5PPEt+εt
σ(εt)=α+λ1Sizet+λ2σ(CFO)t+λ3σ(Rev)t+
λ4log(OperCycle)t+λ5Losst+νt

Decomposes the standard deviation of the residual from
the accruals model into an innate component that reflects
the firm’s operating environment and a discretionary
component (νt) that reflects managerial choice.
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Innate estimation errors are the predicted component
from σ(ε)t regression.

